International Politics of Democracy Promotion PO229

International Politics of Democracy Promotion PO229 Session 1: Framing the Module and Basic Vocabulary

Framing the module • United Nations Sec. General’s statement • The ‘when’ of democracy promotion. • The ‘who’ of democracy promotion. • The ‘where’ of democracy promotion. • A roller coaster ride. • Questions the module addresses. • Dispelling three myths. • Do you have any questions?

Vocabulary • Democratisation • Means movement towards/in the direction of democracy. In practice that usually means western style liberal democracy. But we can challenge that reduction if we think other forms of democracy may be more appropriate

Democratisation • Includes both transitional phase in the installation of democracy, and subsequent progress, for example from new, fragile, unstable, defective or imperfect democracy, towards more established, stable, and ‘more democratic’ democracy. Open question of how to assess ‘democraticness’ or a democracy’s quality.

Democratisation • No end point: no country has reached the ideal typical position; the ideal itself may be dynamic, as for example new technology makes new forms of mass political participation possible.

Democratisation • Democratisation is analytically distinct from the political liberalisation of authoritarian regimes, which may not produce democracy

Democratisation • Democratisation is analytically distinct from authoritarian break down, which may not lead to democracy. Locating the borderline (the ‘tipping point’) between authoritarian break-down and democratic transition is somewhat arbitrary: the one merges into the other. Of course we can only know if the one merged into the other with benefit of hindsight, i.e. after the event.

Democratisation Backwards • Increase in attention paid to examples of democratic decay and authoritarian persistence and revival, and, even, the diffusion of authoritarian and semi-authoritarian or illiberal rule. New theoretical perspectives required.

Democracy Assistance • Concessionary (i.e. grant-aided) and largely consensual projects and programmes. But can become politically contentious – borderline with non-consensual forms of democracy promotion difficult to locate.

Democracy Promotion • All the different methods and approaches to promoting democracy that range from assistance and ‘soft power’ (e.g. influence) through ‘pressure’ to ‘hard power (i.e. coercion, including for example military intervention)

Democracy Support; Supporting Democracy-Building • Can cover assistance and also knowledge-sharing about democracy/democratisation and diplomatic engagement, but not coercion. Sometimes preferred by non-governmental practitioners. • ‘Shared democracy-building’ (IDEA’s preference) echoes the evolution from foreign (economic) aid, thru’ development assistance, to internat. development cooperation, and now ‘partnership for development’.

Regime Change • The attempt to bring down a government (as distinct from changing the type of political regime or political rule or political system) by the use of military force. Born of the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq by US and coalition forces. • Clausewitz famously said ‘war is a continuation of politics by other means’. ‘Regime change’ might be thought of as an endeavour that sometimes masquerades as democracy promotion but employs ‘other means’ than assistance, most notably physical violence, and in the first instance is driven by other purposes and goals. It might or it might not lead to democracy.

International Dimensions of Democratisation • Dwells on context or environment or ‘causes’ rather than consequences of democratisation. Comprises both active and passive international democracy promotion • Active form comprises intentionality, i.e. deliberate assistance and/or promotion, by whatever means. • Passive sense refers to democracy being spread or diffused (or the opposite) by international influences (positive or negative) other than intentional democracy promotion and democracy assistance. Example: effects of living in a good, or conversely bad, neighbourhood; effects of global economic trends.

Towards a Borderless World? • ‘International’ itself a contested dimension • Impact of globalisation on the national/international or foreign/domestic distinctions: the transnational dimension (e.g. global civil society) and the mutually constitutive nature of the ‘internal’ and the ‘external’, whereby each stimulates or provokes and shapes the other and influences its effects. Assigning causality in democracy promotion even more difficult than identifying democratisation’s causes.

IPDP • Session 2: Evolution in the State of Democratisation as Reality and as Subject of inquiry • Aim of Lecture: to introduce the apparent paradox that democratisation and its international promotion warrant close inspection even though, possibly, the best is already behind us. • The rise of democracy is ' the most important thing to have happened in the twentieth century' (Amartya Sen, 1999). • Since then the optimism has dimmed, the romance has faded away. Unclear whether the ‘Arab awakening’ is coming to the rescue.

