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THE ZAMBIA BUDGET TRACKING PROJECT. PUBLIC EXPENDTURE REVIEWS IN ZAMBIA: A REVIEW OF LITERATURE. The Study Purpose. Provides summary of findings of studies on Zambia’s public expenditure management since 2000
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THE ZAMBIA BUDGET TRACKING PROJECT PUBLIC EXPENDTURE REVIEWS IN ZAMBIA: A REVIEW OF LITERATURE
The Study Purpose • Provides summary of findings of studies on Zambia’s public expenditure management since 2000 • Through findings of these studies, to check extent to which budget is an effective tool for poverty reduction • Main purpose is to amplify issues around which public could engage the GRZ on how best to raise the quality of service delivery
Literature on PEM in Zambia • A lot of literature on public expenditure management • But few studies directly tackle the link between PEM and poverty. But issue strongly highlighted in many studies even not the key focus • A wide range of focus – From looking at the entire PEM system to analysis of how the budget supports objectives of particular sectors • WB has conducted a number of PERs since 2001 • Zambia a leader in Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys/Quality of Service Delivery Surveys
Study Organisation • Thebudget process: how amiable is the process to the voice of the poor? • The poverty-reducing merits: To what extent is spending pro-poor? • Sector case studies in education, health, agriculture and social protection. • Recommendations to make the discretionary budget truly pro-poor.
Role of parliament is not adequate • Has responsibility to scrutinize the budget so that it reflects the needs of the people • But studies show that Parliament does not fulfill this role because: • Not sufficient time to scrutinize the budget • The Executives’ tendency to submit supplementary expenditure after the fact • It is playing a minimum role in the MTEF • Inability of its recommendations to translate into enforceable sanctions on the Executive and individuals
The civil society and the general public have not injected themselves strong in the budget process • CS has various forums to analyse and discuss the budget • But it is not clear to what extent this in the end has a bearing on the budget
Neither do line ministries play an effective role • They complain that the budget negotiation process has been deteriorating because of delays in publishing the Green Paper • The late setting of ceiling by MFNP means that line ministries cannot meaningfully engage their sub-national structures • Process for priority setting in line ministries through the budget has broken down because of the low integrity of the budget
There are also inconsistencies and ambiguities in the legal framework • For the budget process and its outcomes to be effectively pro-poor, it must first of all be supported by a sound legal framework • But… • Weaknesses in the legal framework that provisions on the budget subject to various interpretations • The Public Finance (Control and Management) Act was found to be weak • The Financial Regulations Act does not properly allocate responsibility • All this compounded by very weak legislation in the procurement system
The Budget Process: Technical Weaknesses
The Zambian budget is not comprehensive in its coverage • It excludes revenues and expenditures of the wider public sector including local authorities and semi-autonomous bodies • Information on domestic and external debt stock of the wider public institutions and GRZ guarantees for loans contracted by public and private institutions is not comprehensive • Non-tax revenue is not remitted to the treasury by some departments • Donor funds to projects not comprehensively captured • Omissions mean that the quasi budget deficit is much bigger than the deficit reported in the budget
Lacks predictability • Can only be an effective tool for poverty reduction and for steering development, the extent to which it is predictable • The quality of revenue projection is not the problem • Problem is on the expenditure side due to budget’s lack of comprehensiveness • Hence too many contingencies and supplementary allocations
Poverty monitoring of the budget is complicated • Results from classification of allocations by administrative units rather than programmes • Difficult to know the relationship between the budget and the FNDP • Makes difficult the analysis of budget with respect to developmental and poverty impacts
A three-pronged criteria for determining whether a budget is pro-poor • Spending on activities with growth impact in activities where the poor are • Spending on activities with direct impact on the poor • Spending that corresponds with the expressed needs of the poor themselves
Spending for growth • Not just growth but the sources of growth matters • Concern that agric where nearly 70% of population derive living is not contributing as much to growth • Improvements noted in the allocations to agric • But this is mostly to input support, starving in the process other services • Analysis of distribution of allocations show that there is room to improve spending on agric to contribute to growth and to poverty reduction
Spending on activities that directly benefit the poor • The Human Development paradigm helps to identify what these are
In general, trends suggest that the budget is becoming more pro-poor • Combined share of education and health in total expenditure increased from 22.1% in 2000 to 25.7% in 2007 • Social protection also increased from 0.74% in 2000 to 2.96% in 2007 • Improvements in spending on agriculture from 2% in 2000 to 7.6% in 2007
But poverty impact of spending is blunted by intra-sector misallocation • Within sectors, sub-sectors unlikely to have big poverty impact sometimes receive more resources: • In education, tilted towards higher rather than basic education • In education again, tilted towards urban against rural areas • In agriculture, the budget is overwhelmed by input subsidies that reach only about 15% of the farmers, who are the better off
Spending that corresponds with the expressed needs of the poor • Would be supported by the existence of systems to consult the poor in national planning and budgets to be strongly linked to plans • Complicated by an over-centralized governance system. • Decentralization more able to have structures that allow for regular consultation, look at the various dimensions of poverty and mobilizing a more integrated response • Planning for the FNDP attempted to consult grassroots but had challenges to integrate issues articulated by people on the ground • The budgets that have followed have had this handicap
To Summarise: Failing the Pro-Poor Test, Some Examples • Over 60% of expenditure in agriculture goes to support only one commodity, maize • Input support has only reached 15% of farmers, 60% of whom have cell phones! • Donor support in education helps increase enrolment but not the recruitment and retention of teachers. The quality of education is undermined in the process • Leakage is a big problem: The 2002 PETS in education found that only 25% of discretionary funds actually got to schools!
Recommendations • Radical reforms required in the governance, legal and institutional systems. • Reforms will not be accepted and implemented easily because the factors that undermine the pro-poor qualities of Zambia’s budget are deeply entrenched. • Civil society should thus mount a massive campaign to both educate the Zambian public and to bring pressure on Government to begin implementing these reforms. • Three areas for reforms particularly important.
1. Reform the planning process and make it more sensitive to poverty reduction • Decentralise the governance system to create an institutional framework that accommodates grassroots’ consultations • A planning model that is effective in identifying key development issues and the leverage points where investments yield greatest pro-poor impacts at minimal cost
2. Reform the budget process to make it more inclusive • There should be more participation by various stakeholders in both the MTEF and the budget at various stages • The public should be sensitised to take interest – CS to play this role • Parliament should be given enough time [already implemented] and resources, including specialist analysis, to scrutinize and debate the budget
3. Strengthen line ministries in their engaging MFNP • Strengthen their capacity to provide a strong case for returns to investments in their sector • Strengthen their ability to demonstrate value for money by adopting tools that improve transparency of spending • Where reviews reveal low efficiency and effectiveness, bold steps should be taken to reform spending patterns and changing service delivery modalities