Voting- Machines, Ballots, and Solutions

1. Voting- Machines, Ballots, and Solutions Gail Yacyshyn, Tom Mahoney, Tyler Reynolds, Cedric Suzuki

2. In the Media • The Simpsons “Homer Tries to Vote for Obama” 2008 Election: • http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1aBaX9GPSaQ

3. What Exists Today: HAVA • In 2002, the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) was passed due to the “Hanging Chad” controversy that occurred in Florida during the 2000 presidential elections. • What It Does: • Provides funding to states in order to help them meet HAVA standards. In order to receive this funding, states must draft a plan detailing allocation of funds and performance measures. A report must be submitted for each year federal funding is received.

4. What Exists Today: HAVA (Cont.) • Voters that are ineligible to vote but believe they are eligible to vote are able to cast a provisional ballot. • The Election Assistance Committee (EAC) was created to hold hearings, create testing and certification programs for voting machines, provide guidance to states, and administer HAVA grants. • States are required to replace “outdated” punched card or lever voting systems with electronic systems.

5. What Exists Today: HAVA (Cont.) • Requires that polling places must be accessible to and have one voting system designed for individuals with disabilities, including the visually impaired, while also granting those individuals with the same access, independence, and privacy that is given to other voters. • States are required to develop a statewide voter registration list. This list must be coordinated with other state agency databases. • Voters are required to show a valid photo ID if they have registered by mail or not participated in the previous federal election. Absentee voters are exempt from this policy.

6. The Problem • Electronic Voting Machines are easily hack-able • Insecure • Malfunction Often • HAVA tried to propose a solution that did not work • Has that goal help or hindered the voting process? • Were we better off with the paper ballot system? • Election officials causing more confusion • E-voting machines require power • Natural Disasters are inevitable

7. Apathy/Registration Issues • Lack of interest defeats the purpose of the system. • Polls cannot accurately depict the statistics if everyone is not voting. • States not updating their registration lists leads to some voters being left out. • Some state voter registration databases are susceptible to hacking.

8. “Smart Card” Hacking • Many common voting machines use these cards as a means of verifying that a person is a valid voter or poll worker. • Most have little to no security measures to block the use of homebrew smartcards. • These easily obtainable homebrew smartcards can drastically affect the operation of a voting machine. • Examples: The “Hursti Hack”, Johns Hopkins University Information Security Institute

9. Physical Hacking • Many electronic voting machines are stored at voting sites days before the election with minimal supervision. • Anyone can feasibly break into the machines and insert a cheap device to intercept, block, or change vote data as it is entered into the vote tabulation component. • Example: Vulnerability Assessment Team at Argonne National Laboratory

10. Machine Malfunctions

11. Machine Malfunctions • In every major election since 2000, there have been hundreds of reports of voting machines flipping votes due to calibration problems with touchscreens, vote counters not increasing when votes were cast, and general machine failure

12. Denial-of-Service Attack • Much like DDoS attacks on websites, hackers can forcibly take down a voting machine to prevent votes from being cast at that location. • This could be done to deny votes in areas that may favor one candidate or the other. • Even if the machines are not connected to the internet, a hacker with access to the machine or software beforehand could install malicious code that would shut down the machine at a preprogrammed time.

13. “Black Box Voting” • Voting machines are by and large produced by private companies, and thus the source code is kept secret. • Local governments hire independent testing authorities to test and verify the operability of machines that are purchased from these private manufacturers. • Many times, not even election officials can look at the software even after the machines have been purchased.

14. Connection to Political Parties • Close elections make parties detail oriented • Politicians/Election Supervisors of elections • Decide where to put money • Help their party • Change voting schedule (early voting) • Republicans “suppressing” vote. • Democrats trying to encourage people to vote • Strong Political Ties to Electronic Voting Machines • Romney with Hart Intercivic • Walden O’Dell (Chief Executive of Diebold, Inc) in 2004 Presidential election • “Committed to helping Ohio deliver its electoral votes to the president next year.’

