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Handball : Simple Security Tools for Handheld Devices

LABORATORIES. Handball : Simple Security Tools for Handheld Devices. Niklas Frykholm, Markus Jakobsson, Ari Juels. Our aim: To rethink palm security from scratch. Palm pros: Cheap Convenient Someday ubiquitous Smartcard alternative?. Palm cons: Easily stolen No tamper resistance

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Handball : Simple Security Tools for Handheld Devices

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  1. LABORATORIES Handball:Simple Security Tools for Handheld Devices Niklas Frykholm, Markus Jakobsson, Ari Juels

  2. Our aim:To rethink palm security from scratch

  3. Palm pros: Cheap Convenient Someday ubiquitous Smartcard alternative? • Palm cons: • Easily stolen • No tamper resistance • Often used for sensitive data • New (sometimes clumsy) style of data entry

  4. Despite this, we want: • To prevent unauthorized access • Get good security from low entropy keys • Alert/disable in case of unauthorized access • Achieve functionality like backup in hostile environments

  5. Attackers may • Steal devices and copy them surreptitiously • Emulate copied devices completely • See all old transcripts • Do fairly serious computing (250 or so…) • Mount some on-line attack

  6. Problem with passwords on palm devices • Passwords geared toward keyboards • Palm devices use other data entry • Some studies suggest superiority of visual memory (e.g., Sheperd) • The visual approach... • Jermyn et al., Xerox PARC, Blonder, Perrig, Passfaces • Only Jermyn et al. suitable for palm devices

  7. Visual Passwords Your PIN consists of a point on an image (or multiple such) Icons help stimulate the user’s memory

  8. Visual Passwords Error-tolerance techniques allow user to come only close to point, but security remains maximal Training routine helps fix PIN in user’s memory Prototype available

  9. Some more problems with passwords • Users and passwords don’t mix well: • Either too long to be easily memorized (high entropy) • Or too short to be used effectively in naïve manner • For example, AES encryption of credit cards

  10. Credit-Card Vault • Special “non-redundant” encryption protects card and bank account numbers with just a PIN -- • Protection even against a determined hacker • Prototype available

  11. Encryption using low-entropy keys • To encrypt a list of PINS: • Select master PIN -- call it M • E[PIN1] = PIN1 M • E[PIN2] = PIN2 M , etc. • But a credit card is not so simple: • Has redundancy: Check digit • Unprotected parts may give clues to attacker

  12. Accommodate credit-card structure • Idea: Isolate essential digits • Strip away check digit • Strip away bank numbers • Encrypt remaining digits under stream cipher mod 10 • RC4(key) 10 (cc digits) • Note: Decryption with any key yields a valid-looking credit card number

  13. Credit-card vault Can we do Social Security Numbers? Names? Addresses?

  14. Infrared Palm Lock • Small key locks and unlocks PalmPilot • Strong key would be inexpensive ($2) to manufacture in quantity

  15. Infrared Palm Lock • Current prototype is “conceptual” • Static key • 20-bit entropy • Evolution: • Static key, 80-bit entropy encryption key • Rolling key, rolling encryption • Bluetooth -- interactive variant

  16. Digital Signing on the Palm • Palm is convenient platform for signing • An offline digital signing key protected with a PIN is vulnerable to attack if palm device is stolen I agree to buy 1000 shares of Enron at $100/share from Ken. • Online approaches may suffer from spotty connectivity

  17. Our aim • Distinguish attacker–generated signatures from “real” signatures • Alert authorities of any attacks • But make alarm “silent” • attacker should be unable to distinguish a good signature from a bad one • All with a low-entropy PIN!

  18. h h h h’ h’ h’ r1 r3 r2 Funkspiel schematic s1 s2 s4 s3 • si = h(si, i) • ri= h’(si, PIN) • Incorporate riinto message to be signed • Verifier can check correctness of ri

  19. ? h h h ? Why does this yield “silent” alarm? s1 s2 s4 s3 s2 h’ h’ h’ r1 r3 r2 r2 • Attacker can’t learn s2 because of one-wayness of h • Attacker can’t learn PIN because she can’t learn s2 • Attacker can’t tell whether she’s tripping alarm if she signs using s3

  20. Inserting riinto standard scheme • We use RSA-PSS (Bellare-Rogaway) • RSA-PSS supplies random padding of messages to be signed using RSA – to avoid existential forgery • Padding has some random component, some redundancy • We let ri be the random portion

  21. The Big Picture • Everybody can verify signatures using standard RSA-PSS • “Alarm center” can check PIN, too, for “silent alarm”! • “Alarm center” can, e.g., inform bank if theft suspected

  22. LABORATORIES • Prototypes available for visual passwords, credit-card vault, and IR key • Patents pending on visual passwords

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