SEABEE COMBAT WARFARE COMMON CORE

SEABEE COMBAT WARFARECOMMON CORE Communications/ Electronic Key Management System (EKMS) Fundamental

Communications/ EKMS Fundamentals • Reference: • Navy Electronic Key Management System (EKMS 1). • MCRP 3-40.3(series) FMFM 3-36 Radio Operators • TM 11-5820-890-10-8 Operators Manual, SINCGARS GROUND COMBAT NET RADIO, ICOM

Communications/ EKMS Fundamentals • Reference: • PUB. NO. 10515-0103-4100, AN/PRC 150 MANPACK Radio Operators Manual • PUB. NO. 10515-0109-4100, AN/PRC-117F Operations Manual • MCWP 6-22 Communications And Information System

Communications/ EKMS Fundamentals • Reference: • NAVEDTRA 14235, SEABEE COMBAT HANDBOOK, Vol. 2

Overview • Communication Terms • Communications Security (COMSEC) • Two-Person Integrity (TPI) • Electronic Key Management System (EKMS)

Overview • Receiver-Transmitter (RT) “Radio”-AN/PRC 119, AN/PRC 117, AND AN/PRC 150. • Phonetic alphabet, numerals, and pro-words • Line Of Sight (LOS) • Purpose Of Retransmissions

Communications / EKMS PQS Question 107.1 Discuss Communication Security ( COMSEC) and the Role of Electronic Key Management System (EKMS) Local element

COMSEC/EKMS An organization that requires COMSEC material must obtain such material through an EKMS or COMSEC account managed by a designated EKMS Manager. When it is not possible to draw needed COMSEC material from an existing EKMS account (either within the organization or located in close proximity thereto), the requirement to establish a new EKMS account must be validated by the organization's Immediate Superior in Command (ISIC).

COMSEC/EKMS At least 45 days is required to establish an EKMS account and to provide the initial COMSEC material.

Communications / EKMS PQS Question 107.2 What is meant by Two-Person Integrity (TPI) and how it is related to COMSEC?

TPI TPI is a system of handling and storing, designed to prevent single-person access to certain COMSEC material • TPI handling requires that at least two persons, authorized access to COMSEC keying material, be in constant view of each other and the COMSEC material requiring TPI whenever that material is accessed and handled. Each individual must be capable of detecting incorrect or unauthorized security procedures with respect to the task being performed. • TPI storage requires the use of two approved combination locks (each with a different combination) with no one person authorized access to both combinations.

Communications / EKMS PQS Question 107.3 Discuss the following terms: • Controlled Cryptographic Item ( CCI) • Physical Security • Practice Dangerous to Security (PDS) • Emergency Action Plan / Emergency Destruction Plan (EAP/EDP) • Data Transfer Device (DTD) • COMSEC Incident

Controlled Cryptographic Item (CCI) A secure telecommunications or information handling equipment, or associated cryptographic component, which is unclassified but controlled. Designated items will bear the designation Controlled Cryptographic Item or CCI.

General Access requirments for CCI (1) A security clearance is not required for access to un-keyed CCI. Normally, access must be restricted to U.S. citizens whose duties require such access. (2) Un-keyed CCI and/or CCI keyed with unclassified key marked or designated CRYPTO, must be stored in a manner that affords protection against pilferage, theft, sabotage, or tampering, and ensures that access and accounting integrity are maintained.

CCI Access Access Requirements for Resident Aliens: Resident aliens who are U.S. Government employees, U.S. Government contractor employees, or National Guard, active duty, or reserve members of the U.S. Armed Forces may be granted access to CCI provided their duties require access. Access Requirements for Foreign Nationals: Non-U.S. citizens who are employed by the U.S. Government at foreign locations where there is a significant U.S. military presence (two or more military bases) may handle CCI material in connection with warehouse functions, provided they are under the direct supervision of an individual who has been granted access to CCI material.

Physical Security: Physical security is the COMSEC component that results from all physical measures necessary to safeguard classified equipment, material, and documents from access or observation by unauthorized persons. When a commander or designated representative has determined that an individual has a need to know and is eligible for access, then access to classified cryptographic information will be formally authorized. The authorization process must include an introduction to the unique nature of cryptographic information, its unusual sensitivity, the special security regulations governing its handling and protection, and the penalties prescribed for its disclosure. Reportable violations include— • Loss of material. • Unauthorized viewing. • Capture of individuals having access to COMSEC information

Practice Dangerous TO Security (PDS) PDSs, while not reportable to the national level (NSA), are practices, which have the potential to jeopardize the security of COMSEC material, if allowed to perpetuate. Examples of NON-reportable PDSs • (1) Improperly completed accounting reports (i.e., unauthorized signatures, missing signatures or required accounting information, incomplete short title information). • (2) Physical COMSEC keying material transferred with status markings still intact. • (3) Mailing of SF 153 Forms with status dates annotated for material listed. • (4) COMSEC material not listed on account, local element (LE), or user inventory documents when documentation exists to indicate that the material is charged to the account. • (5) Issue of keying material in hardcopy form marked/designated CRYPTO, without authorization, to a LE more than 30 days before its effective period. • (6) Late destruction (includes key in a fill device) of COMSEC material (i.e., destruction not completed within the timeframes in this manual), except where a waiver has been

