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Trade Policy, Food Crops Marketing and Trade. CORNERSTONES OF THE TRADE POLICYThe National Trade Policy 2003Developed to oversee a competitive economy and export led growthRecognizes: importance of trade openness in raising efficiency and productivitythe need to go beyond reduction of tariff
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1. THE COMPATIBILITY OF TRADE POLICY WITH DOMESTIC POLICY INTERVENTIONS AFFECTING THE GRAINS SECTOR IN TANZANIA Andrew E. Temu
Sokoine University of Agriculture
2. Trade Policy, Food Crops Marketing and Trade CORNERSTONES OF THE TRADE POLICY
The National Trade Policy 2003
Developed to oversee a competitive economy and export led growth
Recognizes:
importance of trade openness in raising efficiency and productivity
the need to go beyond reduction of tariff and non-tariff barriers
The need for appropriate sector policies
The need to transform agriculture
and accords due weight to supply-side constraints
Envisions
- a role for the government in selective interventions
efforts to conform to WTO rules and regulations
Amongst goals
Attaining 14% annual growth in trade, and
exports contribution to GDP 25%
3. Practical Political Challenges, Market Interventions and Trade Objectives of domestic markets interventions
reduction of price uncertainties to producers
stabilize farm incomes
protect farmers from exploitation by private dealers
reduce income inequalities between rural urban areas and between regions
provide adequate food to urban population at reasonable prices and hence maintain political stability,
extract agricultural surplus for the development of other sectors of the economy (taxation – even at LGAs),
guarantee foreign exchange earnings
Political Dilemma in Grains:
Farmer Income v/s Urban Dwellers Food security
Taxation for development versus lowered farmer income
Food security intervention strategies versus production incentives
Strategic grain reserve
Food aid and food aid counterpart funds
4. Restrictions of in-country regional Grain Flows and Cross Border Trade Tanzania, overall is food secured,
When there is production failure, mainly because of rainfall failure
The Most common reaction has been:
Restricted movements of grains
Often not based on critical analysis on the ground
At times allowable volumes are stipulated e.g. 0.5 tons
Effects:
Denies farmers of income in surplus producing areas
Anti-Market: Discourages production for markets
Enhances subsistence orientation of smallholder producers
Poor enforcement
Marketing and trade goes on but at high transactions costs
Enhances cross-border trade; itself illegal
7. Management of Strategic Grain ReserveA Politically appealing FS strategy tool Tanzania’s SGR
Strategic Reserve Act No 10 of 1991
15 Silos, Capacity=240,000 MT
Objective:
Price stabilisation; dampening price volatility
Maintain 150,000 tons of grains
Adequate to cover 3 months in case of food inadequacy to allow importation thereafter
Criticisms:
suppresses price volatility during buying
But raises volatility during disposal / release time
Inefficient, currently only 24% of the capacity is deployed
It is expensive, imposes pressure on government budget
Analysts suggest regional grain stocks/reserves and trade to be a better option
More analysis, however, is needed; both empirical and one that accommodates political imperatives.
8. Producer TaxationPolitical Dilemma: Decentralisation & Devolution v/s Centrally controlled Taxation Tanzania is committed to Decentralisation and Devolution
Much of the development initiatives and resources managed at LGAs
Accordingly, LGAs deserve autonomy in revenue generation
Agriculture is the major pre-occupation in most LGAs
Both export and food crops are therefore subject to taxation.
The tax levels vary across districts
In the 1992 Finance Act,
LGAs are limited to tax agricultural products only 5% of farm-gate price.
This is equivalent to an ad-valorem tax rate.
Though necessary for LGAs income and development,
Taxation is a disincentive to producers, especially marketers and trade oriented ones;
What are they paying for is the issue?
Compounded by deteriorating public agriculture services – extension
Enhances subsistence production
9. Management of Food Aid and FA Counterpart FundsPolitical Dilemma: Politics Surrounding Aid to LDCsIn Tanzania, food aid accounts for 90% of food imports Food aid and its effects on local crop production sectors: A known debate
A Special Tanzanian example: Counterpart food aid fund
Rice, imported and bought/distributed by commercial bidders
Funds generated are intended for supporting agricultural productivity
A political trap to favouring the scheme!
Problems: Fungibility of funds and Inability of Govt to police processes
Unfair bidding and price setting have created monopolists in grain marketing and food aid counterpart funds
Generated funds are politically allocated to projects
Non-agricultural; most have built schools – politically appealing with quick results
Imports’ effects on local markets
Imports not coinciding with times of shortage depresses domestic prices
Imported rice fetches lower market price than domestically produced
Imported rice used for reconstituting domestic rice, 1:5 ratio, and sold at higher prices
10. However, the lack of Interventions is more crucial! Domestic Market interventions is not the only issue
There not being interventions is more pertinent in Tanzania
There is a broad range of interventions needed to address ‘supply side’ , ‘behind-the-border’ constrains
11. Grain Marketing Chain: Large v/s Small Scale Players in the Chain
12. Supply Side and ‘Behind-the-Border’ Constraints- Boring!- The NTP emphasises but much has yet to be done Scale economies and entrepreneurial skills:
Smallholder Productivity challenge; .25 to 3ha of low-value-bulk-commodities
Productivity: Inputs supply and use
Lowest yield levels in the region
Weak producer and marketers organisations
Remnants of top down coops; very slow emergence of strong farmer groups
Grain post harvest storage
Only large farmers and traders have such storage
Agriculture finance: bankers’ dilemma
Risk: Very many small producers, scattered, vulnerable to vagaries
Weather, pests, diseases, markets etc
Extension
Decentralisation, lack of BDS providers; auguring with smallholders
Market information
Asymmetrical information; smallholders succumb, weak bargaining position
Marketing infrastructure
Rural roads, storage, etc
13. Thank you for your attentionAndrew Temu