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‘ State Security’ and ‘Human Security’ in Conflict and Post-conflict Societies Mandy Turner Department of Peace Studies University of Bradford. Problematising ‘security’. Not a neutral concept: ‘security’ for whom?
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‘State Security’ and ‘HumanSecurity’ in Conflict and Post-conflict Societies Mandy Turner Department of Peace Studies University of Bradford
Problematising ‘security’ • Not a neutral concept: ‘security’ for whom? • Focus on struggles for statehood/recognition: Kosovo, Timor-Leste (East Timor), Bosnia-Herzegovina, Palestine. • Widening of concept of ‘security’ out from merely ‘state security’ to include ‘human security’.
Problematising ‘security’ • State building process split into 3 phases: • Period of non-recognition/armed struggle • Process of recognition/peace process. • Initial period of recognition/peacebuilding Each phase faces different security challenges. We need to ask the same question in all 3 phases: security for whom?
Period of non-recognition/armed struggle • Tension between right to self-determination enshrined in Article 1 of UN Charter & right to state sovereignty enshrined in Article 2 of UN Charter (prohibits challenges to the ‘territorial integrity’ or ‘domestic jurisdiction’ of sovereign states. • Struggle for recognition challenges state sovereignty of the occupier/central state.
Period of non-recognition/armed struggle • ‘Security’ in this phase = security of the occupier/centralstate. • ‘Human security’ of unrecognised people threatened by occupier/central state, particularly in phase of struggle if O/CT uses military force and refuses to negotiate.
Period of non-recognition/armed struggle • Security of unrecognised people in this period dependent upon a peace process and UN (or regional security organisation e.g. NATO) peacekeeping force. • Direct appeals to UN and other security organisations common method: • Arafat speech at UN 1974; • Kosovo Liberation Army/NATO.
Period of non-recognition/armed struggle • Veto power of 5 Permanent Members of UN Security Council (US, UK, France, Russia & China). Security interests of Great Powers centre stage. • ‘Right’ to self-determination not a ‘right’ but dependent on other key factors: • Support of a powerful patron. • Does not challenge political/strategic interests of one of the P5. UN powerless if it does.
Security in the period of recognition • Coherent and legitimate peace process with involvement of all parties: • Problem of ‘spoilers’ i.e. parties who seek to undermine it: • Actors ‘inside’ the peace process? • Actors ‘outside’ the peace process? • International actors (‘custodians of the peace’) need to ensure security of weaker party and balance asymmetry.
Security in the period of recognition • Bosnia-Herzegovina • Dayton Peace Accords/UN SC Resolution 1035 (1995) • Withdrawal of Serbian forces ensured by UNPROFOR (replaced by NATO, then EU forces). • UNMIBH and Office of High Representative (international supervision).
Security in the period of recognition • Kosovo • No UN SC mandate, NATO intervention • UN SC Resolution 1244 (1999) • Serbian forces withdrawal ensured by KFOR (NATO) • UNMIK (transitional administration).
Security in the period of recognition • Timor-Leste • 1999 vote for independence • UN SC Resolution 1264 (1999) • INTERFET (Australian-led) • UNTAET (transitional administration)
Security in the period of recognition • Palestine • Oslo Peace Accords (1993); Oslo II (1995) • Israeli withdrawal not overseen by a UN or regional security force • Creation of Palestinian Authority (interim self-rule). • Oslo about ensuring ‘security’ for Israel?
Security in ‘post’-conflict period ‘Freedom from fear’ • Demilitarisation of society • Nascent state needs monopoly over legitimate use of force. • Pacify other sources of physical force, e.g. militias and freedom fighters. • DDR and security sector reform. • Development of ‘rule of law’
Security in ‘post’-conflict period Freedom from want • Post-conflict reconstruction • Humanitarian assistance & IDP resettlement • Infrastructure repaired/built • Development and state-building • Stimulating the economy & creating jobs • Building state institutions, civil society and political participation.
Comparison of case studies: Bosnia • State security: • borders & independence assured by internationals. • Bonn Powers: OHR. • Human security: • freedom from fear: Demilitarisation, SSR. ICTFY. EU ‘Stability Pact’. Problems: organised crime, Republika Srpska, reform fragmented. Ethnic nationalism strong. • Freedom from want: huge PCR programme; development problematic - high unemployment, low economic growth; state-building - still divided into 2: FBiH/ RS; still under international supervision.
