Vietnam: Origins and Pacification

1. Vietnam: Origins andPacification Lsn 23

3. Road to War • 1941… Ho Chi Minh secretly returns to Vietnam after 30 years in exile and begins organizing Viet Minh. US works with Ho to harass Japanese and rescue downed US pilots • 1945… Allies divide Vietnam to aid in disarming Japanese (Chinese disarm north and British disarm south). Allies honor French request for restoration of its pre-war Indochina colonies (Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia) Ho Chi Minh

4. Road to War • Sept 1945… Ho unsuccessfully seeks US recognition • Oct 1945… French troops return to Vietnam; guerrilla fighting begins almost immediately • Dec 1946… First large scale Viet Minh assault on French French Far East Expeditionary Corps

5. Road to War • 1949… Mao defeats Chiang Kai-shek in China. US begins “containment” policy • 1950… US authorizes aid and advisors to French • 1954… Viet Minh defeat French at Dien Bien Phu. US does not intervene French paratroopers run for cover during the 55 day siege of Dien Bien Phu

6. Road to War • 21 July 1954… Geneva Accords divide Vietnam at 17th parallel. • 1955… Ngo Dinh Diem becomes president. Begins illegitimate and corrupt (but strongly anticommunist) rule. • 1956… Last French soldier leaves.

7. Road to War • 1959… Ho declares “Peoples’ War” to unite Vietnam. • 1961… President Kennedy sends 400 Green Berets to Vietnam • Oct 1961… Maxwell Taylor visits Vietnam and reports “If Vietnam goes it will be exceedingly difficult to hold Southeast Asia.” (domino theory) Recommends sending combat troops.

8. Road to War • 1963… Diem assassinated in US-backed coup • 1964… North Vietnamese patrol boats attack US destroyer in Gulf of Tonkin. US begins bombing • 2 Mar 1965… Operation Rolling Thunder begins • 8 Mar 1965… First US combat troops arrive. By the end of the year, 184,300 troops are in Vietnam. The massive bombing campaign was plagued by restricted targeting and the non-industrialized nature of North Vietnam

9. Lessons 22 and 23 • Key Players • Guerilla War • Pacification • The “Big War” • Domestic Issues • Legacy and Lessons

10. Key Players President Kennedy began US involvement in Vietnam using counterinsurgency techniques. When Kennedy was assassinated, Johnson became president and escalated US involvement. Nixon became president in 1968 promising “peace with honor.”

11. Key Players General Westmoreland commanded US forces in Vietnam from 1964 to 1968 Creighton Abrams succeeded Westmoreland US troop levels peaked in 1967 at nearly 500,000

12. Key Players General Vo Nguyen Giap led North Vietnamese military forces The Viet Cong soldier was tough, disciplined, and in it for the long haul Ho Chi Minh was the political leader of the Viet Minh

13. Key Players Vietnamese civilians were often caught in the middle of the fighting Journalists like Walter Cronkite did much to influence public opinion College students were among the most active war protesters

14. Guerilla War

15. Definitions • Insurgency-- An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict • Guerrilla warfare-- Military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy-held or hostile territory by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces.

16. Vulnerable population Leadership available for direction Lack of government control Popular support Unity of effort Will to resist Discipline Intelligence Propaganda Favorable environment External support Prerequisites and Other Conditions Required for or Conducive to an InsurgencyFM 90-8

17. Conditions in South Vietnam • Diem illegitimate and corrupt • Catholic in an overwhelmingly Buddhist society • Ignored Geneva Accords call for elections in 1956 • Nepotism • Succession of military coups resulted in a revolving door government Several Buddhist monks burned themselves alive to protest Diem’s religious oppression

18. Insurgent Leadership • Increasing North Vietnamese infiltration creates security threat in South Vietnam • In Dec 1960, the insurgents formed the National Liberation Front (typically called the Viet Cong or VC), a broad-based organization led by communists but designed to rally all those disaffected with Diem by promising sweeping reforms and genuine independence Flag of the National Liberation Front

19. Insurgent Leadership • The NLF skillfully combined political and military organizations and efforts • Politically they created special organizations to give status to such groups as farmers, women, and youth • Used agitation and propaganda (“agitprop”) to arouse the people to the government’s oppressiveness and lack of responsibility Protesters in Saigon to express their dissatisfaction with the Diem government.

