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2. State responsability

Information and documentation Center on NATO in Moldova Non-proliferation of MDA: threats, mechanisms and solutions Chisinau, Moldova, April 18. Moldovan legal, technical and human resources capabilities to combat Nuclear and radioactive materials proliferation Dr.h . A.BUZDUGAN , director

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2. State responsability

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  1. Information and documentation Center on NATO in MoldovaNon-proliferation of MDA: threats, mechanisms and solutionsChisinau, Moldova, April 18 Moldovan legal, technical and human resources capabilities to combat Nuclear and radioactive materials proliferation Dr.h. A.BUZDUGAN, director NATIONAL AGENCY FOR REGULATION OF NUCLEAR AND RADIOLOGICAL ACTIVITY

  2. 2. State responsability • Establishing • Implementing • Maintaining • Sustaining of nuclear security regime, aplicable to: nuclear materials & other radioactive materials whether it is under or out of regulatory control, and to associated facilities & associated activities throughout their lifetime under a state’s jurisdiction

  3. 3. Repercussions of the nuclear and radioactive terrorism on non-nuclear countries • No State, regardless of the status of its nuclear/non-nuclear, cannot be sure that the threats and risks of proliferation will not be applied in its territory. • The Republic of Moldova is not an except, confirmed, unfortumately, by 2 events of illicit trafficking of NM with LEU (2010) and HEU (2011) (see next slide) - origin of NM were Transnistria region). • These cases were mentioned in the Global Security Newswire (September, 27, 2011) and in the speech of IAEA Director General, Dr. Y.Amano, addressed at Seoul Security Summit of 21 March 2012. • 2 above mentioned illicit traffics with NM, Bulgaria NM illicit traffic case (1999, origin of the NM being in the same Transnistria region), concludes that the territory of Moldova were selected by the non-state actors as a illicit transit corridor for NM.

  4. 4. Detection of nuclear security events • 4 cases of radioactive contamination at the Ribnitsa Metallurgical Plant (non-controlled Transnistria region) results with 295 tonn of contaminated metal by Co-60 and 500 tonn of dust contaminated by Cs-137,

  5. 5.Tentative of illicit traffic of Highly Enriched Uranium Shielding container is made of lead with about of 10 mm thickness, lined on the inside with yellow paraffin or wax. The wax coatingforms a central channel with about18 mm diameter. Inside of the channel there is a glass ampoule with thick walls about 63 mm long, about 13 mm diameter and an internal volume about 5-7 ml. Inside the glass ampoule contained a powder of dark gray color, almost black – is assumed to be uranium oxide powder. Estimated mass of material is about 4-5 g.

  6. 6. HEU (Illicit trafic case from Moldova)

  7. 7. MAJOR RISKS ON NATIONAL SECURITY Approved (Law 112/22 May 2008) National Security Concept of Moldova among the major risks, reiterated: • separatist regime – on the left bank of the Nistru river, • international terrorism, • consequences derived from human activity , • organized crime and corruption. All these risks may by liaisons with unauthorized possess or use of NRM

  8. 8. Identification and definition of nuclear security regime State designate competent authorities responsible for nuclear security regime: • Regulatory body: NARNRA • Border control (First Line Officers) a) Border Police b) Custom Service. • Law enforcement: a) Ministry of Interior b) Intelligent Service • Response measures: a) State Service on Civil Protection and Emergency Situations b) NARNRA (in case of incident).

  9. 9. Main legal regulatory nuclear framework • Law no. 132/8 June 2012 On safe deployment of nuclear and radiological activity • Laws no. 985/18.04.02 (Penal Code), no. 154/28.03.03 (Labor Code), no.115/22.05.05 art. II,no. 41/02.03.06, no. 335/16.11.06, no.235/20.06.06,no. 85/24.04.08,no. 20/21.02.08, no.36/28.02.08, no. 218/24.10.08 (Contravention Code),no. 10/03.02.09, no.111/18.12.09, no.142/14.07.11, no.80/12.04.12 • Parliament Decisions no. 1623/26.10.93, no. 1267/17.07.97, no. 1450/28.01.98, • Government Decisions: no. 961/21.08.06, no. 328/23.03.07, no. 1017/01.09.08, no. 1220/30.10.08, no. 212/13.03.09, no.388/26.06.09 • Departmental Decisions: MoH: Basic Radiation Protection Norms (NFRP-2000), NARNRA: no. 37/18.06.12

