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Nuclear Nonproliferation and Balance Role

Nuclear Nonproliferation and Balance Role for Future Strategic Relations Between the Republic of Korea and Australia CHOE, Kwan-Kyoo Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control (KINAC) Nautilus Institute research workshop

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Nuclear Nonproliferation and Balance Role

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  1. Nuclear Nonproliferation and Balance Role for Future Strategic Relations Between the Republic of Korea and Australia CHOE, Kwan-Kyoo Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control (KINAC) Nautilus Institute research workshop “Strong connections: Australia-Korea strategic relations – past, present and future” Seoul, 15-16 June, 2010

  2. Contents I. Introduction II. Nuclear Energy in Two Countries III. Regional Security and Nuclear Nonproliferation IV. Strategic Approaches for Future Cooperation V. Conclusion

  3. I. Introduction - 1 • Purposes of Presentation 1)Clarifying Common Aspects ○ Accents Highlighted to Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy 2) Interdependence and Synergetic Cooperation ○ Ways and Principles 3) Finding Out Balance Role for International Security and Peace ○ Geopolitical Aspects ○ Economic and Social Dimension ○ Political and Military Areas

  4. I. Introduction - 2 • Features of Mutual Relations 1) Relatively short history, but Cooperative and Complementary ○ End of the 2nd World War and start of mutual official contacts ○ Australia providing energy resources, raw materials, elaborately transformed manufactures, food and beverages, and technology and services to the ROK, while importing finished products such as cars, telecommunications equipment and computers. 2) Common Aspects and Fundamental Differences ○ Common aspects: Joint struggling experience against Japan Imperialism & against Communist expansionism, USA alliance policy strategy, relatively strong influence of Christianity in culture, coherent nuclear nonproliferation policy ○ Fundamental differences: European background & Northeast Asian geopolitical background, Pacific-Indian Ocean oriented strategic features and Eurasian Continent oriented characteristics, Minimum application of nuclear energy use and Maximum uses of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes

  5. I. Introduction - 3 • Strong and global engagement strategy 1) Both countries taking active engagement strategy to regional and global security issues ○ Korean War, Vietnam War, Iraq, Afghanistan, East Timor, etc. 2) Continued engagement and presence in the Asia-Pacific region of the United States is considered as a crucial element for performing the strategy by both countries 3) Strong anti-terrorism and active global movement against WMD proliferation • Strategy concept and balance roles 1) In terms of defense policy, both countries pursuing commonly the capacity to: ○ “act independently” where having unique strategic interests at stake ○ “lead military coalitions” where having shared strategic interests at stake with others ○ “make tailored contributions” to military coalitions where sharing wider strategic interests with others and willing to accept a share of the burden in securing those interests. Cf. ‘Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030’, p. 13 2) Geopolitical approaches and reinforcing balance of power by way of coalition strategy of the two ‘middle’ powers, which joined by European and USA alliance strategy

  6. Nuclear Energy in Two Countries - 1 • Position of nuclear energy 1) Australia: Abundant energy resources (Coal, LNG, Uranium, etc.) ○ Minimum application: 1 Research reactor with abundant Uranium ○Rich of fossil energy resources ○Nuclear energy policy ‘changeable’ considering its new security concern * Potential impact of climate change and resource security issues, involving future tensions over the supply of energy and water, Australia is not dare exclude nuclear energy for its full application (cf. ‘Defence White Paper 2009 - Defending Australia in the Asia/Pacific Century: Force 2030 –’, p. 39) 2) ROK: Import of 97% natural energy resources from abroad ○ 20 Reactors in operation, 8 under construction and 10 more to be built by 2030 (Release of the ROK’s Energy Basic Plan for 2008-2030 in August 2008) ○Vulnerability of energy security leading to efficient and sustainable energy resources: Nuclear energy and LNG (Second largest importer of LNG)