20. Insurgent Leadership • Militarily they assembled a disciplined and potent force of an estimated 80,000 fighters by 1965 • Relied on speed, surprise, and deception to strike targets selected for the maximum psychological effect • Used violence to coerce or win over the population and undermine the legitimacy of the South Vietnamese government A hit and run Viet Cong attack in 1968 leaves a South Vietnamese soldier and civilian lead as children run for cover.

21. External Support • North Vietnam began constructing a massive supply route through Laos and Cambodia that allowed it to infiltrate supplies and personnel south • The Ho Chi Minh Trail • The Soviet Union and China provided equipment, advisors, and diplomatic support

22. Mao on Guerrilla Warfare • Mao wrote On Guerrilla Warfare in 1937 while in retreat after ten years of battling the Nationalist Chinese army of Chiang Kai-shek • In 1949, Mao defeated the Nationalist Chinese and validated his theories of revolutionary guerrilla warfare • Remember from Lesson 21 • The National Liberation Front would pattern much of its strategy and tactics after Mao

23. Phases of Development • Phase I: Latent and incipient insurgency. • Activity in this phase ranges from subversive activity that is only a potential threat to situations in which frequent subversive incidents and activities occur in an organized pattern. It involves no major outbreak of violence or uncontrolled insurgent activity. The guerrilla force does not conduct continuous operations but rather selected acts of terrorism. Viet Cong tactics included the use of punji sticks smeared with excrement to foster infection

24. Phases of Development • Phase II: Guerrilla warfare. • This phase is reached when the insurgent movement, having gained sufficient local or external support, initiates organized continuous guerrilla warfare or related forms of violence against the government. This is an attempt to force government forces into a defensive role. As the guerrilla becomes stronger, he begins to conduct larger operations. Scene of Viet Cong terrorist bombing in Saigon, 1965

25. Phases of Development • Phase III: War of movement. • When the guerrilla attains the force structure and capability to directly engage government forces in decisive combat, then he will progressively begin to use more conventional tactics and may obtain combat forces from an external source. He may also begin to conduct more extensive defensive operations in this phase to protect the areas he controls. VC planning an attack upon a South Vietnamese Regional Force post.

26. Pacification

27. Pacification • Between 1961 and 1963, President Kennedy launched a full-scale counterinsurgency program in Vietnam, part of which would become the “pacification” program • Major goals • Strengthen the South Vietnamese government’s hold on the peasantry • Cut into the heart of the Viet Cong politico-military organization • Designed to “win the hearts and minds” of the South Vietnamese In 1967, Robert Komer, shown here with President Johnson, was selected to head CORDS (Civil Operations and Rural Development Support)and coordinate all pacification programs

28. Pacification • Strategic Hamlet Program… South Vietnamese peasants from scattered villages were brought together in defended and organized hamlets in order to protect them, isolate the Viet Cong, and show the superiority of what the SVN government could offer • Patterned after British experience in Malaya • Did not work in Vietnam because of traditional Vietnamese ties to the land

29. Pacification • Combined Action Program… Placed selected Marine squads within the village militia to eliminate local guerrillas • Very successful at the local level but required a degree of American-Vietnamese cooperation unable to be replicated on a wider scale • Drew American troops away from the “big war” • Instead, American troops concentrated on the “big war”and left pacification to the South Vietnamese who did not show an abundance of commitment to the task

30. Pacification • Revolutionary Development Program… Put armed social workers into Vietnamese villages to begin grass roots civic improvement and eliminate the VC shadow government • Didn’t reach full potential because South Vietnamese government feared the consequences of real rural politicalization 25th Infantry Division soldiers support the Revolutionary Development Program by clearing the village of Rach Kien during Operation Lanakai

