The Chinese Revolution and the Korean War

1. The Chinese Revolution and the Korean War Kevin J. Benoy

2. WW2 Ends • Just as the end of the world called into question the future geopolitical situation in Europe, Asia was also in a state of flux after Japan collapsed. • In Asia the preponderant military power was America – so initially it appeared that American interests would come out on top.

3. WW2 Ends • Neither of the new super-powers considered the possibility of a Communist China. • Stalin seemed committed to accommodation with Chiang Kai Shek’s (Jiang Zhongzheng in Mandarin) Kuomintang (Guomindang). As Stalin’s biographer, Isaac Deutscher notes, Stalin was: “contemptuous of partisans, sceptical of the chances of communism in China, and distrustful of any revolution asserting itself without his fiat and beyond the range of his military power. • The Americans also underestimated Mao’s partisans and were confident Chiang would become the policeman of the Far East – in cooperation with the USA.

4. Mao’s CCP (Chinese Communist Party) • Mao was more confident in his own forces than was his Soviet sponsor. • He understood better than anyone outside China that KMT (GMD) power rested on a fragile base.

5. Mao’s CCP • During WW2 the Communists waged a reasonably effective guerilla war against the Japanese. • They were seen as Chinese patriots willing to continue the struggle even behind Japanese lines. • The KMT were seen as ineffective. Chiang seemed to place more importance on conserving his forces to use later, against the communists, than risk them against the Japanese prior to Japan’s invasion in 1937.

6. Mao’s CCP • In 1937 the CCP (Chinese Communist Party) had 5 secure base areas with a population of 12 million people. • In 1945 there were 19 base areas with 100 million people.

7. The Kuomintang • KMT government was ineffective. • Corruption was rife. Officials were as likely as not to be lining their own pockets and those of their landowning friends with whatever could be skimmed from foreign aid or from national production. • Little or nothing was done for the rural peasantry, making up the bulk of China’s population.

8. The Kuomintang • Peasants remembered that Chiang tolerated food profiteering during the 1930’s – a time of rural famine. • Peasants also faced high taxes and forced labour when many landlords conspicuously displayed their wealth.

9. The Kuomintang • Laws intended to prevent child labour were not enforced. • Factory inspectors were openly bribed, yet nothing was done to stop the practice because Chiang was afraid of alienating his industrialist backers.

10. The Communists • Compared to the KMT, the Communists appeared paragons of virtue. • Land reform took place in Communist areas; all, including the poorest peasants, received some land. • Corruption was not tolerated by the thoroughly dedicated CCP leadership.

11. War’s End • At the end of the war American and Soviet forces ensured their clients, Chiang and Mao, moved in to replace the defeated Japanese in occupied territories. • Manchuria fell into Communist hands (though Stalin saw this as temporary – giving him a bargaining chip). • To the South Chiang’s KMT took control. • In both cases, Chinese forces inherited the weapon stocks of the defeated Japanese.

12. War’s End • As Soviet troops withdrew from Manchuria, they took with them about $200 million in industrial machinery. • When Chiang’s troops finally entered the northern province, they were in a difficult situation. • They could only assert control in the cities. • Like the Japanese before them, they faced a hostile population…and their supply lines ran through hostile territory.

13. War’s End • Attempts to reconcile the KMT and CCP by US General George C. Marshall seemed to help as a compromise settlement was worked out in early 1946. • However, nationalist (KMT) generals, fearing loss of power in a reconstructed national army, and CCP elements opposing expanded KMT influence in Manchuria, sank the deal. • Marshall called for an embargo on arms shipments to China – but to no avail. • He left China blaming both sides as civil war raged.

14. Civil War • Chiang had strong support in the USA – the China Lobby – business interests and missionary groups opposed to communism. • Truman’s policies elsewhere had stirred up strong anti-communist feelings – now the administration was a prisoner of the great fear. • Pressure to resume aid to Chiang grew stronger.

15. Civil War • At first the KMT enjoyed some success in N. China and Manchuria, taking many of the cities from the communists. • However, economic trouble caused by the high cost of paying for the war undermined Chiang’s efforts.

16. Civil War • Inefficiency and corruption, along with high inflation, could not be countered by even large-scale US aid – about $900 million worth of military equipment was sold to Chiang for about 20% of its real cost. • Civilian and military morale suffered.