15. Jon Husted • Implementing untested software • Curtailed Early Voting Weekends • 5 weeks down to 1 week • Provisional Ballot Issues • Poll worker SHOULD be responsible for taking down correct ID • Friday before election Husted gives a new directive opposing this • “Right Church, Wrong Pew” • Right polling place, wrong precinct supposed • Vote to be counted

16. Mother Nature/ National Crises • Disasters are inevitable • Necessary to have disaster election plan • Voting previously has been suspended • Ex. Hurricane Katrina and 9/11 • Hurricane Sandy: • New York Gov. Andrew Cuomo said to vote by provisional ballot in any place in state • New Jersey Gov. Chris Christie said displaced voters to vote by e-mail or fax (later voters still obligated to submit paper ballot) • Having impromptu changes like these can cause problems

17. HAVA’s Shortfall’s • Criticisms: • Electronic voting machines have been unreliable time and time again. They are easily compromised and make recounts all but impossible due to inadequate backup measures, both physical and electronic. • HAVA’s voter requirements might increase the odds of voter confusion and intimidation. They are considered lenient and inadequate.

18. The AMENDMENT to Hava: SDA • The Secure Democracy Act would reinforce problem areas in the electoral process that HAVA improperly addressed. This essentially breaks down into two crucial areas: • Electronic Voting Machines • Voter Identification

19. Electronic Voting Machines • Currently, electronic voting machines are produced by private companies. Despite assurances that the machines are secure, incidents during elections show otherwise. • SDA would create a new government agency whose role would be to design, test, and manufacture electronic voting machines. The SDA would set minimum standards for machines.

20. Voter Identification • SDA would create a standardized voter ID that would be issued to voters during the registration process. This would be coordinated on a state level and the ID itself would resemble a driver’s license.

21. Resources • http://takingnote.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/11/06/problems-at-the-polls/?ref=davidfirestone • http://thedianerehmshow.org/shows/2012-11-05/casting-your-vote-2012/transcript • http://www.forbes.com/sites/rickungar/2012/10/20/romney-family-investment-ties-to-voting-machine-company-that-could-decide-the-election-causes-concern/ • http://votingmachines.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=000273 • http://www.politicolnews.com/tagg-romney-invested-in-ohio-electronic-voting-machines/ • http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1aBaX9GPSaQ • http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/documents/TROmotion.pdf • http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/11/ohios-provisional-ballot-order-the-biggest-legal-story-of-the- weekend/264498/ • http://www.thenation.com/blog/171011/eleventh-hour-gop-voter-suppression-could-swing-ohio# • http://www.sos.state.oh.us/sos/elections/Voters/FAQ/provisional.aspx

22. Resources • http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/decision2012/hurricane-sandy-victims-vote-then-evacuate-as-weather-continues-to-impact-election-2012/2012/11/06/85350a1c-2840-11e2-b4e0-346287b7e56c_story.html • http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2004/11/the_problem_wit.html • http://www.cnn.com/2012/11/05/opinion/frum-election-chaos/index.html?hpt=hp_c1 • http://nymag.com/nymetro/news/politics/columns/nationalinterest/10280/ • http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/13/us/politics/cracks-in-maryland-and-washington-voter-databases.html?_r=0 • http://www.law.cornell.edu/background/HAVA.html • http://www.eac.gov/about_the_eac/help_america_vote_act.aspx

23. Resources • http://www.popsci.com/gadgets/article/2012-11/how-i-hacked-electronic-voting-machine • http://www.ssfcm.org/addon/content/down_load/vote.pdf • http://people.howstuffworks.com/e-voting.htm • http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rVTXbARGXso • http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Elections/2012/1107/Voting-machine-glitches-How-bad-was-it-on-Election-Day-around-the-country • http://www.verifiedvoting.org/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2008AvanteVoteTrakker-full.pdf • http://citpsite.s3-website-us-east-1.amazonaws.com/oldsite-htdocs/pub/ts06full.pdf