VCE INTERNATIONAL STUDIES UNIT 4

1. VCE INTERNATIONAL STUDIES UNIT 4 AUSTRALIAN FOREIGN POLICY SECURITY AND DEFENCE

2. DEFENCE PHASES A number of phases of defence since late 1800s: • Expeditionary force mentality up until 1941 • Forward defence from 1941 to early 1970s • Mainland defence was focus mid-1970s to 1986 • Greater self-reliance in defence and reaching out to neighbouring area 1986 – 1996 • Continued support for US alliance whilst maintainin a focus on our regional neighbours

3. HOWARD 1996 • Expected Howard to return to a “Cold War mentality” of forward defence and a strong relationship with U.S. • 2000 Defence White Paper stated army’s task was to operate in our immediate neighbourhood (e.g. Australian led UN forces into East Timor in 1999) to help stabilise weak, small neighbours. • September 11, 2001 changed the global security environment. • We played a role in helping US in Middle East (e.g. Buying Abrams tanks and focus on heavier forces), but security challenges still lay closer to home and it was recognised these could not be ignored.

4. AUSTRALIA’S REGIONAL FOCUS • Policy of pre-emption failed to provide for Australian security (e.g. Bali bombings and Jakarta embassy bombings in 2005) • Events in Solomon Islands and East Timor reminded Australia about its commitments locally. • 2006 – announced intention to grow army by two light infantry battalions and Australian Federal Police overseas deployment group to also grow significantly. • Army is to undertake independent operations designed to maintain the stability of Australia’s immediate neighbourhood.

5. DEFENCE SPENDING • Canberra focus on security evidenced by $6 billion Howard poured into new national security programs since September 11 attacks. • Rudd 2008 budget announcement to increase defence spending by 3% every year to 2017-2018 is further support for this direction. This will provide for an extra $2.8 billion for equipment and training and $1 billion for defence force operations. • Rudd foreshadowed navy expansion, arguing Australia “must be in a position to defend Australia’s own sealines of communication”. This is partly in response to arms build-up in Asia-Pacific region following economic growth in the region (2008 Beijing announced a 17.6% increase to its military budget).

7. SECURITY AND ALLIANCES • Traditional notions of security focused on defence of a state’s borders, ensuring they’re not compromised. • However, the advent of internationalism and globalisation have increased the scope of what can be called “security”.

8. THIRD-AGENDA ISSUES • Third-agenda issues are issues which can only be successfully met/achieved through the joint action of the international community. e.g. Global warming, migration, drug trafficking These issues have changed the traditional concept of security and defence. • Many third agenda issues require joint action of the international community to be effectively combated. E.g. Kyoto Protocol – requires its signatories to reduce emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases in an attempt to slow pace of global warming. Such international agreements only work with the combined actions of their signatories.

9. REACTIVE TO PROACTIVE SECURITY • Traditional security measures were often reactive in nature (responding to threats to borders by sending troops to defeat the threat), but new notions of security require proactive actions. e.g. 2003 – British reveal one of their foreign policy national interests is to ensure their access to energy resources was maintained – ensuring security of energy. To do this defence of energy sites is not enough, they need to pursue equitable access to other energy sources through diplomatic negotiation or trade deals.

10. THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT • The security environment in which a state operates necessarily affects foreign policy actions and the national interests of the state. In times of conflict a state cannot be assured its borders will not be compromised so it feels less secure which can lead to actions to achieve greater security by either participating in the conflict or adopting a neutral position in an effort to not become a target in the conflict. E.g. Switzerland in WWII

11. THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT • WWI – primarily based in Europe so did not directly affect the security of Australia’s borders but due to our alignment with Britain we became involved. • WWII – Very direct threat posed by Japan (Darwin bombing and mini-submarines in Sydney Harbour) necessitated Australian troops to be recalled from Europe to Asia to protect Australia’s borders.

12. THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT • WWII to 1989 – Cold War defined global security. Australia aligned with Western capitalist side, headed by US. The threatening security environment saw Australia become an implicit part of US containment policy and caused Australia to act in particular ways e.g. Not recognising communist PRC.

13. THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT • After end of Cold War – a “new world order” characterised by collective actions to resolve issues. E.g. 1990 Gulf War authorised by UN. • September 11, 2001 attacks – new global threat of terrorism as a threat to security of states. • Terrorist bomb attacks in Bali (2002 and 2005) and Jakarta (2004) resulted in deaths of many Australians. • The menacing environment has justified Australia aligning itself with the world’s remaining superpower (US). • Australia has also met the spectre of terrorism by sending troops to Afghanistan as part of the “war on terrorism”.

14. WHAT IS AN ALLIANCE? • An alliance is a liaison for certain purposes that brings with it all the issues of compatibility, pride, shared interests and varying expectations. • Alliances are usually expressed in a treaty that outlines the nature of the alliance and its particular provisions, but norms and conventions of behaviour that build up over time between participants often add more to the alliance than the treaty itself.

15. ALLIANCES • The Encyclopedia Britannica describes an alliance as “a union for joint action of various powers or states ... great importance is attached to close and co-operative action, both militarily and politically”. • Typically alliances are formed when 2 or more states believe that they have sufficient shared objectives to warrant a relationship – commonly these centre on a shared threat. e.g. Prior to WWI – Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy against the Triple Entente of France, Russia and Britain. Both alliances had been drawn up based on mutual fear and suspicion, providing a deterrence to each side and mutual assistance for each side if necessary. • Some alliances are between states of unequal strength – a smaller state may be useful due to its strategic importance. • Alliances can become redundant as concerns of any of the parties change.

16. AUSTRALIA - U.S. RELATIONS Phase 1 • 1798 U.S. Ship Philadelphia visited Sydney Cove – relations began and trade between the two countries grew. • 1908 – Withdrawal of British naval ships to aid the growing German-British rivalry and the developing ties between Britain and Japan made Australia fearful. • 1908 – American Great White Fleet docked in Sydney to a warm welcome. • Advent of cinema promoted spread of American popular culture which further consolidated the relationship. • U.S. dropped in regard between the wars as they were late to enter WWI, sustaining few fatalities in the war and refused to address the trade imbalance caused by the Great Depression.

17. AUSTRALIA – U.S. RELATIONS Phase 1(cont’d) • WWII – U.S. Forces in the Battle of the Coral Sea frustrated Japanese landings in New Guinea (protected Australia’s mainland) • WWII – over 1 million Americans were stationed or passed through Australia as part of its Pacific theatre operations. • Australia was not happy though to be excluded from key strategy meetings with the U.S. • U.S. did not want a harsh peace treaty with Japan after WWII despite lingering bitterness from Australians for the treatment of our soldiers at the hands of the Japanese as the U.S. saw the new threat as international communism which needed as many allies as possible in order to defeat it.

18. AUSTRALIA – U.S. RELATIONS Phase II – ANZUS • Signed on 1st. September, 1951 • Arising from: • Australian and New Zealand fears of Japan • Sending of Australian troops to Korean War in 1950 • Need to maintain allies in new fight against communism • Means of compensation • Guarantee of security

19. AUSTRALIA – U.S. RELATIONS Phase II – ANZUS (cont’d) • Minister for External Affairs, Sir Percy Spenders stated the objective was “to build up with the United States somewhat the same relationship as exists within the British Commonwealth?. • P.M. Sir Robert Menzies referred to ANZUS at the time as the “greatest single accomplishment, formally attaching US to Australia’s long-term security and providing access to the highest American councils”. • It remains a cornerstone of Australian Foreign Policy, but is actually little more than a commitment by all sides to consult one another in times of need.

20. AUSTRALIA – U.S. RELATIONS Phase II – ANZUS (cont’d) • Evidence of the strengthening Australia-U.S. relationship post WWII was: • Increasing importance of U.S. For trade (U.S. became Australia’s most important source of imports, 2nd. most lucrative export market and accounted for 1/3 of overseas investment) • Installation of U.S. monitoring facilities in Australia from 1962

21. AUSTRALIA – U.S. RELATIONS Phase II ANZUS (cont’d) • Criticisms of strengthening Australia – U.S. Relations was based on: - spread of economic influence - infringed upon Australian sovereignty - diluted Australian identity - held Australia’s national interests hostage to U.S. security priorities • Five Prime Ministers between 1950 and 1972 generally continued Australian foreign policy along the same path.

