Utilizing the NSS to Create a Next Generation Nuclear Material Security Regime

1. Utilizing the NSS to Create a Next Generation Nuclear Material Security Regime Conference on the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit and Next Generation Nuclear Security Seoul, Republic of Korea November 2, 2011 Kenneth N. LuongoPresident, Partnership for Global Security

2. Building on the 2010 NSS’ Foundation • The Washington Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) was successful both in terms of political will and substantive achievement. It underscored and solidified the existing regime and accelerated implementation of some key issues and programs. • But, it did not push the boundaries of the current nuclear material security regime, and this must happen to protect global and growing fissile material stockpiles against evolving threats. • Today, the regime is almost entirely nationally focused and voluntary. • But, nuclear crises do not respect borders, and national approaches and regulations alone are insufficient to protect the global community. We must not wait for a nuclear terrorist version of Fukushima before taking coordinated international action. • The international community needs to get and stay ahead of potential crisis events.

3. The Goal for Seoul • The Seoul summit should be a clear and important pivot point for adapting the nuclear security agenda to meet 21st century threats. • It should articulate clear objectives anddefine a process for meeting them. • It should endorse new initiatives, funding streams, and partnering. • The 2012 NSS must be more than a restatement of 2010’s goals – It must advance the regime further. • To evolve the regime, we must grapple with issues of: • National Sovereignty • Information Transparency • Policy Consensus • Regime Harmonization

4. Three Objectives and Four Opportunities • There should be three objectives for the Seoul NSS and beyond. • Preventing nuclear terrorism using fissile materials (HEU & Pu) • Preventing nuclear terrorism using high intensity radiological sources • Preventing an unauthorized radioactive release from nuclear reactors • We have four opportunities to move these objectives forward: • Government NSS • Seoul industry event • Seoul experts event • Beyond Seoul (with or without future summits)

5. Five Actions for the Future • Five actions are needed to innovate the existing nuclear material security regime and make it more secure, robust, and responsive: • Endorse and develop an international nuclear material and radiological security standard/baseline • Apply elements of the nuclear safety regime, including regularized assessments, information sharing, and peer review, to the security regime • Build a 21st century nuclear architecture that streamlines existing elements of the nuclear material security regime and improves the safety and security of all nuclear facilities and materials worldwide • Knit together the key stakeholders – government, industry, and expert communities • Ensure adequate funding support for nuclear material security efforts from a diverse funding base, including the G-8 Global Partnership and new contributions from NSS and G-20 states

6. Where Do We Go From Here • The summit forum offers an opportunity for making progress on a scale that otherwise would not exist because of the large number of countries involved and the attendance by national leaders. • Continued high level political involvement is critical because most of the international institutions thatdeal with nuclear material security are technical, while the regime’s challenges are often political. • Each summit needs to be viewed as a chance to strengthen and improve the regime further beyond its current limits. • If NSS participants support an evolution of the summit’s purpose and agenda, it will have the flexibility and strength to drive progress on nuclear security governance into the future. • If they do not, we will need to find another way forward – that probably should be a self-selected group of willing nations and nuclear leaders that recognize that more needs to be done and are willing to break free from the lowest common denominator multilateral and consensus approach.

7. Contact Information Kenneth N. LuongoPresident, PGS Email: kluongo@partnershipforglobalsecurity.org Partnership for Global Security1025 Connecticut Ave., NWSuite 506Washington, D.C. 20036 Phone: 202-332-1412Fax: 202-332-1413