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Evaluating the Impact of Performance-related Pay for teachers in England

Evaluating the Impact of Performance-related Pay for teachers in England. Adele Atkinson, Simon Burgess, Bronwyn Croxson, Paul Gregg, Carol Propper, Helen Slater, Deborah Wilson. Background.

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Evaluating the Impact of Performance-related Pay for teachers in England

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  1. Evaluating the Impact of Performance-related Pay for teachers in England Adele Atkinson, Simon Burgess, Bronwyn Croxson, Paul Gregg, Carol Propper, Helen Slater, Deborah Wilson

  2. Background • Improving education outcomes key priority for governments, but evidence suggests poor returns from simply raising school resources. • One alternative mechanism: incentives for teachers, but rel. little evidence on impact. • 1999: UK government introduced performance related pay scheme for teachers (the “Performance Threshold”). • Performance assessed across five criteria, inc. pupil progress (value-added). www.bris.ac.uk/Depts/CMPO/

  3. What we do in this paper • Quantitative evaluation of the impact of this PRP scheme for teachers on pupil test score gains. • Design • Longitudinal teacher-level data and a difference-in-difference research design. • Link pupils to their teachers for each subject; collect prior attainment data for each pupil. • So control for teacher and pupil fixed effects. • Also control for differences in teacher experience. • Incentive scheme had significant effects on pupil progress. www.bris.ac.uk/Depts/CMPO/

  4. Outline of the talk • Current evidence (in paper, not here) • The National Curriculum • The PRP scheme • Data • Evaluation methodology • Results • Conclusion www.bris.ac.uk/Depts/CMPO/

  5. The National Curriculum • Centralised system of control over national exams and teacher pay scales. • All pupils tested at the end of each Key Stage of the National Curriculum. • KS1 and KS2 tests taken at ages 7 and 11; KS3 and KS4 (GCSE) taken at ages 14 and 16. • KS1, 2, 3 tests taken in English, maths, science. • These subjects compulsory also at KS4. • We focus on KS4 and value added between KS3 and KS4. www.bris.ac.uk/Depts/CMPO/

  6. The PRP scheme • Labour administration 1998 Green Paper: range of reforms to education, inc. performance-related element to teacher pay. • The ‘Performance Threshold’ introduced in 1999/2000; first applications in July 2000. • The Performance Threshold itself was one element of larger pay reform, designed to affect teacher effort, as well as recruitment and retention. www.bris.ac.uk/Depts/CMPO/

  7. The PRP scheme II • Prior to the PRP scheme, all teachers paid on unified basic salary scale which had 9 full points. • Position on scale depended on qualifications and/or experience; progress through annual increments. Plus additional management points available. • 1999/2000: approx. 75% of teachers at top of scale, at spine point 9. www.bris.ac.uk/Depts/CMPO/

  8. The PRP scheme III • After the reforms, teachers on spine point 9 could apply to pass the Performance Threshold. 2 effects: • Annual bonus of £2,000. • Move onto the Upper Pay Scale (UPS): additional spine points, each of which related to performance. www.bris.ac.uk/Depts/CMPO/

  9. The PRP scheme IV • To pass the Threshold, teachers had to demonstrate effectiveness in five areas, including pupil progress (value added). • Forms submitted by July 2000. Assessed by headteacher and external assessor. • Initial Threshold payments funded out of a separate, central budget; no quota or limit. • The vast majority of eligible teachers both applied and were awarded the bonus. www.bris.ac.uk/Depts/CMPO/

  10. Was it incentive pay? • Wragg et al (2001) survey of 1000 schools • In these schools, 88% of the eligible teachers applied, and of these 97% were awarded the bonus • Unconditional pay increase - little effect on teacher effort. • But • Ex ante (Marsden) survey suggests teachers believed it to be ‘real’ • UPS element clearly performance related www.bris.ac.uk/Depts/CMPO/

  11. Teacher survey before implementation www.bris.ac.uk/Depts/CMPO/

  12. Data requirements • Control for pupil prior attainment to measure progress or value added: • KS3-GCSE; English, maths, science. • Longitudinal element: • Follow same teachers through two complete KS3-GCSE teaching cycles (before and after scheme introduced). • Link pupils to teachers: • Obtain class lists direct from schools. www.bris.ac.uk/Depts/CMPO/

