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Security. Chapter 9. The Threat Environment. Figure 9-1: CSI/FBI Survey. There are many types of attacks. Companies Face Many Attacks Viruses (and other malware) Insider abuse of net access Laptop theft Unauthorized access by insiders Denial-of-service attacks System penetration
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Security Chapter 9
Figure 9-1: CSI/FBI Survey There are many types of attacks • Companies Face Many Attacks • Viruses (and other malware) • Insider abuse of net access • Laptop theft • Unauthorized access by insiders • Denial-of-service attacks • System penetration • Sabotage • Theft of proprietary information • Fraud • Telecoms eavesdropping and active wiretaps In Order of Decreasing Frequency
Figure 9-1: CSI/FBI Survey • Very Common Successful Incidents • Viruses and other malware • Insider abuse of net access • Laptop theft • Low-Frequency / High-Damage Attacks • Theft of proprietary information ($2.7 M per incident) • Denial-of-service attacks ($1.4 M per incident)
Figure 9-2: Malware • Malware • A general name for evil software • Viruses • Pieces of code that attach to other programs • When infected programs execute, the virus executes • Infect other programs on the computer • Spread to other computers by e-mail attachments, IM, peer-to-peer file transfers, etc. • Antivirus programs are needed to scan arriving files • Also scans for other malware
Figure 9-2: Malware • Worms • Stand-alone programs that do not need to attach to other programs • Can propagate like viruses through e-mail, etc. • But this require human gullibility, which is slow • In addition, vulnerability-enabled worms jump to victim hosts directly • Can do this because hosts have vulnerabilities • Vulnerability-enabled worms can spread with amazing speed • Vendors develop patches for vulnerabilities but companies often fail or are slow to apply them
Figure 9-2: Malware • Payloads • After propagation, viruses and worms execute their payloads (damage code) • Payloads erase hard disks, send users to pornography sites if they mistype URLs • Trojan horses are exploitation programs that disguise themselves as system files
Figure 9-2: Malware • Attacks on Individuals • Social engineering is tricking the victim into doing something against his or her interests • Spam is unsolicited commercial e-mail • Credit card number theft is performed by carders • Identity theft is collecting enough data to impersonate the victim in large financial transactions • Fraud involves get-rich-quick schemes, medical scams
Figure 9-2: Malware • Attacks on Individuals • Adware pops up advertisements • Spyware collects sensitive data and sends it to an attacker • Phishing: sophisticated social engineering attack in which an authentic-looking e-mail or website entices the user to enter his or her username, password, or other sensitive information
Figure 9-3: Human Break-Ins (Hacking) • Human Break-Ins • Viruses and worms rely on one main attack method • Humans can keep trying different approaches until they succeed • Hacking • Hacking is breaking into a computer • Hacking is intentionally using a computer resource without authorization or in excess of authorization
Figure 9-3: Human Break-Ins (Hacking) • Scanning Phase • Send attack probes to map the network and identify possible victim hosts • Nmap programming is a popular program for scanning attacks (Figure 9-4)
Figure 9-4: Nmap IP Range to Scan Type of Scan Identified Host and Open Ports
Figure 9-3: Human Break-Ins (Hacking) • The Term “Exploit” is Used in Different Ways • Noun: The actual break-in • Noun: Exploit is the program used to make the break-in • Verb: Attackers exploit the computer
Figure 9-3: Human Break-Ins (Hacking) • After the Break-In, the Hacker • Becomes invisible by deleting log files • Creates a backdoor (way to get back into the computer) • Backdoor account—account with a known password and super user privileges • Backdoor program—program to allow reentry; usually Trojanized • Rootkit—stealthy backdoor that cannot be detected by the operating system • Does damage at leisure New
Figure 9-5: Distributed Flooding Denial-of-Service Attack The attacker installs handler and zombie programs on victims The attacker sends an attack command to handlers. Handlers send attack commands to zombies. The zombies overwhelm the victim with attack packets.
Figure 9-6: Bots Bots are like zombies, but they can be updated by the human master to give new functionality.
