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Mitigating Attacks on Open Functionality in SMS-Capable Cellular Networks Patrick Traynor, William Enck, Patrick McDaniel, and Thomas La Porta | MobiCom ‘06. CS712 병렬처리특강 | Dependable Software Lab. | Lee Dong Kun. Contents. Introduction Related Work System/Attack Characterization
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Mitigating Attacks on Open Functionality in SMS-Capable Cellular NetworksPatrick Traynor, William Enck, Patrick McDaniel, and Thomas La Porta| MobiCom ‘06 CS712 병렬처리특강 | Dependable Software Lab. | Lee Dong Kun
Contents • Introduction • Related Work • System/Attack Characterization • Mitigation Technique • Current Solution • Queue Management • Resource Provisioning • Simulation Result • Conclusion KAIST | Dependable Software Lab | Direito Lee(dklee@dependable.kaist.ac.kr)
Introduction • Cellular Network System • Traditional cellular(phone) network system provided closed voice comm. • Currently cellular network system provides opened voice and data comm. • Service Interconnection • Phone network service and Internet service are interconnected by telecommunication provider. • Problems • Traditional phone networks had designed for only homogeneous closed system. • But current phone networks tightly interconnected with phone network and Internet. • Unexpected security problems occur • Heavy SMS traffics can flood over the phone network through Internet services. KAIST | Dependable Software Lab | Direito Lee(dklee@dependable.kaist.ac.kr)
Contents • Introduction • Related Work • System/Attack Characterization • Mitigation Technique • Current Solution • Queue Management • Resource Provisioning • Result and Discussion • Conclusion KAIST | Dependable Software Lab | Direito Lee(dklee@dependable.kaist.ac.kr)
Related Work| Vulnerability and Approaches • Traditional Solution • Disconnection method • Disconnect from external network – effective way in the past • Not effective anymore, because of new access pattern and service • Vulnerability • Telecomm. Networks are not only systems to suffer from vulnerabilities related to expanded connectivity. • Systems less directly connected to the Internet have also been subject to attack. • DoS(Denial of Service) Attack • Traditional DoS attack happen on the online web site. • Reported DoS accident over the phone networks KAIST | Dependable Software Lab | Direito Lee(dklee@dependable.kaist.ac.kr)
Contents • Introduction • Related Work • System/Attack Characterization • Mitigation Technique • Current Solution • Queue Management • Resource Provisioning • Result and Discussion • Conclusion KAIST | Dependable Software Lab | Direito Lee(dklee@dependable.kaist.ac.kr)
System characterization(I)| Message Delivery Overview KAIST | Dependable Software Lab | Direito Lee(dklee@dependable.kaist.ac.kr)
System characterization(I)| Message Delivery Overview – logical channel • TCH(Transfer Channel) • Carry voice traffic after call setup • CCH(Control Channel) • Transport information about the network • Assist in call setup/SMS delivery KAIST | Dependable Software Lab | Direito Lee(dklee@dependable.kaist.ac.kr)
Attack characterization(II)| System Vulnerability – Attack Phase Step Recognition(identification of a vulnerability) Reconnaissance(characterization of the conditions necessary to attack the vulnerability) Exploit(attacking the vulnerability) Recovery(cleanup and forensics) KAIST | Dependable Software Lab | Direito Lee(dklee@dependable.kaist.ac.kr)
Attack characterization(II)| System Vulnerability – Attach Phase Step • Recognition • Vul. of GSM cellular network in this paper • Problem : Bandwidth allocation in air interface(call blocking) • Shared SDCCHs Problem • Voice Communication • SMS • Reconnaissance • Using tools, an attacker can easily construct a “hit-list” of potential targets. • Exploit • Saturating sectors to their SDCCH capacity for some period of time KAIST | Dependable Software Lab | Direito Lee(dklee@dependable.kaist.ac.kr)