17. Civil War • Financial matters in CCP controlled rural areas were of less consequence, as most lived outside the cash economy. • Communist morale remained high.

18. Civil War • In January, 1947 communist forces began an offensive that captured ½ of KMT territory in Manchuria. • Mass KMT desertions followed and much equipment fell into CCP hands.

19. Civil War • Other Communist forces advanced in Central China. • In 1948, decisive Communist victories occurred in North China. • Each CCP victory sapped KMT strength and undermined KMT morale.

20. Civil War • In a key battle for Hsuchow, total air superiority and superior armour could not overcome inept KMT leadership. • By January, surrounded KMT forces numbering 500,000 men surrendered with all of their equipment.

21. Civil War • In 1949 Chiang resigned and was replaced by General Li – but the situation was hopeless. • Nanking, Hankow and Shanghai fell. • By the end of 1949 only Hainan, Taiwan and some small islands were in KMT hands.

22. Civil War • The KMT government re-established itself on Taiwan – taking with it as much of China’s wealth as possible, including most of the national gold reserves and much treasure from mainland museums. • Chiang came out of retirement to head what was left of Nationalist China. • America was shocked that $35 billion in aid were not enough to give Chiang victory in the civil war.

23. Communist Victory • Mao now had the mammoth task of re-building a war-torn mainland China. • He began talks with Stalin (who he did not trust), hoping to receive aid. • For his part, Stalin wanted to exploit the unexpected communist windfall, while realizing that Mao’s victory also presented the Soviets with problems.

24. Communist Victory • It was clear that Mao would expect Stalin to give up some of his Manchurian booty. • Ideological differences between the two leaders were vast, despite their common Marxist rhetoric. • Stalin was a European proletarian communist, whereas Mao was an Asian communist with his roots planted firmly in the rural peasantry.

25. Communist Victory • After 3 hard months of negotiations in secret talks, a deal was finally reached. • On February 14, 1950 a formal alliance was signed. • Stalin promised to return what his forces took from Manchuria. • The Manchurian railway would be returned to China not later than the end of 1952. • Port Arthur was returned (though Dairen remained in Soviet hands). • Generous development aid was promised – though only $300 million was ever delivered. • Stalin wanted to avoid having another breakaway Communist country – like Jugoslavia. He needed any help he could get at a time of increasing friction between the USSR and the capitalist West.

26. America’s Response • Communism’s terrific success in Asia shook US leadership. • Though the Truman Doctrine spoke forcefully of containing communism, it was felt that more was needed. • In early 1950 the National Security Council began work on a secret document (declassified in 1975), known as NSC-68, which would form the basis of US policy for the next 20 years. • America was committed to massive re-armament – to the tune of $50-60 billion in spending per year.

27. America’s Response • The premise of the document was that the US and USSR were locked in a struggle of ideologies which “...inescapably confronts the slave society with the free... To that end Soviet efforts are now directed toward the domination of the Eurasian land mass.”

28. America’s Response • Secretary of State Dean Acheson overruled the opposition of two key State Department experts on Russia, George Kennan and Charles Bohlen, who felt Stalin had no master plan for world conquest. • Acheson felt it necessary for the USA to launch a world-wide offensive to gain the initiative in the Cold War. • Events of 1950 were sufficient to convince Truman that Acheson was right.

29. Korea • At the end of hostilities in 1945, Korea was divided into two zones of occupation at the 38th Parallel to facilitate the surrender of Japanese forces. • The United Nations called for free elections in the entire country to determine a post-war government. • No agreement was reached on a formula suitable for both occupying powers.

30. Korea • Frustrated by Communist intransigence, the UN supervised elections in the South in 1948. • The result was the establishment of the Republic of Korea (ROK), under President Syngman Rhee.

31. Korea • In the North, the Soviets installed their own protégé – Kim Il Sung – in the new Democratic People’s Republic of Korea a month later. • When American And Soviet troops pulled out of Korea in 1949, they left two mutually antagonistic regimes in Seoul and Pyongyang – with two leaders claiming to be the legitimate leader of the whole country.

32. Korea • Both rulers were authoritarian. • Kim Il Sung adopted the traditional communist methods of dealing with the opposition. • Syngman Rhee also disregarded constitutional rights to the point where the US State Department registered a protest of his actions in early 1950.