Figure 9-7: Types of Attackers • Traditional Attackers: • Traditional Hackers • Hackers break into computers • Driven by curiosity, a feeling of power, and peer reputation • Virus writers • Vandals • Amoral
Figure 9-7: Types of Attackers • Traditional Attackers: • Script kiddies use scripts written by experienced hackers and virus writers • Have limited knowledge and abilities • But the large numbers of script kiddies makes them very dangerous collectively
Figure 9-7: Types of Attackers • Traditional Attackers: • Disgruntled employees andex-employees • Dangerous becausethey have knowledge ofand access to systems • Too often ignored, they can do extensive damage • The most dangerous employee attackers are IT and security staff members
Figure 9-7: Types of Attackers • Criminal Attackers • Most attacks are now made by criminals rather than amateurs • Crime generates funds that criminal attackers need to increase attack sophistication
Figure 9-7: Types of Attackers • On the Horizon • Cyberterror: Attacks by terrorists • Cyberwar: Attacks by nations • Potential for massive attacks
Figure 9-8: Planning Principles • Security Is a Management Issue, Not a Technical Issue • Without good management, technology cannot be effective • Comprehensive Security • An attacker only has to find one weakness • A firm needs comprehensive security to close all avenues of attack • This requires centralized security planning and management
Figure 9-8: Planning Principles • Defense in Depth • Every protection breaks down sometimes • Attacker should have to break through several lines of defense to succeed • Providing this protection is called defense in depth Countermeasure 1 (fails) Countermeasure 2 Stops the Attack
Figure 9-9: Access Control • Enumerating and Prioritizing Assets • Firms must enumerate and prioritize the assets they have to protect • Otherwise, security planning is impossible • Risk Analysis • Must balance threat risks against the cost of protection • Don’t overpay for security • Don’t fail to protect sensitive assets
Figure 9-9: Access Control • Companies Must Then Develop an Access Control Plan for Each Asset • The plan includes the AAA protections • Authentication is proving the identity of the person wishing access • Authorization is determining what the person may do if they are authenticated • Auditing is logging data on user actions for later appraisal. May send an alarm if certain conditions are found.
Figure 9-10: Authentication The applicant is the person who wishes to prove his or her identity. The verifier is the person who wants to authenticate the applicant. The applicant sends credentials (passwords, etc.). Usually a central authentication server judges the credentials. This provides consistency in authentication.
Figure 9-11: Password Authentication • Passwords • Strings of characters • Typed to authenticate someone wanting to use a username (account) on a computer • Benefits • Ease of use for users (familiar) • Inexpensive because built in to operating systems
Figure 9-11: Password Authentication • Problems • Passwords that are common words or names are widespread • Can be cracked quickly with dictionary attack • Variations of common words (capitalizing the first character, adding a digit at the end, etc.), can be broken almost as quickly by hybrid dictionary attack that looks for these tricks
Figure 9-11: Password Authentication • Passwords should be complex • Mix case (A and a), digits (6), and other keyboard characters ($, #, etc.) • Can only be cracked with brute force attacks (trying all possibilities) • Passwords should be long • Eight characters minimum • Each added character increases the brute force search time by a factor of about 70
Figure 9-11: Password Authentication • Other Concerns • If people are forced to use long and complex passwords, they tend to write them down • People should use different passwords for different sites • Otherwise, compromising a password will give access to multiple sites. • But many people use the same password at multiple sites
Figure 9-11: Password Authentication • Critique each of the following passwords, tell what attack can break it, and tell how difficult it will be for the attack to guess the password. • swordfish • Processing1 • SeAtTLe • R7%t& • 4h*6tU9$^l
Figure 9-12: Digital Certificate Authentication • Public and Private Keys • Each party will have both a public key and a private key • Each party makes its public key available to everybody • Each party keeps its private key secret • Digital Certificate • Tamper-proof file that gives anamed party’s public key
Figure 9-12: Digital Certificate Authentication Calculation Digital Certificate Applicant does a calculation with his or her Private key Public key of the person the applicant claims to be Authentication Verifier tests the calculation with the public key of theclaimed party. If the test succeeds, the applicant mustknow the secret private key of the claimed party, whichonly the claimed party should know.
Figure 9-12: Digital Certificate Authentication • Appraisal • Digital signature authentication gives extremely strong authentication • Very expensive: must set up infrastructure for distributing public-private key pairs • The firm must do the labor of creating, distributing, and installing private keys.
