Secure Software Reusability with Binary Analysis Framework

1. Analyzing and Transforming Binary Code (for Fun & Profit) Gopal Gupta R. Venkitaraman, R. Reghuramalingam The University of Texas at Dallas 11/15/2004

2. The Components Marketplace • COTS Component based software engg has been touted as a pathway to improving productivity (now called web-services) • However: many obstacles to be surmounted: • Discovering that the needed component exists • Checking that the component is compliant • Checking that the component is secure

3. Companies Cost of Project Software Reuse & System Integration But, the Integrated System does not work

4. Our work • Design of a Universal Service-Semantics Description Language (USDL) [ECOWS’05] • Construction of automatic service discovery and service composition engines • Once a service/component has been down-loaded, ensuring that it is compliant & safe

5. Analyzing & Transforming Binaries • Most of the time when a component/service is obtained, only the binary code is available (source code is properietary). • Compliance and safety checks have to be done on the binary code. • Our thesis: this is quite feasible • Illustrate compliance check with an example from DSP industry. • Illustrate code securing by transforming binary for protecting from buffer overflow attacks.

6. Analyzing DSP codes: Motivation • Facilitate software reuse in the DSP industry • DSP h/w manufacturers are interested in developing DSP software COTS components so that time to market is small • DSP components generally available only in binary form (no source code) • DSP software uses low-level optimizations for efficiency • Need to ensure that these optimizations do not interfere with reusability

7. Our Framework • We develop necessary and sufficient conditions that ensure that a software binary is reusable • We relate these conditions to TI’s XDAIS standard • We show how static analysis can be used to check if these conditions hold • We illustrate this through analysis for detecting hard coded pointers

8. Conditions to ensure reusablility • C1: The binary code should not change during execution in a way that link-time symbol resolution will become invalid • C2: The binary code should not be written in a way that it needs to be located starting from some fixed location in the virtual memory

9. Broadening the Conditions • C1 and C2 are hard to characterize and even harder to detect • So, broaden the conditions C1 and C2 to get conditions C3 and C4

10. Framework to ensure reusability • C3: The binary code is re-entrant • No self-modifying code • Should not make link-time symbol resolution invalid • C4: The binary code should not contain any hard-wired memory addresses • Binaries should not be assumed to be located at a fixed virtual memory location

11. TI XDAIS Standard • Contains 35 rules and 15 guidelines • SIX General Programming Rules • No tool currently exists to check for compliance • We want to build a tool to ENFORCE software compliance for these rules

12. XDAIS – General Programming Rules • All programs should follow the runtime conventions of TI’s C programming language • Programs must be re-entrant • No hard coded data memory locations • No hard coded program memory locations • Algorithms must characterize their ROM-ability • No peripheral device accessed directly

13. Advantages Of Compliant Code • Allows system integrators to easily migrate between TI DSP chips • Subsystems from multiple software vendors can be integrated into a single system • Programs are framework-agnostic: the same program can be efficiently used in virtually any application

14. XDAIS vs. Our Framework • Rule 1 is not really a programming rule, since it requires compliance with TI's definition of the C Language • Rules 2 through 5 are manifestations of conditions C3 and C4 above. • Rules 2 and 5 correspond to condition C3 • Rules 3, 4, and 6 correspond to condition C4

15. XDAIS – General Programming Rules • All programs should follow the runtime conventions of TI’s C programming language • Programs must be re-entrant • No hard coded data memory locations • No hard coded program memory locations • Algorithms must characterize their ROM-ability • No peripheral device accessed directly

16. Problem and Solution • Problem: Detection of hard coded addresses in programs without accessing source code. • Solution: “Static Program Analysis of Assembly Code”

17. Some examples showing hardcoding void main() { int *p, val; p = ….; val = …; if(val) p = 0x900; else p = malloc(…); *p; } Example3: Conditional Hardcoding void main() { int * p = 0x8800; // Some code *p = …; } Example1: Directly Hardcoded void main() { int *p = 0x80; int *q = p; //Some code *q = …; } Example2: Indirectly Hardcoded NOTE: We don’t care if a pointer is hard coded and is never dereferenced.

18. Static Analysis • Un-decidability: Impossible to build a tool that will precisely detect hard coding • Static Analysis: defined as any analysis of a program carried out without completely executing the program

19. Interest in Static Analysis • “We actually went out and bought for 30 million dollars, a company that was in the business of building static analysis tools and now we want to focus on applying these tools to large-scale software systems” • Remarks by Bill Gates, 17th Annual ACM Conference on Object-Oriented Programming, Systems, Languages and Application, November 2002.

20. Hard Coded Addresses • Bad Programming Practice. • Results in non relocatable code. • Results in non reusable code.

21. Overview Of Our Approach • Input: Object Code of the Software • Output: Compliant or Not Compliant status Obtain Basic Blocks Split Into Functions Disassemble Object Code Output the Result Static Analysis Obtain Flow Graph Activity Diagram for our Static Analyzer

22. Basic Aim Of Analysis • Find a pathto trace pointer origin. • Problem: Exponential Complexity • Static Analysis approximation makes it linear

23. Analyzing Source Code – Easy #include<stdio.h> void main() { int *p, *q; //some code p = (int*)8000; //some code q = p; //some code *q = 5; } So, the program is not compliant with the standard P IS HARD CODED { { p } } { { q } }

24. Analyzing Assembly Code is Hard • Problem • No type information is available • Instruction level pipeline and parallelism • Solution • Backward analysis • Use Abstract Interpretation