Attack Characterization| Experimental Attack Characterization • Events Characterization • Deploy a detailed GSM simulator • Base scenario • Cellular deployment in the scale of metropolitan. i.e.,) Manhattan • 12 SDCCHs / each of 55 sectors • No pre-SDCCH queue • Assume a Poisson distribution for the arrival of text message KAIST | Dependable Software Lab | Direito Lee(dklee@dependable.kaist.ac.kr)
Contents • Introduction • Related Work • System/Attack Characterization • Mitigation Technique • Current Solution • Queue Management • Resource Provisioning • Result and Discussion • Conclusion KAIST | Dependable Software Lab | Direito Lee(dklee@dependable.kaist.ac.kr)
Mitigation Technique(I)| Current Solution • Goal • Not only protect voice services from targeted SMS attacks,But also allow SMS service to continue. • Current Deployed Solution : Edge Solution • Rate-Limiting Solution • Restrict the amount of messages on each IP • Drawbacks : Spoof IP and Existence of Zombie network • Filter SMS traffic • Similar to SPAM filtering methodology • Drawback : An adversary can bypass by generating legitimate looking SMS traffic KAIST | Dependable Software Lab | Direito Lee(dklee@dependable.kaist.ac.kr)
Mitigation Technique(II)| Queue Management • Queue Management Technique(Network-based) • Weighted Fair Queuing(WFQ) • Fair Queuing(FQ) • Separate flows into individual queues and then apportions bandwidth equally between them(Round Robin) • Drawback : small time for packet to be transferred • Weighted Fair Queue(WFQ) in this paper • To solve FQ drawback, set priority to each flow. • Voice Call has higher priority compare to SMS • Install two queue on SDCCHs for Voice Call and SMS KAIST | Dependable Software Lab | Direito Lee(dklee@dependable.kaist.ac.kr)
Mitigation Technique(II)| Queue Management(cont.) • Weighted Random Early Detection(WRED) • Random Early Detection(RED) • Prevent queue lockout by dropping packets base on Qavg • Weighted Random Early Detection(WRED) • Determine the victims to be dropped base on packet’s priority KAIST | Dependable Software Lab | Direito Lee(dklee@dependable.kaist.ac.kr)
Mitigation Technique(III)| Resource Provisioning • Resource Provisioning(Air Interface) • Strict Resource Provisioning(SRP) • Some subset of SDCCH is only for Voice Call • Voice Call and SMS are shared other SDCCHs. • Dynamic Resource Provisioning(DRP) • If a small number of unused TCHs could be repurposed as SDCCHs,additional bandwidth could be provided to mitigate such attack. • Drawback : increase call blocking because of TCH exhaustion • Direct Channel Allocation(DCA) • The ideal means of eliminating the competition for resource- the separation of shared mechanism. • Separate SDCCHs to only Call setup and only SMS, strictly KAIST | Dependable Software Lab | Direito Lee(dklee@dependable.kaist.ac.kr)
Contents • Introduction • Related Work • System/Attack Characterization • Mitigation Technique • Current Solution • Queue Management • Resource Provisioning • Result and Discussion • Conclusion KAIST | Dependable Software Lab | Direito Lee(dklee@dependable.kaist.ac.kr)
Simulation Result(I)| Queue Management Technique • WFQ vs. WRED KAIST | Dependable Software Lab | Direito Lee(dklee@dependable.kaist.ac.kr)
Simulation Result(II)| Queue Management Technique • SRP vs. DRP vs. DCA KAIST | Dependable Software Lab | Direito Lee(dklee@dependable.kaist.ac.kr)
Contents • Introduction • Related Work • System/Attack Characterization • Mitigation Technique • Current Solution • Queue Management • Resource Provisioning • Result and Discussion • Conclusion KAIST | Dependable Software Lab | Direito Lee(dklee@dependable.kaist.ac.kr)
Conclusion • Vulnerability by SMS-based DOS over the phone Network • Adversaries with limited resources can cause call blocking probabilities(70%) – incapacitating a cellular network • This work provides some preliminary solutions and analysis for these vulnerabilities. • Queue Management Scheme • Resource Provisioning • Future works • Seek more general solution that address these vulnerabilities KAIST | Dependable Software Lab | Direito Lee(dklee@dependable.kaist.ac.kr)