APS Beamline Safety Coordinators Meeting

1. APS Beamline Safety Coordinators Meeting Tom Barkalow PSC ESH/QA Coordinator August 6, 2013

2. Topics • Stepper Motor Driver Unit Hazardous Voltage to Ground Issue • Work Planning & Control Documents • General Discussion APS Beamline Safety Coordinators Meeting 8-7-13

3. Hazardous Voltage to Ground Issue • Background • AC Powered Stepper Motor Driver Units Involved • Two Solutions • Information Needed from Beamlines • Time Frame for Solution Implementation APS Beamline Safety Coordinators Meeting 8-7-13

4. Background • Electrical shock occurred on December 20, 2012 • Traced to damaged wiring insulation inside ungrounded ELCO type connector • PSC Safety Notice issued January 15, 2013 • Later measured hazardous voltage to ground present on AC powered driver units APS Beamline Safety Coordinators Meeting 8-7-13

5. Background Cont’d • Survey taken in Late February and early March 2013 of driver units in use on beamlines • Identified over 5100 units in use of which about 460 are AC powered units of concern • 17 sectors identified as having AC powered units of concern; mostly APS operated • Several models of AC powered driver units have this issue • Compensatory measure taken of labeling problem AC driver units and their cables between the driver units and their stepper motors APS Beamline Safety Coordinators Meeting 8-7-13

6. AC Powered Driver Unit Models Involved • All Kohzu AC powered models • All Oriental Motors (Vextra) AC powered models • Parker Aries ACR, RAM, & Zeta Series • Industrial Devices Next Step models • Compumotor OEMZL4 & S6 series • Bodine 120 V Stepper model (not in use) APS Beamline Safety Coordinators Meeting 8-7-13

7. Sectors Involved with Number of Driver Units APS Beamline Safety Coordinators Meeting 8-7-13

8. Source of Hazardous Voltage • 120 VAC distribution system has delta-wye transformers with the secondary neutral winding grounded • Driver units are pulsing the DC voltage being delivered to the stepper motors, but the pulsing is overlaid on an AC voltage level with a 60 hertz cycle • Need to eliminate the 60 hertz AC voltage APS Beamline Safety Coordinators Meeting 8-7-13

9. Two Solutions • Replace AC powered driver unit with a DC powered driver unit • Install an AC-AC isolation transformer in the power feed to AC powered driver unit APS Beamline Safety Coordinators Meeting 8-7-13

10. Solution 1: Replace with DC Powered Driver Unit • Removes AC input concern • Simply swap out driver unit • May require adding a DC power supply (need information from beamlines to determine power requirements for any new DC power supplies) • Beamline staff need to evaluate whether stepper motor performance would be adequate with a DC powered driver unit APS Beamline Safety Coordinators Meeting 8-7-13

11. Solution 2: Install AC-AC Isolation Transformer • Removes the hazardous voltage to ground on the driver unit output • Several sizes and models of isolation transformers are available • Information is needed from beamlines to determine power requirements for the isolation transformer installations • Selection of isolation transformer make and model will be made after evaluating information provided • Current warning labels must be retained for this solution APS Beamline Safety Coordinators Meeting 8-7-13

12. Information Needed from Each Involved Beamline • Need to have the following information for each involved beamline (not station) in order to determine the needed power output for isolation transformers or DC power supplies and how many are needed: • the total number of driver units with makes and model numbers • how the driver units are grouped together and each group’s location within the beamline • the number of driver units in use simultaneously for each group • the maximum amperage setting actually used for each unit • the number of groups in use simultaneously and which groups they are • a beamline drawing or sketch showing where the groups are located and the distances they are apart • Clay White has already collected this information from a few beamlines as a pilot exercise; these beamlines do not need to submit the already gathered information • A web link with form to submit information is nearly ready – will send link • Submit by COB August 16, 2013 (Revised to August 30, 2013 in meeting) APS Beamline Safety Coordinators Meeting 8-7-13

13. Implementation Schedule & Costs • One of the two solutions must be implemented for each driver unit of concern before the start of the 2014-3 operating run (tentatively 10/1/2014) • AES will provide an engineer to coordinate the implementation and all 3 APS divisions will participate in the implementation and any needed DEEI inspections • Costs remain to be determined, but Brian Stephenson has stated APS will assist the involved CAT beamlines • Strongly recommend that AC powered driver units not be installed in the future • Anyone installing AC powered driver units will be responsible either for demonstrating the units do not exhibit the hazardous voltage to ground concern or for installing isolation transformers APS Beamline Safety Coordinators Meeting 8-7-13

14. Open Discussion on Hazardous Voltage Issue ??? APS Beamline Safety Coordinators Meeting 8-7-13

15. Work Planning & Control • Background • Argonne Requirements & Online System • APS Documentation Requirements • Beamline Application • Implementation Timeframe APS Beamline Safety Coordinators Meeting 8-7-13