  13. Sample • First approached schools in 2000. • Onerous data requirements; problems with school information systems; teacher and headteacher turnover. • Final sample: • 18 schools. • 181 teachers (145 eligible; 36 not eligible). • Approx. 23,000 pupils. • No presumption that sample is representative. www.bris.ac.uk/Depts/CMPO/

  14. Evaluation Methodology • Pupil i; teacher j; teaching cycle t. • Teacher effectiveness, X; test score, g; value-added v. www.bris.ac.uk/Depts/CMPO/

  15. Teacher mean scores: • Difference between two tranches: www.bris.ac.uk/Depts/CMPO/

  16. Differencing between eligible and ineligible teachers. D(x) operator means: D(x)  E(x|DI=1) – E(x|DI=0) • This is the difference-in-difference. If • This yields: www.bris.ac.uk/Depts/CMPO/

  17. For value-added: • And same steps as before yield the following as the diff-in-diff: www.bris.ac.uk/Depts/CMPO/

  18. Key issues • Parameters of interest are: • g3b for gross test score • m2b for value added • Role of experience profile: • If f(W) is linear, no problem, as DDf(W) = 0 • If concave, diff-in-diff underestimates parameters of interest, as DDf(W) < 0. www.bris.ac.uk/Depts/CMPO/

  19. Experience Profile www.bris.ac.uk/Depts/CMPO/

  20. Key issues (cont.) • Experimental design and pupil assignment: • No grouping on effort. • Timing of class assignment. www.bris.ac.uk/Depts/CMPO/

  21. Results • Difference-in-difference results • Regressions • Robustness checks • Interpretation and evaluation www.bris.ac.uk/Depts/CMPO/

  22. Table 2: D-inD analysis: GCSEs www.bris.ac.uk/Depts/CMPO/

  23. Table 3: D-in-D VA Means www.bris.ac.uk/Depts/CMPO/

  24. Experience Difference • Potentially need to control for systematic differences in experience: ideal: non-parametrically defined experience-effectiveness profile. • Not enough data to do that, so define a ‘novice’ teacher dummy picking out teachers with least experience. www.bris.ac.uk/Depts/CMPO/

  25. Table 4: GCSE Analysis www.bris.ac.uk/Depts/CMPO/

  26. Table 5: Value Added Analysis www.bris.ac.uk/Depts/CMPO/

  27. Table 6: Subject Differences www.bris.ac.uk/Depts/CMPO/

  28. Robustness checks • Leave out novices to just compare eligibles and ineligibles with pretty similar experience. • Ceiling effects on marks: just look at pupils in bottom 75% of KS3 distribution • Robust to these www.bris.ac.uk/Depts/CMPO/

  29. Evaluation • One standard deviation in the teacher-mean change in GCSE is 1.29, and 0.58 for VA • Coefficients on eligibility of 0.890 for GCSE change and 0.422 for VA change • As percentages of a standard deviation these are 69% and 73% • Alternatively, eligibility dummy is 67% of the novice teacher dummy for GCSE change, and 78% for VA change. www.bris.ac.uk/Depts/CMPO/

  30. Conclusions • Rich data, research design which controls for teacher and pupil effects • Results: around 0.5 GCSE grade per pupil • Caveats • Was it incentive pay and the experience-effectiveness profile • Extra effort or effort diversion? www.bris.ac.uk/Depts/CMPO/

  31. Additional slides www.bris.ac.uk/Depts/CMPO/

  32. Table 2: Summary teacher stats www.bris.ac.uk/Depts/CMPO/

  33. Table 3: Summary pupil stats www.bris.ac.uk/Depts/CMPO/

  34. Table 4: Comparative stats www.bris.ac.uk/Depts/CMPO/

  35. Data requested from schools www.bris.ac.uk/Depts/CMPO/

  36. www.bris.ac.uk/Depts/CMPO/

  37. www.bris.ac.uk/Depts/CMPO/

  38. www.bris.ac.uk/Depts/CMPO/

  39. Table 12: Distributional Impacts www.bris.ac.uk/Depts/CMPO/

  40. Table 13: Robustness checks www.bris.ac.uk/Depts/CMPO/

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