Current State of Cyber Security In the Czech Republic

2. Current State of Cyber Security In the Czech Republic

3. Content • CyberSecuritySystem in theCzechRepublic • Draft legislation • Practicalexample – DoSAttacks in March 2013

4. Cyber Security System in the Czech Republic

5. Recent development in cyber security Ministry of Interior 2010 Memorandum on National Cyber Security Incident Response Team with the CZ.NIC Association 2011 Strategy for Cyber Security 2011-2015 and accompanying Action plan National Security Authority 2011 Decision of the Government n. 781 of 19th October 2011 - NSA appointed as authority responsible for the field of cybernetic security active participation in NATO exercise „Cyber Coalition 2011“ March 2012 MoU with NATO on Cyber Defense signed 2012 Legislative intent of Law on cyber Security approved by the Government (30th May 2012) Amendment of Strategy and Action plan September 2012 Start of operation of the Governmental CERT (IOC) November 2012 Participation on „Cyber Coalition 2012“ exercise

6. Entities Active in Cyber Security • Several teams recognized by the international CERT/CSIRT community i the Czech Republic • Operated by private or academic entities • Crucial are GovCERT at the NSA CZ and National CERT (CSIRT.CZ) operated by CZ.NIC Association as well as Military CERT operated by MoD

7. Responsibilities of the NSA in the field of Cyber Security • Decision of the Government n. 781 of 19th October 2011 • NSA appointed as authority responsible for the field of cybernetic security • Establishment of Council for Cybernetic Security • NSA Director has to present draft law on cyber security to Government • NSA Director has to establish a fully operational National Cyber SecurityCentre till 31st December 2015 and as its part establish Governmental CERT

8. Cooperationwithentities in the Czech Rep. • Cooperation and consultationwithgovernmentalbodies and public administration • 2012 survey • NSA director’s working group of experts • NCSC director’s working group of CIO’s • Cooperationwith expert’s community • Cooperation with universities • Cooperationwithother CERT / CSIRT teams - as national as international

9. International Cooperation • NATO – participation at the Cyber Coalition exercise 2011 (as observer) and CC12 (as full participant) • MAR 2012 – Signature of MoU with NATO on Cyber Defense • Information and experience sharing meetings with institutions in partner countries • AFCEA – cooperation on the „Dictionary of Cybernetic Security“ • ENISA – representation of the Czech Republic in ENISA since JAN 2013

10. Draft legislation

11. Basic Principles • Regulation by law – need to oblige both public and private entities (operators of critical infrastructure) • Individual responsibility of the operator for security of its network (protection against external attack and against misuse of its network for attacks on other networks) • Division of cyberspace to areas of competence of Governmental CERT (critical information infrastructure) and National CERT • Cost effective, not infringing into rights of the private entities in an excessive manner

12. Governmental CERT • Has in its competence: • IS of Public Governance • Operators of Critical Information Infrastructure (in cooperation with Czech Telecommunication Office – fulfillment of license conditions regarding communication operators) • Basic duties of operators: • - Establishment of permanent communication channels with NSA; • - Protection of ICT systems according to NSA regulations; • - Incident reporting and implementing measures recommended by the NSA

13. National CERT • Operated by private entity on the basis of public-law contract with the NSA • Mediates information sharing, particularly for private entities, academic sphere, self-government, non-profit organizations, not falling into competence of the Governmental CERT

14. Government State of cybernetic emergency Prime Minister CS Commission Reporting of incidents NSA Director National CERT/CSIRT Implementation of security measures Implementation of counter-measures National Cyber SecurityCenter Cooperation; Information sharing ISPs Governmental CERT/CSIRT Important ISPs Critical information infrastructure ISs of public governance Important ISs

15. Next steps May 2013 Interministerial consultation procedure to the draft Law on Cyber Security June 2013 Submission of the draft to the Government Září 2013 Submission of the draft to the Government December 2013 Report on the state of cyber security for the Governmkent (including private entities) beginning 2015 Law on Cyber Security in force NLT 31/12/2015 Fully operational National Cyber Security Center