  10. 10. Main legal regulatory nuclear framework Law 132/08 June 2012 On safe deployment of nuclear and radiological activity Regulation functions of the NARNRA: • Authorization (it’s mean licensing); • Elaboration and approve of laws and norms in the fields of nuclear securityand physical protection… • Evidence/accounting of NRM; • State control and supervision of activity with NRM • Constrains for infringements… • Control of non-proliferation and of respects of international obligations…

  11. 11. NPT role • The Republic of Moldova fully recognizes the central role that the safeguards international systems of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has played in providing assurances for the peaceful nature of nuclear programs of States Parties. By being part (signing on 26 October 1993)) to the NPT, concluding a comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA and ratifying the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) our country has shown its permanent commitment to strengthening of the international NPT framework. • Recently, our country passed necessary step for entry in force of the Additional Protocol to Safeguard Agreement in connection with the NPT, as • On December 2011 it was signed in Vienna, by the Director of the National Agency for Regulation of Nuclear and Radiological Activities and IAEA Director General; • On 12 April 2012, it was ratified by the Parliament; • On 10 May, 2012 our President promulgate Law about it ratification. For more information we presents the general picture about memberships of the Republic of Moldova in more important international instruments liaisons, directly or indirectly, with non-proliferation

  12. 12. NPT role • The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is the most important multilateral instrument for the promotion of nuclear disarmament and prevention of nuclear proliferation, whereas sustaining the peaceful use of nuclear energy. • For that reason, the Republic of Moldova perceives the NPT as a key universal instrument for the maintenance of international peace and security that requires a comprehensive implementation.

  13. 13. NPT role • We means, that the NPT may be resume to the following 3 milestones • Nonproliferation of nuclear weapons • Nuclear Disarmament • Inalienable right of any country to develop and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes

  14. 14. NPT role Is refer de facto to: • Primo: to 5 states with has nuclear weapons and technology before signing of the NPT (France, China, Russian Federation (as successor of died URSS, United Kingdom and USA). • Secundo: to other country memberships of the NPT, which accept conditions about interdiction for procurements or proper development nuclear weapons. • Terto: to states, which confectioned and has, contrary any agreements, nuclear weapons (India, Israel, Pakistan, DPR of Korea), or, which has technology which permit to produce nuclear weapons in any time (Taiwan, Egypt, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Alger, Brasilia, Argentina, South Africa, Japan) From the last we would like to mentioned, as conclusion, that NPT is not an universal treaty, and there are not a efficient mechanism do regulate these

  15. 15. International obligations...

  16. 16...

  17. 17...

  18. 18. Lacks on domestic legal instruments with impact on nuclear and radiation activity There are no: • domestic strategy on nuclear security • regulation about physical protection • graded approach of physical protection levels, • domestic regulation about transportation of NRM; Are planned for 2013elaboration and approving of: Regulation for Physical protection, including cyber security requirements; National Strategy for Nuclear Security; National Strategy for management of nuclear and raioactive waste Review of regulations on authorisation, inspection, management of radioactive waste

  19. 19. Sustaining a nuclear security regime • Take part on multilateral treaties and their verification mechanisms; • Effective export control at national level, in good correlation to the international requirements; • Cooperation in frameworks of regional Programe or Global ThreatReduction Initiatives; • Prohibition of any illegal acquisition activity; • Use of economic and political levers; • Export-import control (Law & Regulation); • Autorization issuance (Law & Regulation); • Yearly inventory by stakeholders; • Categorization of radioactive sources • Inspection; • Safeguards and materials control & accountancy ;

  20. 20. Sustaining a nuclear security regime • Action Plan between the Moldovan Government and the USA (signed, 2011) on combating illicit traffics of NRM; • TACIS project withEC on combatting of illicit traficking of NRM. • Action Plan with IAEA Nuclear Security Office (INSSP) • Road Map with IAEA about implementation of the Additional Protocol requirements; • National and regional TC projects with IAEA; • By Nuclear Security Office of the IAEA were implemented the project on upgrade of nuclear security of our waste radioactive repository; • Technical assistance for domestic operators/authorities from the USA DoE and US NRC for upgrade Moldovan capacities – part of nuclear and radiological infrastructure; • Projects with UNICRI in the framework of the initiative of CoE. • Establish of Nuclear Security Support Center in Chisinau;

