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This presentation explores the use of big data to measure the reaction of authoritarian states, specifically North Korea and Russia, to tools of foreign policy. It discusses methods for collecting and analyzing open source media reports to assess state-level reactions, including sentiment analysis. The study focuses on four types of foreign policy tools - diplomacy, information, military, and economic - and examines their impact on positive and negative sentiment.
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April 2019 Using Big Data to Measure the Reaction of Authoritarian States to Tools of Foreign Policy: Case Studies of North Korea and Russia By Scott Fisher, PhDAssistant Professor, Security StudiesNew Jersey City University
Using Big Data to Measure the Reactionof Authoritarian States to Tools of Foreign Policy: Case Studies of North Korea and Russia Description: This presentation discusses how open source media reports can be collected and analyzed to assess state-level reaction to foreign policy tools. Specific topics include establishing baselines and detecting spikes that can measure the (in)effectiveness of an activity (e.g. military exercises, economic sanctions, UN resolutions).
DIME • Of four common types of foreign policy tools, which one most reduces positive sentiment (or increases negative sentiment) by the Russian or North Korean government? • Diplomacy (e.g. UN resolutions) • Information (e.g. press releases, broadcast) • Military (e.g. military exercises) • Economic (e.g. economic sanctions) • To answer our question we use the DIME construct and select activities from each tool to serve as a proxies. • But where and how to get data?
Russian Data First, we need a proxy for measuring how governments react to different DIME activities. For Russia, we used all reports from January 2003 to June 2018 scraped from the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) website. Other possible data sources include TASS and Sputnik.
North Korean Data For North Korea, we downloaded all English articles from the Korean Central News Agency’s website (http://www.kcna.co.jp) from January 2002 to August 2017.
Sentiment Analysis Once scraped, we conducted sentiment analysis on the data to determine whether the sentiment expressed was very positive, positive, neutral, negative, or very negative. This provided our baseline and DIME sentiment for each government and activity.
Russia Sentiment Baseline This image highlights our Russia baseline – it shows aggregated sentiment from Jan. 2003 to June 2018. P+ (green) is very positive P (blue-green) is positive NEU is neutral N (orange) is negative N+ (red) is very negative What about a timeline?
Russia Sentiment Timeline This is our timeline of aggregated sentiment, 2003-2018. P+ (green) is very positive P (blue-green) is positive NEU is neutral N (orange) is negative N+ (red) is very negative Note positive is always highest, neutral & negativealways similar, what else? Next, we’ll look at select DIME activities.
Russia Diplomacy On the right we see a nearly 20-point decrease in positive sentiment related to the UN’s Crimea resolution. On the left we see a nearly 20-point increase in positive sentiment related to the signing of the new START treaty, 2010 (U.S. and Russia).
Russia Military Similar to diplomacy, NATO military exercises lead to a decrease of 20% in positive sentiment. Note negative sentiment also drops, while neutralincreases. TotalsBaseline: 72% Diplomacy: 55% Military: 52%
Russia Economic Sanctions create less of a change from the 72%baseline.
Russia Information Information (press releases) decreased positive and increased very negative sentiment.
Conclusion • Overall Results (strongest values from each category): • Baseline: 72% positive; 12% negative • Diplomacy: 55% positive; 16% negative • Information: 36% positive; 29% negative • Military: 52% positive; 8% negative • Economic: 65% positive; 15% negative • To answer our question, information tools created both the lowest positive sentiment (Human Rights Watch reports) and the highest negative sentiment (Freedom House reports).
North Korea Baseline Overall baseline sentiment of all KCNA English articles from Jan 2002 to Aug. 2017
North Korea Diplomacy Combination of United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions 1718 (from 2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2270 (Mar. 2016), and 2371 (Aug. 2017).
North Korea Military North Korean reaction to joint U.S. and South Korean military exercises, typically held twice a year in South Korea.
North Korea Economic North Korean reaction to sanctions.
North Korea Information Loudspeaker (below) was 69% negative; leaflet was 58% negative and psychological warfare was 55% negative.
North Korea Conclusion In terms of sentiment, all military and information related results were over 50% negative. All diplomatic and economic related results were under 50% negative. North Korea reacts more negatively to military and information tools than economic or diplomatic tools, in some cases 30% more negatively.
Overall Conclusion Of the DIME tools, Russia reacts most negatively to information. North Korea reacts most negatively to military and information tools. In terms of policy, efforts to pressure Moscow or Pyongyang with information tools are likely to create a more powerful effect than economic or diplomatic tools. Military tools are likely to have a stronger effect on North Korea than on Russia. Questions?