  7. II. Nuclear Energy in Two Countries - 2 • Strong engagement for nuclear nonproliferation 1) Australia’s position: ○ Combination of global institutional counter-proliferation measures and export control regimes with military power projection, including US extended deterrence cf. “Military power will continue to play an important role in the disruption of WMD proliferation activity <…> the best defence against WMD proliferation will continue to be found in security assurances, including US extended deterrence.” ○ Leading role in setting and operation of nuclear nonproliferation regimes: a . Global regimes: NPT, NSG, IAEA Safeguards systems, CTBT, CWC b. Regional and bilateral cooperation: APSN (Chair and Secretary Works), ICNND c. Asia’s major actor against nuclear nonproliferation:

  8. II. Nuclear Energy in Two Countries - 3 2) ROK’s position: Denuclearization and global nuclear nonproliferation ○Declaration of joint denuclearization of Korean peninsula (1991) ○Declaration of ‘4 Principles for peaceful uses of nuclear energy’(2004) ○Continuing Pursuit of transparency and international confidence * Broader Conclusion drawn by IAEA (June ‘08) and Implementation of IS (July ‘08) - All declared nuclear materials are appropriately accounted for, and there are no undeclared materials or activities of safeguards significances ○Joining to vendor club of nuclear reactor building (’09): For UAE and Jordan 3) Common point: Engagement for global nuclear nonproliferation ○How to cooperate with what common targets ?

  9. III. Regional Security and Nuclear Nonproliferation - 1 • Structure of regional security 1) First and unique place where nuclear bombs employed for real war 2) 4 main aspects of geopolitical conflicts ○ Maritime and Continental powers - Pacific-Indian Ocean & Eurasian Continent dimension ○ Asian and Western powers - China-Korea-Japan-ASEAN & USA-Russia-Oceania ○ Multiple religious powers - Islam & Hinduism & Buddhism & Christianity ○ Leftovers of the ideological conflicts - China, Vietnam, North Korea & Capitalism 3) Dynamics of divers economic levels and activities ○ USA, Japan, ROK, Australia – China, Russia – ASEAN – N. Korea, Mongolia ○ ‘ASEAN + 3’, ASEM & APEC, Competitive FTA, BRICs ○ Nuclear renaissance and new nuclear comer countries (Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, etc)

  10. III. Regional Security and Nuclear Nonproliferation - 2 • Regional security and nuclear nonproliferation 1) Regional instability ○Combination of 4 main factors of geopolitics 2) Realism or idealism for the international security ? ○Strategic approach for balance of power with institutional taking root 3) Priorities for regional security ○Removal of past traces: Clearing the Cold War leftovers, International cooperation for Korean peninsular reunification ○Strengthening of regional interdependence in social and economic dimensions ○Multilateral supports for democratization and social liberty ○ Nuclear nonproliferation and fundamental nuclear disarmament ○Comprehensive denuclearization of the region

  11. III. Regional Security and Nuclear Nonproliferation - 3 • Nuclear nonproliferation activities 1) Australia ○Implementation of Integrated Safeguards system after satisfying the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) of IAEA with its Additional Protocol(AP) ○Leading role in Asia-Pacific region - APSN establishment : basic and loose format (Non-binding) of nuclear community - ICNND (International Committee on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament) 2) ROK ○ ‘Declaration of ‘4 Principles for peaceful uses of nuclear energy’(2004) ○ One of the main targets of ‘6 Party Talks’: Denuclearization of Korean Peninsula ○ Strengthening of 3S (Safeguards, Security, Safety) in conjunction of nuclear uses ○Host for the 2nd Nuclear Security Summit in 2012 ○Launching for Establishment and Operation of International Education and Training Center for Nuclear Security, of which operation will be ready by 2012

  12. KHNP KNFC KAERI Education, R&D Non-nuclear Industry - 16 LWRs - 4 CANDUs - Additional NPPs • - LEU Fuel Fab. • CANDU Fuel Fab. • 11 Facilities • Hanaro, PIEF, • IMEF, Fuel R&D • (DUPIC, HFFL • CFFP, Lab.) Others • - R&D Projects - Education Rx. - R&D Org. • LOFs • Radiation Shield. • (RI use, RG) • Other non-nuclear • industries Safeguards Implementation - 1 Full-scope Safeguards Supplier NPT IAEA Report, Consultation Enhanced SSAC Utilization Multi/Bilateral Cooperation (SG, PP, Export Control) Compliance and Cooperation MEST LWR, CANDU Enhanced Cooperation Entrustment Report KINAC IAEA Inspection National Inspection Additional Protocol Reports