33. The Korean War • On June 7, 1950, North Korean troops invaded the South – attempting to take advantage of the political instability resulting from Rhee’s debacle in the May elections – he won only 48 or 168 seats, yet patched together a shaky coalition and continued to rule.

34. The Korean War • Encouraged by Acheson and MacArthur’s comments that Korea stood outside the American defense perimeter, Kim (and his Soviet protector, Stalin) must have believed that the US would not act.

35. The Korean War • At first the N. Koreans defeated the hapless and disorganized forces of the South. • President Truman cut short a visit to Missouri to return to Washington. • He and Acheson was convinced this was part of a Russian-directed plot to spread communism. • Their response, however, was measured.

36. The Korean War • General MacArthur was ordered to sent supplies from Japan to the South Koreans. • Fearing Mao might strike against Taiwan, the US 7th Fleet sailed between the island and the mainland. • At the UN, the USA introduced a resolution in the Security Council branding N. Korea an aggressor and calling for a return to pre-war positions.

37. The Korean War • The Soviets were boycotting the UN in protest against Red China’s exclusion from the organization. • As a result, the motion passed 9-0, with just Jugoslavia abstaining, and no chance of a Soviet veto. • Two days later, with S. Korean forces collapsing, US air and naval forces committed to the war.

38. The Korean War • On the same day, June 27, another Security Council resolution was passed, calling for UN help for S. Korea. • This passed 7-1, with Jugoslavia opposing and India and Egypt abstaining.

39. The Korean War • 15 countries committed troops – Australia, Britain, Canada, New Zealand, Nationalist China, France, Netherlands, Belgium, Colombia, Greece, Turkey, Panama, the Philippines, Thailand, and the United States. • All fell under the command of US General Douglas MacArthur. • Officially a UN operation, it was clear that the major contributor, the US, called the shots.

40. The Korean War • International support saved the South. • Reinforcements poured into the still unoccupied Pusan Perimeter. • In a dramatic counter-attack, MacArthur reversed the fortunes of war. • The Inchon landing, near Seoul, and a couple of hundred miles to the rear of the battle-front, resulted in a stunning defeat for the North Koreans.

41. The Korean War • Soon the North Koreans were in a disorganized retreat. • In two weeks, communist forces were pushed out of the South. • Truman ordered the UN to push beyond the 38th parallel – fully intending to bring about unification by eliminating Kim’s communist government in the North.

42. The Korean War • Communist China’s Zhou Enlai warned the Americans that crossing the 38th Parallel might bring China into the war. • The Americans thought it a bluff. • Confident that their nuclear superiority would keep Stalin out of the conflict and convinced Mao’s army was incapable of effective fighting, the US could not imagine a communist response.

43. The Korean War • With the US 7th fleet poised against it in the South China Sea, American forces approaching the Manchurian border and Chiang Kai Shek calling for his foces to be unleashed on the mainland to roll back communism, the Chinese communists took the initiative.

44. The Korean War • The war almost grew on October 9, when two US F-80 jets attacked a Soviet airfield near Vladivostok. • Stalin protested, the US apologized, and no further action was taken.

45. The Korean War • In November, 300,000 Chinese “volunteers” crossed the border, pushing UN forces out of North Korea by mid-January, 1951. • MacArthur talked of attacking Manchuria and using atomic bombs if necessary.

46. The Korean War • Truman countermanded MacArthur’s orders to bomb Chinese troops and supplies in Manchuria. • Fearing his commander might spark a 3rd World War, Truman dismissed MacArthur on April 11, 1951.

47. The Korean War • The war settled into a long and hard-fought stalemate. • More and more lives were lost as two years of negotiations at Panmunjon continued. • Finally, a compromise was reached in July, 1953. • The border was returned, more, or less to the 38th parallel – modified to follow local landforms.

48. Results of the War • Korea was devastated. • 4 million were killed and 5 million left homeless. • The division of the country seemed permanent. • Cease-fire violations have continued regularly to the present.

49. Results of the War • The Soviet Union never again boycotted the UN. • Likewise, other Security Council members learned a valuable lesson. • Their use of the veto effectively blocked any further use of collective security in the Cold War period.

50. Results of the War • Turning the Cold War hot over Korea intensified the international conflict. • Both sides distrusted each other more than ever. • For the US, North Korean aggression and the Chinese intervention confirmed the beliefs of the authors of NSC-68 that the USSR was using client states to further communist expansion.