Main points • 1.The study of democratisation has been driven by events that were not foreseen in advance. • 'the likelihood of democratic development in Eastern Europe is virtually nil' (Samuel P. Huntington, 1984). Five years later…. • 2.Although American political science tended to dominate the study of democratisation, especially early on, the best way to understand democratisation is to approach it in the spirit of politics as an open discipline. • 'the suggestion that the student of politics is an eclectic is very well observed, for he draws on so many ways of analysis as seem to suit his purpose' (W. H. Greenleaf, 1968). • A multidisciplinary approach is especially well suited to increase our knowledge & understanding of democratisation, if we conceive it to be a multi-faceted & multidimensional process, i.e. about something more than just refashioning the institutions of government.

Main points • 3.The fact that democratisation has had an impact both on politics and on the study of politics around the world means it should be of special interest to political studies and to students of international politics. • 'where democracy is strong, political science is strong; where democracy is weak, political science is weak' (Huntington, 1988).

Main points • 4. Establishing the trend: the flow and the ebb tide of democratisation under the impact of : • revisions to our understanding of democracy, raising the bar • prevalence of state fragility, collapse even, or at minimum weak government • authoritarian persistence & now resurgence

Three provocative thoughts to conclude with • 1)‘It is not true that trends towards greater freedom and democracy in the 1990s have since been stalled, reversed or hollowed out. On the contrary, what we see is a moving of the goalposts: the actualité is being subjected to ever more rigorous appraisal. It is as if we were previously blinded by the impression of a glass half full. In contrast, we now focus our analysis more on the half empty portion of a glass that is being redefined in ever more expansive terms’ (Anon). Discuss.

Three provocations • 2). ‘There are so many places now where democratisation is, or should be, placed on hold, or even dumped. The priorities must be building state and/or building nation, that is to say creating political and social order and the capacity for (better) governance. Our analytical frameworks & explanatory theories should take account of the implications of this both for politics and for the study of politics. And there are implications for international democracy promotion too’. (Anon). Discuss.

Three provocations • 3).‘Authoritarian and semi-authoritarian rule are back. Political science in general, and theories of democratisation in particular, need to adjust their sights and explain how this could have happened. And reflect and what it means for the future of world politics’. (Anon) Discuss.

Summary conclusion • On the ground: democratisation has evolved over recent decades and now faces an uncertain future. Does the ‘Arab spring’ really make a difference? • In the discourse: our knowledge & understanding of democratisation have made progress, but continue to reveal weaknesses, including a repeated failure to make sound prediction. • For practitioners: the policy implications of the above for how to (whether to?) promote or support democracy abroad are under major review.

IPDP • Session 3: Distinguishing processes of political change • Aim of Lecture: to alert us to the conceptual debate and its significance through an analytical review of key concepts in democratisation: political liberalisation; democratic transition; democratic consolidation; democratic reversal.

Political change: transforming the regime rather than changing the state • 1.Political transition or opening not same as democratic transition/opening • 2.The dichotomy of 'authoritarian' versus democratic regime is oversimplified because it conceals the variety of non-democratic regime types and their different claims to political legitimacy, as well as different governance properties. Examples. • 3.Non-democratic not same as pre-democratic. Possible significance: path-dependence.

False dichotomy • 3.The dichotomy of authoritarian versus democratic regime is oversimplified because there can be a variety of outcomes of political transition from the former, apart from the possibility of reversion back to the same kind of regime. • a) transition to a different type of non-democratic regime • b) break-down of political order – regime collapse degrades the state (Saddam Hussein). • c) intermediate categories of regime from authoritarian to democratic (‘with adjectives’ such as semi, limited, partial, etc; hybrids). Stable or unstable? • d) democracy a relativistic concept, e.g. electoral; liberal; participatory; deliberative. The differences may be as profound as the difference from some non-democracies. • e) certain shared underlying features of non-democratic and democratic regimes may colour how examples of both types operate in some similar ways, e.g. informal institutions. • f) The rule of law matters: but is not exclusive to democracy; and may be more a requisite than an inevitable part of democracy. The sequencing debate links state and regime.

Transition v consolidation • 4.Distinguishing political liberalisation from democratic transition (and from economic liberalisation). • 5.Defining democratic consolidation. • 6.Is the idea of post-consolidation meaningful? Irreversibility? Beyond the political arena? Scaling up? • 7.Democratisation as variable geometry: different ‘flight trajectories’ offer an alternative view to linear progress marked by agreed stages and tipping points. • 8. Mirror image of forward and backwards movement and their explanations (‘causes)?