22. AUSTRALIA – U.S. RELATIONS Phase III • Election of Gough Whitlam as P.M. In 1972 lead Australia into a new phase. • Whitlam did not disturb ANZUS, joint defence or other major aspects of the alliance, but was more willing to criticise American actions. e.g. Rebuked Washington for Indo-China defence plans • Onset of detente (warming of Cold War tensions), withdrawal from Vietnam and the Guam Doctrine facilitated pursuit of independent foreign policy. Australia became more self-confident in its interactions with the region.

23. AUSTRALIA – U.S. RELATIONS • Malcolm Fraser – a traditional Cold War politician who truly believed in the communist threat to the world e.g. Soviet invasion of Afghanistan taken to proof of this threat so he opposed it and therefore requested the 1980 Moscow Olympics be boycotted) • Fraser sought to tackle the Communist threat by emphasising the U.S. Relationship as well as creating bonds with other states (e.g. African states). He was not afraid to test the U.S. relationship when needed (e.g. Criticism of President Ronald Reagan for policies on China)

24. AUSTRALIA – U.S. RELATIONS • P.M. Hawke and P.M. Keating both continued the trend set by Whitlam and Fraser – saw Australia take a more active role as a good international citizen. • E.g. Hawke U.S. Visit in 1983 – called America a “reliable partner”, reaffirmed commitment to the alliance as “fundamental” to Australia’s security. • Simultaneously, Hawke opposed US invasion of Nicaragua and Grenada. • Hawke sent troops to the Gulf War as part of U.S. led coalition. • Keating focussed on boosting ties with Asia through APEC and other multilateral organisations.

25. AUSTRALIA – U.S. RELATIONS • John Howard elected in 1996 saw a “leap into the past” in Australia’s relations with Washington. • Howard early on moved away from regional and multilateral diplomacy, concentrating instead on the U.S. Alliance. • White papers issued since Coalition returned to office highlighted the emphasis on the alliance.

26. HOWARD’S ACTIONS TO SUPPORT THE ALLIANCE • 1996 Joint Security Declaration with the U.S. • ANZUS being evoked for the first time, following 9/11 • Sending troops to aid war on terrorism in Afghanistan • Australia only state in region to sign up militarily for invasion of Iraq (Japan, South Korea, Thailand, Philippines and Singapore offered assistance, but not in a pre-emptive strike) • Support for US pre-emptive strike on Iraq as part of “coalition of the willing” without international support or UN approval • Howard taking 5 days to deny he said Australia was “America’s Deputy” in the Asia-Pacific (despite regional criticism) • Political fuss in Australian politics over who is anti-American and who is “kowtowing” to Washington and that criticism of US is support for terrorism.

27. HOWARD AND BUSH – SHARED VISION • Both right wing politicians – both in Washington during 9/11 • Realist school of international relations – belief in assertion of power and in the individual state (rather than international organisations) as the ultimate actor in international relations. • 1997 white paper “In the National Interest” – interests twinned with those of Washington • Desire to maintain international order which aids their shared economic interests as capitalists • Joint desire to stop emergence of a regional power in Asia-Pacific that could threaten the position of US as only remaining superpower. • China’s emergence as a regional powerhouse considered the greatest threat to the alliance e.g. Downer said in 2004 it was not a given that Australia would support U.S. If a China-Taiwan conflict occurred • Reality of threat of terrorism evidenced by 9/11 (World Trade Centre and Pentagon), October 2002 (tourist venues in Bali), October 2004 (Australian embassy in Indonesia) and October 2005 (tourist venues in Bali).

28. RUDD AND U.S. ALLIANCE • Rudd differs in foreign policy from Howard • Believes Australia’s alliance is close and strong enough to withstand disagreements. • Rudd’s actions included: • Reversal of Howard’s refusal to ratify Kyoto Protocol, leaving Washington symbolically isolated • Gradual withdrawal of Australia’s 550 combat troops from southern Iraq left Washington isolated • Veto of the Washington-backed sale of Australian uranium to India

29. RUDD AND U.S. ALLIANCE • U.S. remains one pillar of our foreign policy. • Foreign Minister, Stephen Smith, stated the: “Alliance remains the fundamental and indispensable bedrock of Australia’s security, strategic and defence arrangements. Continued active engagement by the United States in the Asia-Pacific is essential to the peace, stability and prosperity or our region”.

