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NSLS-II Shielding Workshop. S. Buda Personnel Protective Systems March 27, 2007. Design Goals Personnel Protection System . Protects personnel from high radiation areas by preventing access and controlling radiation producing devices Linac (LPPS) Booster Ring (BPPS) Storage Ring (APPS)
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NSLS-II Shielding Workshop S. Buda Personnel Protective Systems March 27, 2007
Design Goals Personnel Protection System Protects personnel from high radiation areas by preventing access and controlling radiation producing devices • Linac (LPPS) • Booster Ring (BPPS) • Storage Ring (APPS) • Experimental Beam Lines (PSS) • RF test cell area
NSLSII Facility Hazards Linac Hazards • Accelerated electrons • Dark Current Main Ring /Booster Hazards • Radiation produced from secondary emissions in RF cavities (Both main ring and booster RF cavities) • Accelerated electrons • Synchrotron and Bremsstrahlung radiation • Oxygen Deficiency Alarm (ODH) (RF Cavity and cryo plant) Experimental Beam Lines hazards • Synchrotron and Bremsstrahlung radiation
Design Goals Personnel Protection System • Modular • Simple as possible to carry out task • Designed with testing as a key feature • Meet DOE and BNL requirements for Interlocks • Quality assurance system • Flexibility for expansion and modification • Diverse Component Selection • Ability to be upgraded with technology • Diagnostic capability
Technical Description Personnel Protection Systems • Dual chain PLC architecture (one safety rated) • Modular • Designed with testing as key consideration • Reliability and availability emphasized • Reduce wiring where possible • Use fiber optic busses for interference and security • Compatible I/O for all systems • Separate safety and command functions in beam line systems
Technical Highlights of Personnel Protection Systems • Integration of Radiation monitors with the main ring system (APPS) 40+ locations • Main ring divided into 6 separate sections for modular concept. • Main ring uses a distributed I/O system • Interface to APICS for archiving of system data • Use of safety rated PLC’s to increase reliability and diagnostic capability
Other Design Features • Interlock system must allow: • Linac operable with personnel in booster • Booster operable with personnel in storage ring • All interlock logic trees will have redundant and independent chains • The system will be fail safe for foreseeable failure modes (e.g., loss of power/pressure, open circuit, short to ground, and single component failure • Redundant circuits will not share cables and should be separated physically on circuit boards and terminal strips. Redundant systems should be configured differently.
Other Design Features (Cont.) • A rigorous configuration management program will be established to control unauthorized modifications to interlock system components • All interlock lines and components will be labeled and readily identifiable. • Testing & certification of interlock systems will be performed by independent personnel • Design for enclosure search systems will include sequenced and timed inspection stations, warning lights, audible alarms, and emergency off- switches.
SYSTEM CONFIGURATION CONTROL PHYSICAL ACCESS CONTROL CABLE IDENTIFICATION