Different processes/different causes • Distinguishing and disaggregating the process is important to identifying ‘causes’. • Significant for the international promotion of democracy, as well as for pro-democracy actors and opponents of reform inside countries • ‘Yet whereas an extensive literature has emerged concerning the causes and consequences of democratisation, emerging types of democracy and issues of democratic consolidation, remarkably little research has been undertaken on the emergence or persistence of authoritarian regimes’ (Levitsky and Way, Journal of Democracy, 13/2, 2002). This is beginning to change, but there is still some to go, especially regarding international influences.

IPDP • Session 4: Democracy’s critiques and alternatives • Aim of Lecture: to identify normative critiques of the very idea of democracy – and by implication of the idea of international democracy promotion. • This is more fundamental than criticising merely some particular theoretical version or interpretation of democracy. More fundamental than criticising just certain particular institutional models associated with democracy (e.g. presidential, or alternatively parliamentary). And it is more fundamental than criticising the democratic performance of countries that call themselves democracies (i.e. do not judge the idea of democracy by the so-called democracies, which might be falling short).

Critiquing the idea is also • Not the same as critiquing the motives that are attributed to international democracy promotion generally and the West’s lead in promoting democracy specifically (e.g. US imperialism). And not the same as criticising the slow pace of democratisation in some new democracies, or the unrealistic expectations that people there and/or in the West have about the pace of change in these countries.

Also, critiquing the idea can • Go beyond the claim that democracy does not solve all problems and procure every good thing that we want (i.e. rejecting democracy is more fundamental than moderating our expectations about what it can achieve or deliver). And it goes beyond the claim that democracy promotion is not a science but a very imperfect art (i.e. the need to moderate expectations about that too). • So far all these are different arguments or claims. • The following reject democracy as a political solution either for some or for all societies, or for some situations, or for some periods or phases in a society’s development (note that these are all different claims too).

Alternative values in the world and over time • 1.Democracy’s values are not universal values (contrary to what Sen claimed in 1999). Asian values, authoritarian capitalism, and some versions of political Islam may all offer alternatives. • In the past, patriarchal rule/the king equates to father of a family/power to rule is inherited (e.g. Filmer,The Natural Power of Kings,1680, critiqued in Locke’s First Treatise). Divine right of kings. • In more recent times, theocratic rule/theocracy/Church overrides or supplies the state (Iran; Vatican City State), still claiming legitimacy based on divine source of authority. God is the ultimate sovereign, and not the people. • Democracy respects the people’s choice, so if the people prefer an alternative to democracy, then the alternative is what they should have.

Who and what are the people? • 2. Power should be the preserve of true members of the national community. This may not mean everyone (i.e. non-inclusionary enfranchisement based on ethno-nationalist and racial or racist theories about blood line or colour, or gender and age discrimination (e.g. apartheid South Africa). • 3.The people are many, but only the few are wise. Democracy empowers the ignorance, stupidity, and irrational passions of the masses. Philosopher kings (Plato: The Republic) or the modern day equivalent - technocrats – should rule. • Contemporary examples include Smith and Shearman on responses to global warming, and recent debates in some European countries over handing power to experts to determine policy responses to sovereign debt crises.

Security an overriding value • 4. Democracy may be a nice idea, but personal safety, or security meaning both at home/internal (‘law and order’) and external/from foreign aggression must come first (Thomas Hobbes’ argument for absolute, unlimited and indivisible power off the sovereign, in Leviathan). By dividing or distributing power widely in society and placing limits on what even a government with clear majority support is allowed to do, the ability of government to guarantee security – the individual’s basic right to life – would be compromised, and could be fatally undermined – especially in an age of terror(ism).

Democracy requires unrealistic commitment • 5.Attaining and maintaining democracy require qualities of self-confidence, energy and vigilance that human nature might not possess, even if people are clever. • Soft version: sustainable democracy requires sustained commitent by the people (J.S.Mill, ‘A few words on non-intervention’, 1859 ); at best might succumb to the appeal of populist leaders, who are insincere democrats. • Hard (scary) version: ‘fear of freedom’/ ‘freedom an unbearable burden’ (Eric Fromm, 1941), provides the conditions for messianic rule that promises a holy grail. Rise of ‘totalitarian dictatorship’, e.g. fascism in the 1930s.