  13. Safeguards Implementation - 2 • IAEA Inspection • 36 MBAs (Nuclear Power Plant 20 units, KAERI, etc.) • 202 PDIs(2009), while 343 PDIs (2008) and 460(2007) cf. PDI means Person-Day-Inspection • National Inspection (SSAC) • Inspection Share with IAEA & SSAC at LWRs • 465 PDIs(2009), while 749 PDIs (2008), 624(2007) • IS (Integrated Safeguards) Preparation and Implementation • 7 times Working Group Meeting (Mar. 2005 ~ Dec. 2007) • Broader Conclusion (IAEA Board of governors, Jun. 2008) • Implementation of IS from Jul. 1st, 2008

  14. IAEA NSG Report, Consultation Convention on Physical Protection of the Nuclear Material NSG Guidelines MEST Entrust Report KINAC PP Support • Evaluation of PP regulation • Preparation & Application of PP regulation - Regulation - Contingency Plan MEST NPP Resident Office • Inspection Plan on Nuclear Material & Nuclear Facility • Request for Inspection on NM in Transit Supervision for PP • Verification & Correction KHNP KNF KAERI R&D Nuclear Industry Physical Protection Implementation -1

  15. Physical Protection Main Works - 2  Design Basis Threat • Re-evaluation and Maintenance of Design Basis Threat • Establishment of Design Basis Threat  Establishment of Implementation System • Establishment of a PP system for each NF • Development of technical standards for inspection and review • Vulnerability and risk assessment of a PP system • Establishment of a central control system • Establishment of education and exercise program  Establishment of Measures against Terror • Development of techniques for evaluation of radiological terror (RT) • Establishment of a response system against RT

  16. Nuclear Export Control System (NEPS) Licensing & Approval Reporting & Declaration Portal Enterprises (User) • Export Control Information • User Support System • Applying • Review • Licensing • Approval • Statistics Licensing • Applying • Review • Licensing • Approval • Statistics Trade Report MEST Implementation Catch-all Digital Certificate Self-Classification Support Tool Certification Brokering • Control Item List • Control Specification Declaration Approval Export Control Monitoring KINAC Customs Linkage Technical assistance Information Collecting Collecting Engine • License & Clearance • Statistics Information Management Relevant Authorities • Analyzing • Real-time Collection • Categorization • News Board • Report Board • Webzine Issuance • Object • Key Word • Schedule Expert Group Customs Service Data Bases • HSKcode • Control # • Specification • Controlled Items • Enterprise • Application • Business Processing • Expert Opinion Business Process Monitoring DB Basic DB 15

  17. IV. Strategic Approaches for Future Cooperation - 1 • International security posture 1) Australia ○ Outlook - Strategic outer facts: Rise of China, emergence of India: End of the unipolar moment - Strategic interest in preserving an international order that restrains aggression by states against each other - Defence policy to be founded on the principle of self-reliance - Active engagement diplomacy: UN peace-keeping and nuclear nonproliferation policy 2) ROK ○ Outlook - Preservation of national security from outer military threat and invasion - Support for peaceful reunification - Contribution to regional stability and international peace - Active engagement policy: UN peace-keeping and nuclear nonproliferation policy

  18. IV. Strategic Approaches for Future Cooperation - 2 • Mutual cooperation for security 1) On 5 March 2009, President M.B. Lee and Prime Minister Rudd released a Joint Statement on Enhanced Global and Security Cooperation. 2) Specific areas of cooperation in the statement include: ○ Law enforcement, border security, counter-terrorism ○ Disarmament and non-proliferation ○ Defence and disaster response • Global cooperation through respective engagement policy 1) Strong and common commitment to regional and global initiatives against terrorism and to prevention of the proliferation of WMD as middle powers  ○ In October 2009, the ROK Government announced plans to establish a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Afghanistan: 350 soldiers and 40 police and 75 civilian aid and reconstruction workers, as part of the PRT.