Figure 9-13: Biometric Authentication • Biometric Authentication • Authentication based on bodily measurements • Promises to eliminate passwords • Fingerprint Scanning • Dominates biometrics use today • Simple and inexpensive • Substantial error rate (misidentification) • Often can be fooled fairly easily by determined impostors • Not a problem for low-risk situations like home computers
Figure 9-13: Biometric Authentication • Iris Scanners • Scan the iris (colored part of the eye)with a camera (not a laser beam) • Irises are complex, so very strong authentication • Expensive • Face Recognition • Camera allows analysis of facial structure • Can be done surreptitiously—without the knowledge or consent of person being scanned • Very high error rate and easy to deceive
Figure 9-13: Biometric Authentication • Error Rates and Deception • Error rates (the frequency of identification errors when there is no deception) typically are higher than vendors claim • Vendors test under idealized conditions • Deception (deliberately trying to fool the system) is easier than vendors claim • Especially for fingerprint recognition • The in-the-field accuracy of biometrics is uncertain
Figure 9-14: Firewall Operation Firewalls inspect each packet. Legitimate packets are allowed through. Provable attack packets are dropped and logged.
Figure 9-15: Stateful Firewall Filtering • Stateful Firewall Filtering • There are several types of firewall filtering • Stateful inspection is the dominant methodology today • Stateful firewalls often use other filtering mechanisms as secondary mechanisms
Figure 9-15: Stateful Firewall Filtering • Connection Initiation Attempts • Some Packets Attempt to Open a Connection • Example: packets with TCP segments whose SYN bits are set • Stateful firewalls have default rules for connection-opening attempts Internally Initiated Connections Are Allowed by default Externally Initiated Connections are Rejected By Default Stateful Border Firewall Site
Figure 9-15: Stateful Firewall Filtering • Stateful Inspection Access Control Lists (ACLs) • ACLs modify the default behavior for ingress or egress • Ingress ACL rules: allow access to selected internal servers • Egress ACL rules: prevent access to certain external servers
Figure 9-15: Stateful Firewall Filtering • Packets that Do Not Attempt to Open a Connection • Most packets do not attempt to open a connection • Very simple behavior • If the packet is part of an established connection, it is passed without further inspection. (However, these packets can be filtered if desired) • If the packet is not part of an established connection, it is dropped and logged • This simplicity makes the cost of processing most packets minimal
Stateful Firewalls: Recap All Packets Connection-Opening Attempts Other Packets Not Part of Previously Permitted Connection Part of Previously Permitted Connection Default Behavior ACL Exceptions Accept Packet Drop Packet
Figure 9-15: Stateful Firewall Filtering • Perspective • Stateful firewalls’ simple operation leads to inexpensive stateful firewall operation • However, stateful inspection firewall operation is highly secure
Figure 9-17: Ingress Access Control List (ACL) for a Stateful Inspection Firewall • 1. If packet’s source and destination sockets are in the connection table, PASS. • If the packet is part of an previously established connection, pass it without further filtering. • 2. If the packet’s source and destination sockets are not in the connection table and the packet is not a connection-opening attempt, DROP and LOG. • Drop any packet that is not a connection-opening attempt and that is not part of an established connection.
Figure 9-17: Ingress Access Control List (ACL) for a Stateful Inspection Firewall • 3. If protocol = TCP AND destination port number = 25, PASS and add connection to connection table. • This rule permits external access to all internal mail servers. • 4. If IP address = 10.47.122.79 AND protocol = TCP AND destination port number = 80, PASS and add connection to connection table. • This rule permits access to a particular webserver (10.47.122.79)
Figure 9-17: Ingress Access Control List (ACL) for a Stateful Inspection Firewall • 5. Deny All AND LOG • If earlier rules do not result in a pass or deny decision, this last rule enforces the default rule of banning all externally initiated connection-opening attempts.
Figure 9-18: Firewalls, Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs), and Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPSs) • Firewalls • Drop provable attack packets • Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) • Very sophisticated filtering—better than firewalls • Identify suspicious packets • Do not drop--suspicious packets may be legitimate • Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPSs) • Use IDS filtering mechanisms • Drop suspicious packets highly likely to be attacks • Ignore other suspicious packets
Figure 9-18: Firewalls, Intrusion Detection Systems, and Intrusion Prevention Systems • IDS and IPS filtering • Stream Analysis • Analyze streams of packets to identify suspicious patterns • Deep packet inspection • Inspect headers and messages at the internet, transport, and application layers
Figure 9-18: Firewalls, Intrusion Detection Systems, and Intrusion Prevention Systems