30. U.S. BASES IN AUSTRALIA • North-West Cape (WA) • Pine Gap (NT) • Nurrungar (SA) • The bases form part of a system aimed at deterring the use and proliferation of nuclear weapons, as well as for gathering intelligence. • Australian governments claim the bases are a logical extension of the ANZUS treaty as they reinforce US commitment to Australia’s security. • Canberra has little, if any, consultation or control over the bases which has led to calls for their removal.

32. ANZUS TREATY • Text of ANZUS treaty is brief – 11 paragraphs and a short preamble. • The treaty states that: “The Parties will consult together whenever in the opinion of any of them the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened in the Pacific”.

33. ANZUS TREATY • The treaty deals with ultimate threats – not the day to day demands of the alliance. • In reality, offers no guarantee of American military response to a threat to Australian security. • If nothing else though, the treaty acts as a deterrent to potential adversaries and an insurance policy for Australian defence.

34. ANZUS TREATY • Without ANZUS, the Australian Defence Department views that a range of military to military activities would disappear – e.g. Joint training exercises, access to high technology military equipment and high quality intelligence. • Over 250 defence arrangements exist between the two states. This has though, led to criticism of over-reliance and risk of Australia’s defensive and military capabilities being disproportionally affected adversely should the alliance disappear.

35. ANZUS TREATY • First and only time it was invoked was by John Howard when announcing he would send Australian troops to wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. • Rudd supported the decision to invoke ANZUS as support for the US-led effort to oust the Taliban from Afghanistan. • Howard stated: ANZUS “has done more to deliver the security of the Australian nation in the years that have gone by since World War II than any other international agreement”.

36. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ALLIANCE • The alliance is not a static one – it is reactive to worldwide events which creates new opportunities and challenges. • E.g. July 2004 – request from Washington to Canberra to develop a permanent military training camp for Australian and US forces on Australian soil which could act as a launching pad for operations in the Asia-Pacific. This is part of a wider rebalancing of US forces around the globe post Cold-War to meet challenges of war on terrorism.

37. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ALLIANCE • Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement (AUSFTA) – great symbolic value as well as economic value. • Estimated to have a net benefit for Australia of $A6 billion (widely disputed). • Key areas have been excluded (e.g. Sugar) the AUSFTA does allow some Australian agricultural products greater access to the US market.

38. AUSFTA - POSITIVES

39. AUSFTA - NEGATIVES

40. THE U.S. ALLIANCE - POSITIVES • Military to military activities • 2004 AUSFTA over 18 years will allow some Australian products greater access to US market and has great symbolism (Aust. Trade Minister referred to it as the “commercial equivalent of ANZUS”) • Australia is seen as closest ally of U.S. – gives us a special position in influencing US foreign policy • Active US role in Asia-Pacific brings stability to the region. • Economic gains from US investment in Australia ($A73.6 billion invested in 2006 an increase of 6.8% over preceding 5 year period – leading to a stock investment from US of $362.8 billion). Currently 100 U.S. companies have established their regional headquarters in Australia.

41. THE U.S. ALLIANCE - POSITIVES • A degree of assurance the US would support Australia if threatened • Has allowed Australia to develop a defence system “on the cheap” • Prestige gained from being associated with the world’s only superpower

42. THE U.S. ALLIANCE - NEGATIVES • U.S. Intelligence sharing with Australia has raised suspicion from Asia-Pacific region • Opportunities with other rising great powers lost as the US alliance takes precedence • Raises Australia’s visibility and attracted hostility and violence (Bali and Jakarta) • Compromises Australian sovereignty and decision-making processes by the commitment to the alliance and its expectations • Insufficient consultation processes as Australian support is often taken for granted • Constrains Australia’s own instruments for achieving foreign policy interests due to the requirements and expectations of the alliance.