25. Analyzing Assembly – Hard {{ }} 000007A0 main: 000007A0 07BD09C2 SUB.D2 SP,0x8,SP 000007A4 020FA02A MVK.S2 0x1f40,B4 000007A8 023C22F6 STW.D2T2 B4,*+SP[0x1] 000007AC 00002000 NOP 2 000007B0 023C42F6 STW.D2T2 B4,*+SP[0x2] 000007B4 00002000 NOP 2 000007B8 0280A042 MVK.D2 5,B5 000007BC 029002F6 STW.D2T2 B5,*+B4[0x0] 000007C0 00002000 NOP 2 000007C4 008C8362 BNOP.S2 B3,4 000007C8 07BD0942 ADD.D2 SP,0x8,SP 000007CC 00000000 NOP 000007D0 00000000 NOP B4 = 0x1f40 So, B4 is HARD CODED Code is NOT Compliant { { B4} } {{ B4 }}

26. Abstract Interpretation Based Analysis • Domains from which variables draw their values are approximated by abstract domains • The original domains are called concrete domains

27. Lattice Abstraction • Lattice based abstraction is used to determine pointer hard-coded ness.

28. Contexts • Contexts to Abstract Contexts • Abstract Context to Context

29. Phases In Analysis • Phase 1: Find the set of dereferenced pointers • Phase 2: Check the safety of dereferenced pointers

30. Building Unsafe Sets (Phase 1) • The first element is added to the unsafe set during pointer dereferencing. • E.g.If“*Reg” in the disassembled code, the unsafe set is initialized to {Reg}. • ‘N’ Pointers Dereferenced  ‘N’ Unsafe sets • Maintained as SOUS (Set Of Unsafe Sets)

31. Populating Unsafe Sets (Phase 2) • For e.g., if • Reg = reg1 + reg2, the element “Reg” is deleted from the unsafe set, and the elements “reg1”, “reg2”, are inserted into the unsafe set. • Contents of the unsafe set will now become {reg1, reg2}.

32. Pointer Arithmetic • All pointer operations are abstracted during analysis

33. Handling Loops • Complex:# iterations of loop may not be known until runtime. • Cycle the loop until the unsafe set reaches a “fixed point”. • No new information is added to the unsafe set during successive iterations.

34. Merging Information • If no merging, then exponential complexity. • Mandatory when loops • Information loss. Block A If (Cond) Then Block B Else Block C Block D Block E

35. Extensive Compliance Checking • Handle all cases that occur in programs • Single pointer, double pointer, triple pointer… • Global pointer variables • Static and Dynamic arrays

36. Extensive Compliance Checking • Loops – all forms (e.g. for, while…) • Function calls • Pipelining and Parallelism • Merging information from multiple paths

37. Proof – Analysis is Sound • Consistency of α and γ functions is established by showing the existence of Galois Connection. That is, • x = α(γ(x)) • y belongs to γ(α(y))

38. Analysis Results

39. Sample Code

40. Fig. Flow Graph

41. Related Work • UNO Project – Bell Labs • Analyze at source level • TI XDAIS Standard • Contains35 rules and 15 guidelines. • SIXGeneral Programming Rules. • No tool currently exists to check for compliance.

42. Current Status and Future Work • Prototype Implementation done • But, context insensitive, intra-procedural • Extend to context sensitive, inter-procedural. • Extend compliance check for other rules.

43. So… • Software reuse is an important issue in the industry, particularly the DSP industry • Checking compatibility of code w/ reusability standards at assembly level is possible • A Static Analysis based technique is useful and practical

44. Buffer Overflow Attack-proofing • Sample Code void function (char *a, char* b, char* c) { char buffer1[8]; } void main( ){ function (“foo”, “bar”, “ren”); } Stack at the start ff ff ff ff ESP Stack Heap Data Code 00

45. Stack Organization: Before a Call • Sample Code void function (char* a, char* b, char* c){ char buffer1[8]; } void main( ){ function(“foo”, “bar”, “ren”); } Stack before a call Stack Param 3 = “ren” Param 2 = “bar” Param 1 = “foo” ESP Heap, Data & Code Parameters

46. Stack Organization: After a Call • Sample Code void function (char* a, char* b, char* c){ char buffer1[8]; } void main( ){ function(“foo”, “bar”, “ren”); } Stack after a function call Stack Param 3 = “foo” Param 2 = “bar” Param 1 = “ren” Return address ebp EBP Local variables . ESP Local variables . . Heap, Data & Code

47. Buffer Overflow • Sample Code void function (char *str){ char buffer1[8]; strcpy (buffer1, str); } void main( ){ char large_str[256] ; for (int i=0; i<255; i++) large_str[i] = ‘A’; function(large_str); Label: } • New return address =41414141 Stack showing buffer overflow Stack Strcpy writes 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 Large_str (Size = 64) Label: 41 41 41 41 Return address 41 41 41 41 Pointer ebp 41 41 41 41 Garbage Buffer1 (Size = 2)

48. Abusing the Buffer Overflow • Step 1: Overwrite the return address with an address that points ‘back’ to the buffer area • Step 2: Insert code that you wish to execute in the buffer area • Step 3: Buffer start of inserted code with NOP instructions • Step 4: Eliminate any null values in inserted code Stack used to abuse Buffer Overflow Stack Return Address ebp NOP NOP mov eax,ebx add eax, 1

49. Buffer Overflow: Security Concern • Percentage of buffer overflows listed in CERT advisories each year • Some examples include Windows 2003 server, sendmail, windows HTML conversion library Percentage of Buffer Overflows Per Year as listed by CERT [1]

50. Buffer Overflow Solutions • RAD: RAD stores the return address in RAR area • It is a gcc compiler patch. All code has to recompiled • Stackguard: Stackguard inserts a ‘canary’ word to protect return address • The ‘canary’ word can be compromised • Splint: Splint allows the user to write annotations in the code that define allocated and used sizes • User is required to write annotations • Wagner’s Prevention Method: Static analysis solution • Depends on source code availability