16. EU Strategy on Cyber Security • Issued by the Commission in February 2013 • Main tasks: • Reaching cyber resilience • Significant reduction of cyber crime • Development of policy and capabilities of cyber defence in the framework of Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) • Development of industrial and technological capabilities of cyber security • Coherent EU policy regarding cyberspace • The Czech Republic already fulfils most of the goals (Cyber Security Strategy, governmental/national CERT)

17. EU Directive on Network and Information Security (NIS) • Proposed by the Commission in February 2013 • To reach high level of cyber security across the EU • Cooperation of the Member States in this field • Harmonization of standards in the field of cyber security and facilitation of information exchange among relevant actors

18. EU Directive on Network and Information Security (NIS) – Czech comments • The draft in line with our policy and we welcome it • The Law on Cyber Security shall implement it into Czech legislation • We have only partial comments: • To limit the scope on critical infrastructure • To allow greater flexibility for the member states (p.e. to allow more CERTs with nation-wide responsibility)

19. Practical example DoS Attacks in March 2013

20. The Course of the Attacks I • Monday 4th March– the attack targeted news servers; The servers involvedwere the largest and most visited news servers in the Czech Republic. • Tuesday 5th March– the mainpage and login page of Seznam.cz, the largest portal and search engine in the Czech Republic with more than 150 000 daily registered users, was targeted. Seznam.cz was unavailable from 10:00 a.m. to 11:30 a.m. The attack reoccurred around 1:30 p.m. and resulted in intermittent unavailability of servers.

21. The Course of the Attacks II • Wednesday 6th March– The attack targeted web servers of all major banks resulting in unavailability of theirwebpages and internet banking services from cca 9:30 to 11:00 a.m. The e-commerce service and some ATMs of Českáspořitelna bank were not operational for a short period of time as well. The second wave of attacks on the servers of Českáspořitelna bank came at 2:00 p.m. • Thursday 7th March– the attack started at 9:30 a.m. and targeted servers of two (of three in total) major mobile telecom operators(Telefonica O2 and T-Mobile). Telefonica eliminated the attack around 10:00 a.m., T-Mobile around 11:00 a.m. • Various other services were affected by the attacks as well (including the servers of the state governance) due to shared infrastructure. However, no critical infrastructure got involved.

22. Types of Attacks • The attacks utilized so called “three-way handshaking” feature of the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP)

23. Types of Attacks – SYN Flood • The first attack (carried out on Monday and Tuesday) was a so called “SYN flood” type of attack. • Large number of SYN messages is sent to the targeted server which replies with SYN-ACK messages. • However, the ACK messagenever comes and since the targeted server has to allocate certain capacity for the expected connection, its resources are soon depleted.

24. Types of Attacks – DRDoS • The second type of attack (carried out on Wednesday and Thursday) was Distributed Reflection Denial of Service (DRDoS) type of attack. • The attacker sends SYN messages with spoofed IP address of the target to the third-party servers (reflectors). • They reply with SYN-ACK messages to the target server and overload its capacities.

25. Conclusions • No damage, but a lot of media attention. • No one claimed responsibility and also the motive remains unknown. • The tracking of packets during the attack showed that they came from the RETN network operated mostly on the territory of the Russian Federation. Further tracking was not possible according to the RETN operator. • The attacks were the first of similar scope on the territory of the Czech Republic and proved to be valuable exercise of cyber security cooperation and capabilities of the private, state and academic entities. • The cooperation and information sharing considerably improved during the attacks and resulted in improved response to the attacks which was probably the reason why the attacker ceased activities after four days.

26. Lessons learned • The legal basis for sharing important operational data among various companies and institutions active in cyber-security has to be established. • The entities have to pay attention to the design of their IT infrastructure from the security perspective and include it in their crisis plans. • The network of points of contact in the most important companies and institutions has to be established and updated.

27. End of PresentationQuestions?