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The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law

The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law. Game-theoretic approachQuestion about the governors' respect for right of citizensCoordination problemAsymmetriesModel for explaining some puzzles about democratic development and stabilityDemocracy as a form of limited government. P

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The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law

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    1. The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law [Barry Weingast, 1997]

    2. The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law Game-theoretic approach Question about the governors’ respect for right of citizens Coordination problem Asymmetries Model for explaining some puzzles about democratic development and stability Democracy as a form of limited government

    3. Puzzles Interests and Values - Almond&Verba: values matter (civic culture) - Barry: dismiss their role - Przeworski: élite-centric approach - Putnam: importance of values of the whole society (social capital) Divided Societies & Democratic Stability - Dhal: democracy more difficult - Lijphart: stable consensus democracies (Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland, India) Elite pacts - Contrasting theories about transition to democracy

    4. Assumptions Citizens have preferences and values about limits of government According to these, they classify state actions as legitimate or transgressions Citizens support Sovereign if he don’t transgress rights To remain in power the Sovereign must retain sufficient citizen support

    5. Main Idea Consensus about boundaries to Government Sovereign has incentive to respect limits to mantein his power This limits are self-enforcing Mantaining democracy is a coordination dilemma Different preferences among citizens provide chance for sovereign to violate rights Citizens must agree on the limits and they must be ready to defend them

    6. Model 1: “pure coordination” Complete and Imperfect information Economy surplus. Transgression collective losses, individual gains Sovereign needs the support of at least one group to remain in office Citizens’ challenge to the Sovereign costs 1) S = Sovereign (political power) 2) A and B two groups of citizens (move simultaneously)

    9. Remarks I: Mixed Strategies What if A and B play mixed strategies?

    10. For A challenge transgression gives a payoff that vary from 1 (when B acquiesce) to 7 (when B challenge) For A acquiesce transgression gives always payoff of 2 The same for B

    11. Model 2: “Coordination in a political context”

    17. Remarks II: Diversities and Citizenship

    18. Remarks III: Exogenous Shocks Small role for citizens. Coordination is due only to exogenous shocks (charism of leaders, ‘apparition’ of Constitutions, unorganized riots*, role of military* as institution to foster democracy) The endogenous elements, such as payoffs, count less. This is all the more true for Citizens’ role in affecting Sovereing payoffs (indeed asymmetric equilibrium is stable despite citizens’ effort to alter Sovereign payoffs) How Constitutions arise is far from being clarified, and this is unlikely to happen due to citizens’ action. Moreover, there is a causal loop: resolution of coordination dilemma creates consensus, but consensus is needed to solve dilemma So, the entire model seems paradoxically unnecessary

    19. First Puzzle Almond&Verba, Barry (Value and Democracy) Game equilibria correspond to Almond&Verba study Solution of coordination dilemma

    20. Przeworski: Equation of the successful democracy (Losing, Complying, Subverting,Winning) L1+C2> S1+S2 where L1= L1(a) ; C2=pW2+(1-p)L2 The restrictions on governing elites that make successful the constitutions: Restrictions that lower the stakes of political battles Restrictions that stop those in power from subverting the system to prevent their opponents from winning the next elections (lowering substantially the probability that the opposition wins) “Successful democracies are those in which the institutions make it difficult to fortify a temporary advantage”* A self-enforcing democracy requires that “restrictions on governing elites can only be binding if there exists a citizen consensus to react against tomorrow’s incumbents if they attempt to rig elections” Three components: institutions, citizens, elite (Putnam miss this latter point) *If I founded such situation in a democratic country, I would say that Przeworski is wrong. Otherwise, if I know he is right, I would say that such country is not a succesful demoracy. What about Italian Electoral Law and the potential outcomes of Referendum?

    21. Second Puzzle Why divided societes face obstacles to mantain democracy? Rabushka&Shepsle/Horowitz/Dhal Members have different point of views, even on the role and the limits of the state Subnational loyalty Fearon&Laitin/Lijphart Constitutional provisions limit the effects of divisions Electoral system Decentralization Limits on majority (written Constitution) Consensual behaviour of elites Consensus over the rules of the game (provide autonomy) They are defended (because consequences of subversion will be profitless) No group will be cut out of the system

    22. Third Puzzle Elite Pacts: agreement among elites to modify rules of the political game, to end conflict Compromise that become consensually shared Partecipants are better off under the pact than under S.Q. The pact must be self-enforcing (for democracy survival) Pact must be bring into the game by external factors (otherwise asymmetric equilibrium will persist) These points confirm previous remarks about the preponderant role of elites (with respect to citizens) and the importance of external shocks. The model seems to be watered-down

    23. New (Fourth) Puzzle Consolidation of democracy Requires that: a society resolve its social coordination dilemma concerning boundaries of state citizens will defend those limits In unconsolidated democracy the asymmetric equilibrium holds Pacts doesn’t assure that the society reaches Pareto-optimal equilibrium of consolidation

    24. Remarks IV: Main Limits “In the absence of a consensus about limits, a coalition between the Sovereign and one group of citizens against another is stable” Why Weingast refers to the need of a Consensus? Neither dominant group nor the Sovereign need it! He doesn’t explain this point “Two ways of constructing limits are elite pacts and Constitutions” Where are the citizens? Where are the payoffs? In transition to democracy Elites dialogue before masses dialogue Elites implement consensual institutions i.e. Iraq, Northern Ireland, Bosnia, Kosovo

    25. Remarks IV: Main Limits “Economic and demographic growth of one group may allow a previously subjugated group to capture the state and impose new rule” But why they should support Pareto-optima instead of a new asymmetrical equilibrium? Only in case of balance of power [see Olson] “It is elites who choose whether to construct pacts, initiate democratization, violate citizens rights, and implement public policies. Mass behaviour is relevant to elite choice because of incentives” Such a hard work! Elite-centric approach are still valid “The approach assume away issues concerning the internal structure of groups, their collective-action problems, and the effects of cross-cutting cleavages” Anything else?

    26. Remarks IV: Main Limits For large N of groups into the society more incentives for free riding, less incentives for coordination and cooperation: “No one has ever found a large society that obtained a peaceful order or other public goods through an agreement among the individuals in the society” [M. Olson, 1993] Most depends on: Costs/Benefits of challenge (with large N population gains are shared among many people; less incentives for challenge; free riding) Stake of groups (when facing a big loss, compared to S.Q., challenge strategy will be more likely to be played) For large N of groups into the society ‘mixed strategy’ are the best reply: ‘pure strategy’ equilibrium loose their power (Population Games)

    27. Remarks IV: Observations & Implications Time Horizon matters: Autocrats face short time horizon; this impedes some equilibria because autocrats discount future. Self-fulfilling prophecy: short time horizon less gain for groups and society incentives for challenge short time duration of Sovereign But democratic political leaders’ time horizons are perhaps even shorter. Not so for democracy in itself (as shown by Przeworski): only democracy could reach Pareto-optimal equilibrium What implications (normative, theoretical, analytical) if the dominant group A that supports the Sovereing against B is an elected majority?

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