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Understanding the Relative Influence of Local Government Interest Groups within the Domain of Land Use Policy A Presentation Prepared for the 2012 European Real Estate Society Conference By. Eric Heberlig, PhD Suzanne Leland, PhD Dustin C. Read, PhD/JD
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Understanding the Relative Influence of Local Government Interest Groups within the Domain of Land Use PolicyA Presentation Prepared for the 2012 European Real Estate Society ConferenceBy Eric Heberlig, PhD Suzanne Leland, PhD Dustin C. Read, PhD/JD Associate Professor Associate Professor Director Dept. of Political Science Dept. of Political Science Center for Real Estate UNC Charlotte UNC Charlotte UNC Charlotte
Theoretical Linkages Between Local Interest Groups and Land Use Policy Reformed Govt. Structures: Council/Administrator Non-Partisan Elections At-Large Elections
Research Questions • Are pro-development interest groups perceived to have privileged access to the local land use policymaking process? • Do partisanship and local government structure mitigate interest group influence over land use policy decisions? • Do partisanship and local government structure mitigate the influence of some interest groups more than others?
Data & Research Methodology • Survey data collected from 1,444 American Planning Association members • Respondents asked to rate the political influence of different interest groups • Descriptive statistics calculated to rank groups by perceived influence • OLS regression models estimated to: • Measure mitigating effects of government structure and partisanship • Consider both aggregate and individual interest group influence • Controls for characteristics of the community where a planner works • Controls for planners’ characteristics such as age, gender, education, etc.
Aggregate Interest Group Influence, OLS Results N=423; Adj. R2=.157; *p<.05, **p<.001
Conclusions • Business interests and neighborhood organizations are perceived to have considerable influence over land use policy. • Reformed government structures, such as at-large elections and professional managers, reduce aggregate interest group influence. • Local governments with full-time mayors are particularly susceptible to interest groups when land use policy is made irrespective of partisanship. • Traditional political alliances continue to mitigate the influence of both business and environmental interests in the land use policy domain.