  19. IV. Strategic Approaches for Future Cooperation - 3 2) Troop deployment to Iraq ○3,500 at its peak - the third largest contribution after the US and the UK ○Mostly engineers and medical support personnel involved in reconstruction of road and bridge building, delivery of training to local police and officials ○In addition to a military contribution, the ROK allocated US$ 260 million in aid to Iraq during 2003–2008, and an additional $200 million for 2008–2011 3) UN Security Council’s co-sponsors ○ROK provided around 350 troops for service in the United Nations Interim Force (UNIFIL) in Lebanon ○ROK and Australia were among the 18 co-sponsors of the UN Security Council's December 2008 Resolution 1846 against piracy off the coast of Somalia. - ROK National Assembly gave approval for a ROK Navy warship to be deployed from March 2009, in order to take part in the international effort to combat piracy in the waters off the Gulf of Aden, which still being in activity.

  20. IV. Strategic Approaches for Future Cooperation - 4 • Concrete action for the Statement of security cooperation 1) On 16 December 2009, ROK Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade Yu and Australia Minister for Foreign Affairs Smith signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Development Cooperation. ○The MOU reflects international development assistance efforts - Engaging on development aspects of the G20 agenda, particularly while the ROK chairs the G20 during 2010 - Strengthening cooperation in disaster and emergency preparedness, response and management (Participation at the joint investigation on a Korean warship sinking by attack from North Korea submarine in 2010) 2) On April 2009, KINAC and ASNO signed a MOU on cooperation for safeguards activities ○Launching of APSN agreed at Seoul meeting from Oct. 1, 2009 through a mutual close cooperation and effort

  21. IV. Strategic Approaches for Future Cooperation - 5 • Future approaches 1) Slow starting in recognizing the mutual importance ○ US, China, Japan, India and Indonesia focused strategic approaches cf. Australia – ‘Defence White Book 2009’ ○ ROK’s position: 4 Powers (US, China, Japan, Russia) oriented strategic approaches in conjunction with North Korea’s threats 2) Strategic cooperation for balance of power ○ Political aspect: Strong development of cooperation for mutual partnership - Historical, religious and ideological background of mutual cooperation for peace ○ Military aspect: Coalition between middle power for the geopolitical balance - Based on USA alliance strategy, - Making regional security environment, which can absorb the rise in strategic and military power of emerging major players (Australia Defence White Book 2009, p. 43) ○ Economic aspect: Maximization of complementary relations - Complementary factor can facilitate the FTA applications

  22. VI. Conclusion - 1 • Common Aspects 1) Fully committed to regional security and international nuclear nonproliferation efforts 2) Strong alliance strategy with USA as well as on close cooperation with international WMD nonproliferation regimes • From Coalition to further strong and strategic relations 1) Establish a geopolitical balance axis through strategic cooperation ○ Form Eastern wing of security by strong coalition among USA-ROK-Australia, while Western wing of security by close coalition with European Union- Australia-ROK - Strategic objective: Balance of power for keeping dominant power(s) from overwhelming against others

  23. VI. Conclusion - 2 2) Form an interdependent and complementary economic relations ○Australia Abundant natural resources, high technology, agriculture, education, finance, Military industry (Limit of domestic demand/market) ○ROK IT, Heavy industry (Car, Ship-building, Train, Aero-space, etc) and Manufacturing industry, Nuclear reactor construction industry, etc. 3) Form a strong political partnership ○With common objective of regional security and peace, make agenda in common and have a close pace at its procedure of discussion in international society ○ With advantage of native English speaking ability, combine original ideas and passion for international peace and security of the ROK with both middle capacity of ‘financial support’

  24. 감 사 합 니 다

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