Default Semantics Workshop University of Pisa, 8 May 2012 Kasia M. Jaszczolt University of Cambridge http://people.pwf.

1. Default Semantics Workshop University of Pisa, 8 May 2012 Kasia M. Jaszczolt University of Cambridge http://people.pwf.cam.ac.uk/kmj21

2. Part 1 Default Semantics and Interactive Semantics: An introduction • Part 2 Selected applications: Temporal reference in discourse • Part 3 Selected applications: First-person reference in discourse and beliefs de se

3. Is the concept of time primitive or is it composed of simpler concepts? • How do linguistic expressions of time reflect it?

5. Jaszczolt, K. M. forthcoming a. 'Temporality and epistemic commitment: An unresolved question'. In: K. Jaszczolt and L. de Saussure (eds). Time: Language, Cognition, and Reality. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Jaszczolt, K. M. forthcoming b. 'Cross-linguistic differences in expressing time and universal principles of utterance interpretation'. In: L. Filipovic and K. Jaszczolt (eds). Space and Time in Languages and Cultures: Linguistic Diversity. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

6. What is expressed in the lexicon in one language may be expressed by grammar in another.

7. What is expressed in the lexicon in one language may be expressed by grammar in another. What is expressed overtly in one language may be left to pragmatic inference or default interpretation in another.

8. Time-tense mismatches:

9. Expressing the Past (1) Lidia went to a concert yesterday. (regular past) (2) This is what happened yesterday. Lidia goes to a concert, meets her school friend and tells her… (past of narration) (3)Lidia would have gone to a concert (then). (epistemic necessity past) (4) Lidia must have gone to a concert (yesterday). (epistemic necessity past) (5) Lidia may have gone to a concert (yesterday). (epistemic possibility past) (6) Lidia might have gone to a concert (yesterday). (epistemic possibility past)

10. Expressing the Present (7) Lidia is at a concert now. (regular present) (8) Lidia will be at a concert now. (epistemic necessity present) (9) Lidia must be at a concert now. (epistemic necessity present) (10) Lidia may be at a concert now. (epistemic possibility present) (11) Lidia might be at a concert now. (epistemic possibility present)

11. Expressing the Future (12) Lidia goes to a concert tomorrow evening. (‘tenseless’ future) (13) Lidia is going to a concert tomorrow evening. (futurate progressive) (14) Lidia is going to go to a concert tomorrow evening. (periphrastic future) (15) Lidia will go to a concert tomorrow evening. (regular future) (16) Lidia must be going to a concert tomorrow evening. (epistemic necessity future) (17) Lidia may go to a concert tomorrow evening. (epistemic possibility future) (18) Lidia might go to a concert tomorrow evening. (epistemic possibility future)

12. Swahili: consecutive tense marker ka (19) a. …wa-Ingerezawa-li-wa-chukuawa-le maiti, 3Pl-British 3Pl-Past-3Pl-take 3Pl-Dem corpses ‘…then the British took the corpses, b. wa-ka-wa-tiakatikabaomoja, 3Pl-Cons-3Pl-put.on on board one put them on a flat board, c. wa-ka-ya-telemeshamaji-nikwautaratibu w-ote… 3Pl-Cons-3Pl-lower water-Loc with order 3Pl-all and lowered them steadily into the water…’ adapted from Givón (2005: 154)

13. rhetorical structure rules, Asher and Lascarides 2003 Narration: (20)Lidia played a sonata. The audience applauded. e1 e2

14. St’àt’imcets(Lillooet Salish), British Columbia only future (kelh) – non-future distinction (Matthewson 2006)

15. Central Pomo Future can be realis or irrealis

16. Thai (21) m3ae:r3i:I kh2ian n3iy3ai: Mary write novel

17. (21a) Mary wrote a novel. (21b) Mary was writing a novel. (21c) Mary started writing a novel but did not finish it. (21d) Mary has written a novel. (21e) Mary has been writing a novel. (21f) Mary writes novels. / Mary is a novelist. (21g) Mary is writing a novel. (21h) Mary will write a novel. (21i) Mary will be writing a novel. from Srioutai (2006: 45)

18. From time to epistemic detachment ‘Why do we believe that events are to be distinguished as past, present, and future? I conceive that the belief arises from distinctions in our own experience. At any moment I have certain perceptions, I have also the memory of certain other perceptions, and the anticipation of others again. The direct perception itself is a mental state qualitatively different from the memory or the anticipation of perceptions.’ McTaggart (1908: 127)

19. Time as Modality: Supervenience (i)supervenience of the concept of time on the concept of epistemic detachment (temporal properties on modal properties in semantics) (ii)supervenience of the concept of time on space-time (properties of the concept of time on properties of space-time).