Comparison of case studies: Kosovo • State security: • borders & independence ensured by NATO. • Feb 2008 Declaration of independence. Recognised by 3 out of 5 P5; problem of Serbia. • Human security: • freedom from fear: establishing military, ICTFY, EU Rule of Law Mission, EU Stability Pact. Problems: organised crime, North Kosovo (Serb). Ethnic divisions widened. • freedom from want: one of poorest countries in Europe, 40-50% unemployment despite huge international aid. State-building: weak institutional capacity.
Comparison of case studies: Timor-Leste • State security • Borders and independence: INTERFET now UNMIT. • Independence May 2002. Attempted assassination of Pres. Ramos Horta, Feb 2008. • Human Security • Freedom from fear: SSR & justice weak: April 2006 riots; tension between UN and TL police. • Freedom from want: Initial large sums of money but continuing prob of poverty & unemployment. State-building: corruption & poor financial transparency. Too rapid withdrawal of international assistance?
Comparison of case studies: Palestine • State security • Borders and independence: left out of Oslo. Areas A, B and C. PA a quasi-state: no sovereignty. • Oslo forbids national army; IDF dominant. • Human security • Freedom from fear: SSR. Probs: militia rivalry, IDF. • Freedom from want: huge international aid flows, but poverty and unemployment: closure system. State-building: governance reforms after 2002. Problems: PA split; ban on Hamas.
Timor-Leste: sound familiar? • Annexed by Indonesia in 1975 after Portuguese decolonisation. • Cold War dynamics - resolution impossible: US support for Indonesia. • 24 year armed struggle. 1 umbrella organisation: CNRT; dominated by one party: Fretilin. • End of Cold War: end of US support for Indonesia. • 1999 vote for independence. Violence from Indonesian troops and pro-Indonesia militias.
Timor-Leste: sound familiar? • 1999. 70% of infrastructure destroyed by Indonesian forces and militias. 300,000 displaced. • Challenge = rebuild infrastructure, strengthen administration and create jobs. • Reform of justice sector and institution building key focus of international involvement. • Need to address the ‘youth crisis’. • Agriculture dominates economy, undeveloped private sector, govt spending main source of economic growth.
The differences... • Palestine not post-conflict. Palestine economy under occupation: fragmentation of territory. Demise of 2-state solution? Aid money flowing into bottomless pit. • Le More ‘killing with kindness’. “The US decides, the World Bank leads, the EU pays, the UN feeds.” • Difference: Timor-Leste: oil and gas wealth. How to utilise. Security issues are internal – no powerful domineering neighbour. Israel: the ‘elephant in the corner’.
Israel’s ‘security’ = Palestine’s insecurity • Strong ‘security’ discourse for actions: • military spending is the second highest in the world at US$1737 per capita in 2008. • ‘revolving door’ between IDF and politics. • Human security: cost of occupation financial/social? • State security: protection of borders, territory and Jewish character of state.
Israel’s ‘security’ = Palestine’s insecurity • Actions in West Bank – a ‘resource conflict’ - land and water grab. • Settlements = illegal extra-territorial communities. How to remove?? • De facto implementation of Allon Plan? • Gaza: destroy Hamas, divide Palestinian national movement, make Gaza Egyptian problem. • Security of ‘Eretz Israel’.
Palestine’s insecurity = Israel’s ‘security’ • Preserving Jewish character of state? • Demographic challenges: 20% of Israeli population = Palestinians. Lieberman: expulsion. • Right of return for Jews but not Palestinian refugees. • Demise of 2-state solution? Belligerent occupation over West Bank and Gaza: Palestinians and Israeli populations @ equal.
Common problems in ‘post’-conflict societies • Destroyed infrastructure. Return of displaced peoples. • Weak & ‘war’ economies. Problem of (re)building private sector. Unemployment. • State-building, problems of capacity, corruption, democratisation. • Militias: demobilise?; SSR. Rule of law
A ‘checklist’ for security and stability • Security (freedom from fear) • Wealth and welfare (freedom from want) • Representation + legitimacy (‘social contract’, democracy) • Sovereignty. Right to self-determination/ self-rule.