Practice Dangerous TO Security (PDS) Examples of Reportable PDS outside of the command: (1) Premature or out-of-sequence use of keying material before its effective date, as long as the material was not reused. NOTE: Premature use is defined as an on-the-air Attempt to establish communications/transmit data. If material prematurely used is reused without consent of the CONAUTH, report as a CRYPTOGRAPHIC incident. (2) Inadvertent (i.e., early) destruction of COMSEC material, or destruction without authorization of the controlling authority (CONAUTH), as long as the destruction was properly documented. NOTE: Whenever this occurs, annotate the destruction record of the material as follows: “Material destruction was not authorized, but was properly destroyed and witnessed. (3) Not completing and returning FC Inventory IAW except where a waiver has been granted. (4) No Special or Combined Inventory was conducted due to Change of Command IAW Article 766.c.(3) or change of Manager

Emergency Action PlanEmergency Destruction Plan Emergency Destruction Planning: Three categories of COMSEC material which may require destruction in hostile emergencies are: • COMSEC keying material • COMSEC-related material (e.g., maintenance manuals, operating instructions, and general doctrinal publications) • Equipment

Emergency Action PlanEmergency Destruction Plan a. Precautionary Destruction: When precautionary destruction is necessary, destroy keying material and non-essential manuals in accordance with EKMS EAP/EDP procedures. b. Complete Destruction: When sufficient personnel and facilities are available, assign different persons to destroy the material in each category by means of separate destruction facilities and follow the priorities listed herein asincorporated into your EAP/EDP.

Emergency Action PlanEmergency Destruction Plan • Every command that holds classified COMSEC or CCI material must prepare emergency plans for safeguarding such material in the event of an emergency. • For commands located within the continental United States (CONUS), planning must consider natural disasters (e.g., fire, flood, tornado, and earthquake), civil/mob actions, and terrorism. • For commands located outside of CONUS and deployable commands, planning must consider both natural disasters and hostile actions (e.g., enemy attack, terrorism, mob action, or civil uprising). These plans will be incorporated into the overall Emergency Action Plan (EAP)/Emergency Destruction Plan (EDP) of the command. Further instructions for EAP/EDP can be found in the EKMS Manual or the S6 shop.

Data Transfer Device The DTD is an integral component of the EKMS. It is used to securely distribute key generated by the LMD/KP to consumers. The consumers are either an end cryptographic unit (ECU) or another DTD. The DTD is also able to replace current common fill devices (FDs).

Data Transfer Device The DTD is a small, lightweight, electronically programmable fill device in a ruggedized case. The DTD has a keyboard for input of commands and an alphanumeric screen to display the status of the unit and operator instructions.

Data Transfer Device For compatibility with existing equipment, the DTD has a 6-pin Input/output connector A fill device application program is provided with the DTD to perform functions comparable to those currently performed by the KYK-13, KYX-15A, and KOI-18. This software also allows the DTD to handle keys with lengths other than 128 bits.

AN/CYZ-10 The AN/CYZ-10 is the full keyboard version and the AN/CYZ-10A is the limited keyboard version of the DTD.

COMSEC Incident To some degree, every item of COMSEC material is accounted for and controlled because of the role it plays in the cryptographic processes that protect or authenticate U.S. Government information transmitted electrically. To counter the threat posed to secure communications by COMSEC material mishandling, losses, or thefts, the National Security Agency (NSA) established the National COMSEC Incident Reporting and Evaluation System or NCIRES.

COMSEC Incident The COMSEC incident reporting APPLICABILITY: (1) Classified and unclassified COMSEC keying material marked or designated CRYPTO (includes NSA-produced electronic key and tape key and field generated electronic key generated from a key variable generator (e.g., KG-83/KGX-93/KP) or STU-III Operational and Seed Key. (2) Controlled Cryptographic Item (CCI) equipment. (3) Classified COMSEC equipment. (4) Floppy disks containing key or other EKMS information. (5) Malicious codes/viruses on the EKMS system. (6) Classified COMSEC-accountable maintenance manuals, operating instructions, and publications.

Communications/ EKMS Fundamentals C PQS Question 107.4 Explain the three different types of “supersession” • Regular • Irregular • emergency

Supersession COMSEC MATERIAL SUPERSESSION Supersession refers to a time when a particular item of COMSEC material is no longer eligible for use. COMSEC material is superseded in one of three ways: • Regular • Irregular • Emergency

SupersessionRegular Regular supersession: is based on a specific, pre-determinedsupersession date for each edition of material. For example, each edition of a monthly key-tape is superseded on the first day of the month after its implementation; each edition of ten-day material is superseded on the 11th, 21st, and the 31st of the month.

