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Budapest, September 29-30, 2011 Terrorism and Democracy in the 21 st Century. Supervising Intelligence Networks: the new challenge for oversight Peter Gill University of Liverpool, UK p.gill@liv.ac.uk. The context. The human costs of terrorism and counter-terrorism since 9/11:
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Budapest, September 29-30, 2011Terrorism and Democracy in the 21st Century Supervising Intelligence Networks: the new challenge for oversight Peter Gill University of Liverpool, UK p.gill@liv.ac.uk
The context • The human costs of terrorism and counter-terrorism since 9/11: • 150k civilians killed (c10% in ‘terrorist attacks) • 60k ‘insurgents’/’terrorists’ killed • 42k national/foreign police/military killed (Burke, 2011, 500-505) • The political cost to democracy: • Enhanced corporatist security-intelligence-industrial complex beyond democratic control and oversight • Threatening democracy in order to save it?
Intelligence control and oversight • Intelligence: ‘mainly secret activities... intended to enhance security and/or maintain power relative to competitors by forewarning of threats and opportunities’ (Gill, 2009, 214) • can they be subject to democratic control and oversight in the interests of effectiveness, efficiency, legality, propriety and respect for rights?
Oversight: the story so far... Studies of oversight have concentrated on state intelligence (military, police, security...) But, two other intelligence sectors/actors: • corporations: a) competitive/business b) security, especially private security and military companies; ‘in-house’ in mining, banking etc; • ‘sovereignties’: groups willing to use violence to control people, resources, territory (Warner, 2009), e.g. paramilitaries, national liberation movements, militias, criminal organisations.
Security and Intelligence Networks • Important relationships between sectors • Networks also across local and national levels • Why? a) ideologies: actors in different sectors may be in alliance or in conflict (or, in some cases, work together for limited purposes) b) interdependencies: personnel, technologies, access to sources, shared objectives ... • How? May be formal/contractual or informal/deniable. • Depend on trust and reciprocity
Overseeing networks: an impossibility? Progress in overseeing states: legalisation via legislation, oversight (judicial, parliamentary, civil society), but networks? • ORCON, secrecy and resistance • Rules, terms of reference and ‘gatekeepers’ • Political will, resources and self-denial • How about oversight networks: national and transnational, official and civil society? (cf. Born, Leigh & Wills (eds.) 2011; Marty, 2007)
Conclusion: some agenda items... • How significant is ‘terrorism’ compared with other security threats? • 2010: 18/27 EU members had no terrorist attacks (Europol, 2011) • How can new corporatist security intelligence complex be scrutinised – for effectiveness and legality? • the issue of militarisation. • The paradox of oversight: necessary to develop state capacity (including regulation of private companies and suppression of uncivil sovereignties) and enhance oversight of the state. Thank you
References Born, Hans , Ian Leigh and Aidan Wills (eds.) 2011, International intelligence Cooperation and Accountability, London: Routledge. (esp. chapters by Born & Wills, Forcese, Hayez, Leigh, Wills & Born, Wright.) Burke, Jason, 2011, The 9/11 Wars, London: Allen Lane. Europol, 2011, EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report, April Gill, Peter, 2009, ‘Theories of intelligence,’ Gill, Marrin & Phythian (eds.) Intelligence Theory: key questions and debates, Routledge, 208-26. Marty, Dick, 2007, Secret detentions and unlawful transfers, CoE. Warner, Mike, 2009, ‘’Intelligence as risk shifting,’ Gill, Marrin & Phythian (eds.) Intelligence Theory: key questions and debates, Routledge, 16-32.