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Captain John M. Cox, FRAeS CEO Safety Operating Systems

“Loss of Control, Avoidance, Recognition and Recovery”. Captain John M. Cox, FRAeS CEO Safety Operating Systems. Fatalities 2000-09. Flight International. Fatalities Per Million Departures. 1990-94: 1.32 serious accidents/million deps . 1995-99: 1.06 2000-04: 0.58 2005-09: 0.55.

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Captain John M. Cox, FRAeS CEO Safety Operating Systems

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  1. “Loss of Control, Avoidance, Recognition and Recovery” Captain John M. Cox, FRAeS CEO Safety Operating Systems

  2. Fatalities 2000-09 Flight International

  3. Fatalities Per Million Departures 1990-94: 1.32 serious accidents/million deps. 1995-99: 1.06 2000-04: 0.58 2005-09: 0.55

  4. Rate of Fatal Accidents

  5. CAST/ICAO Accident Taxonomy

  6. CFIT Decreasing • 1997 – 2006 – 20 of 89 accidents CFIT or 22.5% • 1998 – 2007 – 18 of 90 accidents CFIT or 20% • 1999 – 2008 – 17 of 91accidents CFIT or 18.7%

  7. Loss Of Control Continues As The Number 1 Cause Of Accidents • 1997 - 2006 – 19 of 89 accidents LOC-I or 21.3% • 1998 - 2007 – 22 of 90 accidents LOC-I or 24.4% • 1999 - 2008 – 22 of 91 accidents LOC-I or 24.2% • Trend is not improving

  8. CFIT vs. LOC-I Commercial Jet Fleet

  9. CFIT vs. LOC-I Commercial Jet Fleet

  10. Results of Business Jet Data Review • 35 accidents • 14 would have been helped with Upset Training • 6 might have been helped with Upset Training • Avoidance – Recognition - Recovery

  11. Breakdown of LOC-I Training Need

  12. Threat • Stall is leading cause of LOC-I • NTSB Study 20 LOC-I accidents 1986-1996 • Veillette Aviation Week May 2009 • 29 LOC-I accidents • 13 of 29 on takeoff – usually not recoverable • 16 approach and landing • 6 circling approach

  13. Loss Of Control AccidentCauses Upset Recovery Training Aid rev1

  14. Critical Skills Avoidance!

  15. Critical Skills • Recognition • What is happening? • Am I stalled? • Avoidance of upset • Recovery • Before the upset • Stall • After the upset • Stall

  16. Colgan 3407

  17. Control Column Pitch Angle of Attack Colgan 3407 – NTSB DFDR Plots

  18. Control Wheel Roll

  19. LOC-I C-5 Near Loss This is the most terrifying video I have seen

  20. Upset Recovery Training History• Causes •Solutions

  21. Baseline Knowledge Pilots today are not aerodynamicists

  22. Baseline Knowledge • Past assumptions were WRONG • Many pilot do not know needed aerodynamics • Most have not seen a transport fully stalled • Simulators do not accurately replicate this portion of the envelope • Power out recovery techniques may not work • High altitude • High drag • Full stall

  23. Angle Of Attack Angle of attack (AOA, α, Greek letteralpha) is a term used in aerodynamics to describe the angle between the chord line of an airfoil and the vector representing the relative motion between the airfoil and the air. It can be described as the angle between where the chord line of the airfoil is pointing and where the airfoil is going. Wikipedia

  24. Basic Aerodynamics Different Wings Different Stall Characteristics Wild ride Aerodynamics for Naval Aviators

  25. Basic Aerodynamics Lift Drag How many pilots really understand this? Aerodynamics for Naval Aviators

  26. Basic Aerodynamics At 40,000 feet only 30% thrust is available Thrust available vs. Altitude Aerodynamics for Naval Aviators

  27. Basic Aerodynamics • As coefficient of lift increases so does drag • There is high drag coefficient at critical angle of attack – stall • Powering out of a stall may not be an option

  28. Basic Aerodynamics • At stall there is high drag – wing and fuselage • At cruise altitude there is limited thrust available • Recovery at cruise altitude is different than at 10,000 feet

  29. Stall Characteristics • Jets are unstable when stalled • Jets will roll when stalled • Ailerons are not effective when stalled • Angle of Attack must be reduced to regain control

  30. It May NOT Be Possible to Power Out Of A Stall At Cruise Altitude • Reduce Angle of Attack • Accelerate • Recover to NORMAL flight • Monitor “G” loading in recovery

  31. New Stall Procedure • Airbus and Boeing have recently changed stall recovery procedure • Reduce angle of attack – Nose down • Wings level • Thrust Increase • Speed brakes retracted • Return to normal flight There will be some altitude loss

  32. Power vs. Pitch Courtesy of Captain Dave Carbaugh

  33. CAA UK 3 The standard stall recovery technique should therefore always emphasise the requirement to reduce the angle of attack so as to ensure the prompt return of the wing to full controllability. The reduction in angle of attack (and consequential height loss) will be minimal when the approach to the stall is recognised early, and the correct recovery action is initiated without delay. NOTE: Any manufacturer’s recommended stall recovery techniques must always be followed, and will take precedence over the technique described above should there be any conflicting advice.

  34. Zero Altitude Loss Stall TrainingPower Out Only IS NOT THE RIGHT WAY

  35. FAA Upset Definition 4.9 % Wait a Minute! What if I Am Not Stalled? • We Can’t Just Push Indiscriminately!!! Pitch (+up) + 90o Normal flight envelope + 50o + 30o + 25o Roll (Left) + 10o Roll (Right) 180o 135o 135o 90o 180o 90o - 10o - 50o - 90o Pitch (-down) FAA Upset Definition (45 AOB, +25 & -10 Pitch) Courtesy of APS 87.5 % PUSH-Valid Region 12.5 % PUSH-Possibly-Valid Region (20% Chance? ~ 2.5%)

  36. Simulator Aerodynamic Model David R. Gingras John N. Ralston

  37. Boeing Study

  38. Boeing Study

  39. Boeing Study

  40. When It Goes Right

  41. Fly By Wire Aircraft • Some people have said that FBW technology can eliminate LOC-I • Always respect and follow manufacturers guidance • Follow SOPs • Pilots usually train in conventional aircraft • Often Pilots transition to conventional aircraft • Pilots need more extensive LOC-I training

  42. How Does This Turn Out? It is a matter of the RIGHT training

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