SupersessionIrregular Irregular supersession: it is not pre-determined but which occurs as a result of use. Editions and individual segments of irregularly superseded COMSEC material are to be destroyed after the material has been used operationally, when the CONAUTH directs supersession, or, in the case of maintenance key, it may be used until the key becomes unserviceable. Irregular supersession is normally associated with one-time pads, test key, maintenance key, publications, and equipment.

SupersessionEmergency Emergency supersession: An unplanned change of supersession, usually as the result of a compromise.

Communications/ EKMS Fundamentals PQS Question 107.5 Explain the function and the contents of Communications Electronic Operating Instruction (CEOI)

CEOI The CEOI contains the technical guidance required to establish and maintain communications support of operations. The CEOI amplifies the communication and information systems (CIS) standing operating procedures (SOP) by providing detailed guidance for the coordination and control of communications means and functions.

CEOI Input is normally requested from subordinate commands by higher HQ. Sufficient copies of the CEOI should be maintained by the issuing HQ to allow issue to other units that may be attached for an operation.

CEOI The following information and instructions can usually be included in the CEOI: • Call sign assignments. • Frequency assignments. • Radio guard charts. • Radio net identifiers. • Telephone directory names and numbers. • Identification and marking panel codes. • Signal panel message instructions. • Pyrotechnic and smoke codes. • Ground-to-air signals. • Sound warning signals.

COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS (ACEOI) A locally generated ACEOI containing daily changing frequencies and call signs can be produced to support specific operations or special exercises (Kennel Bear, Gallant Eagle, and homeport field exercises). Units desiring a special ACEOI must submit a written request to higher HQs a minimum of 30 days in advance of the requirement. Units conducting training at deployment sites are required to request frequencies through the local area frequency coordinator.

COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS (ACEOI) The request for an ACEOI will contain: • a. Unit(s) involved • b. Inclusive dates, and number of days required • c. Net name(s) or circuit titles • d. Location of adjacent units • e. Number of copies required • f. Required delivery date • g. Point of contact, email address, and telephone number • Note: Call signs contained in a locally generated ACEOI are not compatible with effective editions of the AKAC.

Communications/ EKMS Fundamentals PQS Question 107.6 Define the following terms: • Essential Elements of Friendly Information (EEFI) • Commanders Critical Information Requirements (CCIR) • Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence (C4) • Communications Information System Officer (CISO)

Commander’s Critical Information Requirements (CCIR) The information required for situational awareness falls into three general categories: • information about the enemy • information about the environment, • information about friendly forces. The identification of CCIRs is a means to focus and direct the collection and processing of information in those categories.

Commander’s Critical Information Requirements (CCIR) CCIRs are the information regarding the enemy and friendly activities and the environment identified by the commander as critical to maintaining situational awareness, planning future activities, and facilitating timely decision-making. Designation of CCIRs reduces the volume of information to a manageable level and helps to ensure the accuracy, relevance, and timeliness of that information.

Commander’s Critical Information Requirements (CCIR) CCIRs is comprised of: • priority intelligence requirements (PIRs), • friendly force information requirements (FFIRs), • essential elements of friendly information (EEFIs)

Essential Elements of Friendly Information (EEFI) EEFIs are specific facts about friendly intentions, capabilities, and activities needed by adversaries to plan and execute effective operations against our forces. Identification of the EEFIs is key to planning effective INFOSEC, operations security, and other force protection operations.

Communications Information System Officer (CISO) The CISO is responsible to the commander for all matters concerning the planning and employment of CIS within the command. As a general or executive staff officer, the CISO serves as an advisor, planner, supervisor, and coordinator.

Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence (C4) The GCCS implements the joint C4I for the warrior concept. This concept calls for the capability to move a joint force anywhere on the globe at any time and to provide that force with the information necessary to accomplish its mission. The GCCS is a revolutionary approach designed to resolve joint C2 interoperability issues and evolve incompatible, Service-specific C2 programs into a single integrated C2 system. GCCS.

C4I

C4I MAGTF C4I is the concept for the integration of Marine Corps tactical information systems and the migration of selected systems MAGTF C4I provides commanders and their staffs at all levels of the MAGTF with the capability to send, receive, process, filter, and display data to aid them in their decision-making process. MAGTF C4I also provides a shared situational awareness through a common picture of the battlespace.

Communications/ EKMS Fundamentals PQS Question 107.7 What is the primary tactical Radio used by the NCF and what man-pack is used in infantry operations.

Single-channel radio Single-channel radio is the primary tactical means of communication for MAGTF/NCF units. Single-channel radio communications equipment is easy to operate. The networks are easily established, rapidly reconfigured, and, most importantly, easily maintained on the move. Single-channel radio provides secure voice communications and supports limited data information exchange.

Single-channel radio The most widely employed tactical radios provide integrated communications security (COMSEC) and jam resistance through frequency hopping. Tactical Single-channel radios operate in the three military radio frequency bands HF- high frequency VHF- very high frequency UHF- ultra high frequency

SEABEE COMBAT WARFARE COMMON CORE