Too expensive • 6.Democracy costs too much, for poor countries anyway: just think of the opportunity cost in terms of the basic (material) needs foregone. Similar arguments used recently against changing the voting system and electing the second chamber in the UK.

Historical obsolescence • 7. In today’s increasingly globalised world the sites of power and leading institutions of governance are moving offshore, and now straddle territorial boundaries between countries. But democracy was designed for - and remains trapped inside - the obsolete shell of the national state. So it can no longer deliver what it claims – rule by (and for) the people (discussed further in summer term – see module programme, week 21).

Radical views from the left • 8. Marxist view of ‘bourgeois democracy’ – an historically transient part of the superstructure. Of no great value in itself (it is the economic base and social relations make history). And it is pernicious in as much as it is fashioned to serve/prolong class domination/exploitation/alienation. • And it is destined to be superseded by communism (alternatively, C. B. Macpherson on democratic socialism of Soviet-style rule). • 9. Anarchist rejection of the state (Tolstoy; Proudhon; etc). Democracy presupposes a state, and the state is the enemy of freedom. The end of politics means no place for democracy as we know it.

Fatal links, or just remediable flaws? • 10.(Electoral) democracy means tyranny by the majority. Is liberal democracy the solution, if it protects the rights of individuals and minorities (e.g. Bills of Rights)? • 11.Democracy threatens property rights (Federalist Paper No. 10, debated in US in 1787). Seems overstated. But highlights importance of rule of law to encouraging wealth-creation). • 12.Democracy perpetuates male domination (feminist critiques). Yes, but remediable – (only?) by social/economic change. • 13.Representative democracy means enslavement between elections(Rousseau in The Social Contract, Book 3, chapter 15, 1762). E-democracy now offers a solution? • 14. Contradicts traditional communal rule (e.g., African style, such as Botswana’s kgotla). ‘Town hall democracy’ and deliberative democracy as solutions?

And democracy promotion? • Irrespective of whether the idea of democracy is good or bad, and regardless of what methods are used to promote democracy, the international promotion of democracy may be a bad idea because: • 1.All national communities have a right to determine their own future free of external influence. Sovereignty limits democracy support to a request basis only. A matter of principle.

And democracy promotion? • 2.It is only the people of a society who can really know what that society wants, what it needs, what will work best, when and how to get it. External influence at best gets in the way, even when it is welcomed and is well-intentioned. A matter of prudence more than principle. • 2a.Variant on above: international democracy promotion is bound to be ethno-centric, i.e. promote models that reflect their country of origin, which may be unsuited (e.g.at the time of the French Revolution in 1790s Burke saw republicanism as anathema to English traditions of liberty that cherish the ‘wisdom of the ages’, so even if it was right for France –which Burke denied – this would mean it could not be right for England).

And democracy promotion? • 3.Governments, especially democratically elected ones, are obliged to place their own countries’ interests first. So beware of foreigners (democracy promoters) ‘bearing gifts’: (Rousseau’s ‘Legislator’ argument inverted). Policy motives elaborated later in module). • 4.If societies in the established democracies do not wish to support international democracy promotion then their elected governments should not use taxpayers’ money in that way (similar to arguments about spending on international development aid).

Homo sapiens’ destiny is to challenge, and the role of the academy to preserve the critical spirit • 5.We should keep alive the idea that faith in democracy could be misplaced, which means that the idea of democracy promotion should be challenged too. • Uncritical support for democracy and/or for democracy promotion leads to complacency and susceptibility to error. If they are not challenged, then even the meaning as well as the vitality of attachment and jealous protection of democracy will be more easily lost – in the established democracies (Socratic method; J.S. Mill in On Liberty, 1859).

Forthcoming attractions • In the weeks ahead: • Critiques of particular motives or policy drivers attributed to the democracy promoters (e.g. week 9). • Criticisms of specific strategies, approaches, techniques or methods used to promote democracy, claiming they are ineffective or may even be counter-productive (see weeks 11 onwards).