16. Work Planning & Control Background • Two significant events involving a hazardous chemical or gas occurred in 2009 • DOE later levied a fine against Argonne for violating 10CFR851 Work Safety and Health Program requirements • Inconsistent hazard analyses and hazard controls implementation a root cause • Argonne committed to implementing a site-wide hazard identification and control process to be used in work planning and control • A site-wide process was developed, implemented, and then substantially revised last year based on feedback received All work must have hazards and hazard controls identified, documented, and implemented (Remember ISM 5 Core Functions) APS Beamline Safety Coordinators Meeting 8-7-13

17. WPC = Standard Method for Documenting the ISM 5 Core Functions APS Beamline Safety Coordinators Meeting 8-7-13

18. Argonne WP&C Requirements • The Argonne site-wide process is described in LMS-PROC-200 • LMS-PROC-200 requires local implementing procedures • Activities excluded from the local implementing procedures include: • Administrative and computer-type office conducted in an office area that does not require permits or special training • Work performed by an Argonne subcontractor on the Argonne site • Hazards analysis & identification of controls must be performed and documented by an accepted method • ESAF is an accepted method for all APS experiments • Otherwise must use online web application https://webapps.inside.anl.gov/wpc/ APS Beamline Safety Coordinators Meeting 8-7-13

19. APS Local WP&C Implementation • The APS local implementing procedure was issued on February 25, 2013 with an effective date of May 1, 2013 • Procedure excludes: • Service work provided by Argonne Operations personnel (e.g., FMS & ESQ staff) • Administrative/office work performed in office areas • Work performed by Argonne subcontractors • Procedure addresses 3 areas: • Non-Experimental APS Facility WP&C • Non-Experimental Beamline WP&C • Experimental WP&C (already covered by the ESAF process) APS Beamline Safety Coordinators Meeting 8-7-13

20. Non-Experimental Beamline WP&C • Address activities not covered under an ESAF • A hazard analysis and identification of controls has been performed and documented to cover common beamline activities such as: • Vacuum work • Alignment & mechanical adjustments • Electronic interfacing on equipment such as slits, mirrors, monochromators, beam position monitors, cryo-cooled options, and the associated motion control, vacuum, mechanical, and electrical systems • Dry labs • Wet labs • This document is applicable to all beamlines • A significant benefit of this document is it relieves beamlines from having to use the Argonne web based process for the core activities covered – otherwise each beamline would need to prepare and issue a document like it APS Beamline Safety Coordinators Meeting 8-7-13

21. What Do Beamlines Need to Do for WP&C? • Compare the common hazard analysis and controls identification document with their beamline operations • Identify and document all activities or specialty systems that are not included in the common document and that have not been covered by an ESAF • XSD operated beamlines will provide a copy of their lists to Paul Rossi, XSD ESH Coordinator • Non-Argonne CAT operated beamlines will provide a copy of their lists to Bruce Glagola, AES User Safety Officer • These lists will be provided by COB December 20, 2013 APS Beamline Safety Coordinators Meeting 8-7-13

22. What Do Beamlines Do Then? • APS staff will evaluate the lists received to determine if additional common beamline activities exist that can be covered by a new common hazard analysis and controls identification document • Beamline staff will be notified of which beamlines and associated activities will be included by a new document • All notifications will be completed by COB February 28, 2014 • APS staff will proceed to perform and document the additional common hazard analysis and controls identification • For activities or specialty systems which are unique, the applicable beamlines will need to produce separate hazard analysis and controls identification documents APS Beamline Safety Coordinators Meeting 8-7-13

23. Additional Implementation Details • Non-APS Argonne operated beamlines will notify Bruce Glagolaif they will perform hazard analysis and controls identification in accordance with their home organizations local WP&C implementation procedure and schedule • All new Non-Experimental Beamline WP&C hazard analysis and control identification documents need to be issued by October 1, 2014 • Beamline staff need to add the commitment to WP&C to their ESH Plan before their next 3 Year Sector Safety Review • It is highly recommended that non-Argonne beamline operating organizations have at least one staff member trained in use of the Argonne web-based WPC system • APS staff will be available to advise beamline staff on the WPC process APS Beamline Safety Coordinators Meeting 8-7-13

24. Open Discussion on Work Planning & Control ??? APS Beamline Safety Coordinators Meeting 8-7-13

25. Recap on What Is Needed from Beamline Staff • Provide information on driver unit power loads by COB August 16, 2013 (Revised to August 30, 2013 in meeting) • Provide information on beamline activities and specialty systems not covered by Common hazard analysis & controls identification document or an ESAF by December 20, 2013 APS Beamline Safety Coordinators Meeting 8-7-13

26. APS Beamline Safety Coordinators Meeting 8-7-13 Other Issues or Discussion?