31. Pacification • Chieu hoi (opens arms) amnesty program… designed to persuade VC to change sides • When VC saw the program might bear fruit they unleashed a terrorist campaign that reduced defections from 5,000 to 500 a month • CORDS responded with Operation Phoenix, a direct action plan to kill, capture, or co-opt the “provincial reconnaissance units” These former VC who took advantage of the chieu hoi amnesty receive training in automotive repair to help them in their new lives

32. Pacification: Overall Assessment • Commonly considered a missed strategic opportunity • Suffered from being “too little, too late” • CORDS not activated until 1967 • Perceived as competition with the “big war” and many military officers favored a “military solution” Air Force Chief of Staff Curtis LeMay reportedly said, “Grab ‘em by the balls and their hearts and minds will follow.”

33. Limited War • When the Soviet Union and the US nuclear programs reached the point of Mutually Assured Destruction, the US faced the dilemma of responding to communist challenges in peripheral areas by either risking starting a nuclear war or doing nothing • The alternative strategy of limited war was developed to harness the nation’s military power and employ only that force necessary to achieve the political aim • The objective was not to destroy an opponent but to persuade him to break of the conflict short of achieving his goals and without resorting to nuclear war The US considered, but did not use, atomic bombs in support of the French at Dien Bien Phu in 1954

34. Limited War • The limited war theory was more an academic than a military concept and its application resulted in tensions, frustrations, and misunderstanding between the military and civilian leadership Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara is sharply criticized for his technocratic and statistical approach to the Vietnam War

35. Johnson’s Approach • The Johnson Administration was deeply influenced by limited war theory • Desirous not to let the conflict expand into a third world war • Imposed precise geographical limitations • Cambodia, etc • Kept military commanders in close check • “General, I have a lot riding on you. I hope you don’t pull a MacArthur on me.” (Johnson to Westmoreland, Feb 1966)

36. Strategy of Attrition • Traditionally, the “American way of war” had been a strategy of annihilation • Seeks the immediate destruction of the combat power of the enemy’s armed forces • In Vietnam, the US would instead follow a strategy of attrition • The reduction of the effectiveness of a force caused by loss of personnel and materiel • This proved to be a poor strategy against the North Vietnamese who used a strategy of exhaustion • The gradual erosion of a nation’s will or means to resist Anti-war protests such as this one at the 1968 Democratic National Convention showed domestic support for the war was waning

37. Problems with the Strategy of Attrition • Led the US to fight according to the theory of gradual escalation • A steady increase in the level of military pressure ( rather than employing overwhelming force all at once) would coerce the enemy into compliance • US never had enough forces to control the countryside • US soldiers served one year tours in Vietnam • North Vietnamese soldiers were there till the end and recognized “Victory will come to us, not suddenly, but in a complicated and tortuous way.” US soldiers regularly conducted clearing operations but the Viet Cong would reoccuppy the area after the US units moved on

38. 1959 760 1960 900 1961 3,205 1962 11,300 1963 16,300 1964 23,300 1965 184,300 1966 385,300 1967 485,600 1968 536,100 1969 475,200 1970 334,600 1971 156,800 1972 24,200 1973 50 US Troop Levels in Vietnam

39. Problems with the Strategy of Attrition • Led to a “body count” mentality • Many reports were exaggerated or falsified • North Vietnamese were always able to replace their losses while Americans became disillusioned with the mounting death toll • Nightly news broadcasts reported US deaths versus North Vietnamese deaths • If ours were less, we were winning! • North Vietnamese showed a remarkable capability to cope, rebuild, and repair • The enemy will was never broken Nightly news anchors such as Walter Cronkite regularly reported the Vietnam “body count”

40. Problems with the Strategy of Attrition • Low-tech nature of the enemy prevented the US from bringing to bear the full effects of its combat power • North Vietnamese infiltration routes were hard to bomb • North Vietnamese ground troops used the tactic of “clinging to the G.I.’s belts” to minimize American ability to use artillery and close air support • The nature of guerrilla war allowed the North Vietnamese to avoid contact when it was not to their advantage to fight A long line of communist porters carry supplies along the Ho Chi Minh Trail. (AP photo by Trong Thanh)

