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Tripartite Tokyo September 2007 Procedural. 4.2 Mutual Recognition of Certificates. Tor E. Svensen Det Norske Veritas IACS Council Chairman. Content. IACS Position – and why Current situation Progress with Commission Process EMEC Further process. IACS Position & why.
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Tripartite Tokyo September 2007 Procedural 4.2 Mutual Recognition of Certificates Tor E. Svensen Det Norske Veritas IACS Council Chairman
Content • IACS Position – and why • Current situation • Progress with Commission Process • EMEC • Further process
IACS Position & why • One classification society is responsible for verification of the overall safety of the ship and its systems, by assessing the interaction of various components within the whole system • The present text of Art 20(1) of the class directive dilute our opportunity to properly perform this responsibility • IACS is primarily concerned over possible negative safety implications of 20(1)
Current situation and further progress • The regulatory process in EU is now in the ”Council” phase. • Discussions in July was not concluded, and the Council WG meets at end September to try to agree on compromise text for Art. 20(1). • If this WG is successful, Council may adopt the compromise text in December meeting. • If this WG not successful, EU Transport Attaches will try to reach a compromise in a political process. However, regulatory process will not be completed in 2007. • a 2nd reading may start spring 2008. • IACS will lobby Council WG, both in Brussels and with Administrations in Member States.
Current situation and further progress • IACS has lobbied selected EU Member States (France, Germany, Denmark, Greece, Italy,UK) • IACS has run workshop on class and Art.20 implications • Position of IACS is reflected mainly in proposed text by France, Germany, Greece and Denmark to Council WG. • … which are concern that dilution of responsibility/liability and continuity, is detrimental for safety
IACS Strategy stays the same reliability Area 4 Area 3 Area 2 Area1 Major consequences of failure Minor consequences of failure risk Direct inspection 100% Process verification 100% “ …to allow a more risk based approach according to the severity of a failure and the likelihood of this failure happening…” (4112hPMb-SG-3MSP (SG/EMEC).