IPDP • Session 5: Explaining the growth of democracy promotion • Aim of lecture: to explain how the 'international community' came to be more enthusiastic about promoting democracy by the late 1980s and took off in the 1990s but did not happen earlier.

Historical Origins • 1. Post-1945 international order: states are sovereign; non-intervention; national self-determination (decolonisation); UN Security Council hamstrung by ‘first world’ v’ second world’ rivalry. • 2.Foreign aid in the cold war era: providers’ (US, USSR, China, OPEC, Japan, UK, France, Germany; WBankl policy rationales not democracy promotion. • 3.The turning point: impact of events in the Soviet Union after Gorbachev became leader (1985) and end of ‘Brezhnev doctrine’. Affects North-South relations as well as East-West relations: window of opportunity for West to apply pressure for political change in developing countries without consequences for East-West balance of power • 4. ‘Third world’ countries became more vulnerable as lose ‘second world’ financial, economic and political support; also, fear aid diversion of Western aid to transition countries in former second world; collapsing appeal of alternative ideology(communism) . • 5. Do not underestimate domestic pressures for political change inside the developing world, provides a demand-pull complement to the supply side push in political development support. Gives legitimacy. But were domestic demands for change primarily aimed at political reform or at economic improvement?

From Foreign (Economic) Aid to Political Development Support • 4.Supply side aid institutions’ opportunistic response to growing 'aid fatigue' at home. • Origins of 'aid fatigue' in the US (disappearance of cold war rationale); and everywhere a growing frustration at aid's weak developmental performance notwithstanding introduction of economic conditionality, and sensitivity to domestic public concern about aiding corrupt and/or incompetent governments, while having to impose fiscal austerity at home. • 5. Early precursors of democracy promotion: President Carter’s human rights policy in late 1970s did not last. • 6.Political (development aid) rejuvenates aid’s moral purpose – a good sell at home – and costs less than economic development aid!

New Thinking about International Relations • 5.Evolving thinking about an international regime of rights - rights belong to people, not governments - and about international obligations – the former state-based notions of national sovereignty are put on the defensive against the role of the ‘international community’ in protecting and/or furthering the rights of peoples (even against their own government ignores or represses the people’s rights). Democracy an entitlement? • Modelling a new norm of international democracy protection and/or promotion on the evolving doctrine of humanitarian intervention (which may even justify use of force and ignoring the objections of the government). • Is it a right – or an obligation – of the international community to do this? And who/what is the international community – same as the UN; other organisations?

Conclusions • Conclusion: the collapse of the USSR and relaxation of former constraints on international ‘diplomacy’, the need for a new rationale for aid given the background of development failures, and the 'pull factor' from peoples seeking political change from their governments all combined to create a favourable environment for international promotion of democracy to take off in the 1990s. • Advances in ‘humanitarian intervention’ begin to look conducive to the evolution – ultimately - of a new doctrine of democracy intervention. • In reality this never got off the drawing board and eventually became ‘dead in the water’ after the US response to 9/11. The idea that the international community has a ‘responsibility 2protect’ is what remains, but restricted to circumstances of specific human rights abuses (genocide; war crimes, ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity), does not have status of international law, and its application is frustrated by the power politics that divide influential states.

IPDP • Session 6: the developmental case for democracy promotion • Aim of Lecture: to examine the intellectual rationales/case for promoting democracy, focusing today on the developmental case. • Note: this is not the same question as the historical origins – how DP came about (see previous lecture), • And note the same question as why certain actors embraced DP and try to do it - the actual policy motives (see later lecture).

The Way We Used to Think • The 'cruel choice' theory (1960s) – pursue either development, or democracy, but not both. Investment requires abstinence from consumption, which is politically unpopular. • The performance of East Asia’s dragons/tigers provides evidence that non-democracies can and do deliver development. • Modernisation school of development proposes that political development will follow economic change; the ‘wealth theory of democracy’ (Lipset) then kicks in. So everything can work out fine in the long run. • Bias towards strong executive government as a means to implement the 'Washington consensus' that requires structural (economic ) adjustment, embodied in conditional programme lending (1980s). ‘No pain, no gain’ a hard sell, politically. So democracy/democratisation unwelcome distractions, or worse, present political obstructions to rational (economic) imperatives.

International Politics of Democracy Promotion PO229