41. Other Manifestations of Limited War Theory • “Gradual escalation” • President never fully acceded to the troop or bombing requests of his commanders but the process resulted in the failure of one level of force justifying the increase to the next level • Restrictive rules of engagement • Bombing pauses and negotiations • Failure to significantly mobilize the National Guard

42. Total War vs Limited War • The relationship between the belligerents is asymmetric. The insurgents can pose no direct threat to the survival of the external power because . . . they lack an invasion capability. On the other hand, the metropolitan power poses not simply the threat of invasion, but the reality of occupation. This fact is so obvious that its implications have been ignored. It means, crudely speaking, that for the insurgents the war is “total,” while for the external power it is necessarily “limited.” Full mobilization of the total military resources of the external power is simply not politically possible. . . . Not only is full mobilization impossible politically, it is not thought to be in the least necessary. The asymmetry in conventional military capability is so great and the confidence that military might will prevail is so pervasive that expectation of victory is one of the hallmarks of the initial endeavor. • Jeffrey Record, “Why the Strong Lose”

43. Total War vs Limited War • Superior strength of commitment thus compensates for military inferiority. Because the outcome of the war can never be as important to the outside power as it is to those who have staked their very existence on victory, the weaker side fights harder, displaying a willingness to incur blood losses that would be unacceptable to the stronger side. The signers of the Declaration of Independence risked their lives, fortunes, and sacred honor in what became a contest with an imperial giant for which North America was (after 1778) a secondary theater of operations in a much larger war. For the American rebel leadership, defeat meant the hangman's noose. For British commanders in North America, it meant a return to the comforts and pleasures of London society and perhaps eventual reassignment. • Jeffrey Record, “Why the Strong Lose”

44. Total War vs Limited War • The tables were reversed in Vietnam. There, the United States attempted to suppress a revolution against foreign domination mounted by an enemy waging a total war against a stronger power, a power for which the outcome of that war could never be remotely as important as it was to the insurgents. The United States could and did wreak enormous destruction in Vietnam, but nothing that happened in Vietnam could or did threaten core overseas US security interests, much less the survival of the United States. Thus, whereas the Vietnamese communists invested all their energy and available resources in waging war, US annual defense spending during the war averaged only 7.5 percent of the nation’s gross national product. • Jeffrey Record, “Why the Strong Lose”

45. Total War vs Limited War • “The ability of the Vietcong continuously to rebuild their units and make good their losses is one of the mysteries of this guerrilla war. We still find no plausible explanation for the continued strength of the Vietcong. . . . [They] have the recuperative power of the phoenix [and] an amazing ability to maintain morale.” (Maxwell Taylor) • “I never thought [the war] would go like this. I didn’t think these people had the capacity to fight this way. If I had thought they could take this punishment and fight this well, could enjoy fighting like this, I would have thought differently at the start.” (Robert McNamara) • “Hanoi’s persistence was incredible. I don’t understand it, even to this day.” (Dean Rusk) • The US leadership “underestimated the toughness of the Vietnamese.” (William Westmoreland) • Jeffrey Record, “Why the Strong Lose”

46. Flexible Response • President Kennedy moved away from the Eisenhower Administration’s reliance on nuclear weapons and developed a strategy of “Flexible Response” which was designed to permit different types of military options at different levels • Very interested in counterinsurgency and initiates the Special Forces • Between 1961 and 1963 Kennedy launched a full-scale counterinsurgency program in Vietnam

47. Counterinsurgency • Provided equipment and advisors to South Vietnamese • Special Forces conducted civic action programs • US helicopter pilots transported South Vietnamese soldiers • Advisors accompanied South Vietnamese units down to the battalion level Special Forces were active in training montagnards in the Central Highlands

48. Counterinsurgency • Overall the counterinsurgency program failed • The US military refused to embrace counterinsurgency and instead stuck to traditional warfighting • Insisted on using technology and tactics that were inappropriate for the environment and the nature of the war • North Vietnamese became very adept at countering US conventional tactics B-52 bomber over Vietnam

49. Next • Vietnam: The Big War and the Vietnam Syndrome