  21. 21. Detection equipment from mobile laboratory (EC donation)

  22. 22. Detection equipment from Sweden SSM donation

  23. 23.Bilateral agreement • NARNRA and Romanian National Commission for Control of Nuclear Activities; • NARNRA and ITU from Karlsruhe (Germany) • NARNRA and Sweden Radiation Safety Authority • Is ready to be signed Memorandum with the Radiation Protection Center from Lithuania

  24. 24.Domestic resources Memorandum of Cooperation between NARNRA and: • National Center of Public Health; • State Service on Civil Protection and Emergency Situations; • Custom Service; • Technical University from Moldova; • State Medicine and Pharmacy University “N.Testimitanu”; • NGO INOTEH.

  25. 25. US donation for border securing... • Leuseni - EU border crossing • Radiation Portal Monitoring Pedestrian RPM for Chisinau airport Associated hand held detection equipment and PRDs.

  26. 26. Planning for preparedness for, and response to a nuclear security event • According to elaborated and implemented Concept of Operation (ConOps), • NARNRA, • Custom Service (CSRM) • Civil Protection and Emergencies Situations Service (CPESS) joints their efforts to response in case of Nuclear/radiological Events

  27. 27. Framework for National Response Plan for Nuclear Security Events

  28. 28. NARNRA MEST • NARNRA Mobile Expert Support Teamconsists of technical experts (from NARNRA jointly with NCPH MoH, CAP MAFI) with experience in radiation detection and response measures.

  29. 29. NARNRA MEST: functions • MESTis responsible for the following: • Coordinating response when assistance is requested • Acting as a Focal Point for all notifications relating to nuclear security events • Provide technical assistance (both remote and in-situ) for identification and/or categorization of NRM detected by CSRM , if the results of secondary inspection are inconclusive, or otherwise assistance is requested related to assessment of an alarm. • Providing assistance in the implementation of the national response plan, in relation to nuclear security events generated by equipment alarm or information alert. • Obtaining detailed information regarding all nuclear security events, whereby assistance was requested.

  30. 30. OTHERCONTRIBUTED PROGRAMMES • Periodic courses/workshop organised by NARNRA • Participation on 8 Centers of Excellence projects launched by UNICRI and EC; • Participation on 2 STCU projects; • Participation on IAEA TC regional projects; • No CV on nuclear security teaching process: to be establishe; • No participation on other education networks liaisons with nuclear security – to be establishe

  31. 31. Events contributed to nuclear security establishes in Moldova in 2012 • IAEA TC for FLO (Custom Service), May, September, 2012; • NARNRA field exercises with new received equipment for detection of NRM, June, 2012; • IAEA workshop on implementation of Additional Protocol to Safeguard Agreement, July, 2012; • Domestic Training Course for stakeholders organized by NARNRA – June, 2012. • IAEA field exercises on response on radioactive incident (with joint efforts of NARNRA, Custom Service, Civil Protection and Emergency Situations), October, 2012; • ARW NATO on 1540 UN CS Resolution, October, 2012; • IAEA TC on Introduction on Nuclear Forensics, October, 2012; • SSM & NARNRA Workshop on Nuclear Security Issues for GUAM countries, November, 2012; • PSI WSH, November, 2012; • International nuclear security exercises At@mic 2012, Hagues, November, 2012; • Summer School “Global nuclear zero: political issues and related technical aspects” June, 11-16, Odessa, Ukraine

  32. 32. INSTEAD OF CONCLUSIONS... State nuclear security policy must contributeon establish efficient domestic structures and measures for prevention of, detection of, response to criminal or intentional unauthorized acts with NRM/facility. Horizontal interaction of involved state authorities and TSO is crucially for achieving high standards. But, indispensable elements of all indicate tasks (prevention, detection and response) are continuous education, maintenances and sustainability of human resources in the field. Recently established in TUM the National Nuclear Security Support Center may play an essential role in establish and maintenance of adequate nuclear security in Moldova.

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