20. Supervenience A set of properties T supervenes on a set of properties M iff no two things can differ with respect to T properties without also differing with respect to M properties. ‘There cannot be a T-difference without an M-difference.’ cf. McLaughlin & Bennett 2005

21. The logical form of the sentence can not only be extended but also replaced by a new semantic representation when the primary, intended meaning demands it. Such extensions or substitutions are primary meanings and their representations are merger representationsin Default Semantics.There is no syntactic constraint on merger representations.

22. The logical form of the sentence can not only be extended but also replaced by a new semantic representation when the primary, intended meaning demands it. Such extensions or substitutions are primary meanings and their representations are merger representationsin Default Semantics.There is no syntactic constraint on merger representations. Merger representations have the status of mental representations.

23. The logical form of the sentence can not only be extended but also replaced by a new semantic representation when the primary, intended meaning demands it. Such extensions or substitutions are primary meanings and their representations are merger representationsin Default Semantics.There is no syntactic constraint on merger representations. Merger representations have the status of mental representations. They have a compositional structure: they are proposition-like, truth-conditionally evaluable constructs.

24. Merger Representations for the Past (1) Lidia went to a concert yesterday. (regular past) (2) This is what happened yesterday. Lidia goes to a concert, meets her school friend and tells her… (past of narration) (3)Lidia would have gone to a concert (then). (epistemic necessity past) (4) Lidia must have gone to a concert (yesterday). (epistemic necessity past) (5) Lidia may have gone to a concert (yesterday). (epistemic possibility past) (6) Lidia might have gone to a concert (yesterday). (epistemic possibility past)

25. Fig. 1: Degree of epistemic commitment for selected expressions with past- time reference

26. Acc ├ p ‘it is acceptable that it is the case that p’ Grice (2001)

27. ACCΔ ├ Σ ‘it is acceptable to the degree Δ that Σ is true’

28. amended and extended language of DRSs (discourse representation structures) (Discourse Representation Theory, DRT, Kamp and Reyle 1993)

29. Fig. 2: Σ for example (1) ‘Lidia went to a concert yesterday.’ (regular past) Σ

30. Fig. 3: Σ for example (5) ‘Lidia may have gone to a concert yesterday.’ (epistemic possibility past) Σ

31. Merger Representations for the Present (7) Lidia is at a concert now. (regular present) (8) Lidia will be at a concert now. (epistemic necessity present) (9) Lidia must be at a concert now. (epistemic necessity present) (10) Lidia may be at a concert now. (epistemic possibility present) (11) Lidia might be at a concert now. (epistemic possibility present)

32. Fig. 4: Degree of epistemic commitment for expressions with present-time reference

33. (22) Lidia will often sing in the shower. (dispositional necessity present)

34. Fig. 5: Σfor example (7) ‘Lidia is at a concert now.’ (regular present) Σ

35. Fig. 6: Σ for example (8) ‘Lidia will be at a concert now’ (epistemic necessity present) Σ

36. Fig. 7: Σfor example (22) ‘Lidia will often sing in the shower’ (dispositional necessity present) Σ

37. Merger Representations for the Future (12) Lidia goes to a concert tomorrow evening. (‘tenseless’ future) (13) Lidia is going to a concert tomorrow evening. (futurate progressive) (14) Lidia is going to go to a concert tomorrow evening. (periphrastic future) (15) Lidia will go to a concert tomorrow evening. (regular future) (16) Lidia must be going to a concert tomorrow evening. (epistemic necessity future) (17) Lidia may go to a concert tomorrow evening. (epistemic possibility future) (18) Lidia might go to a concert tomorrow evening. (epistemic possibility future)

38. Fig. 8: Degree of modal detachment for selected expressions with future-time reference

39. Fig. 9:Σ for example (15) ‘Lidia will go to a concert tomorrow evening’ (regular future) 

40. Fig. 10: Σ for example (13) ‘Lidia is going to a concert tomorrow evening.’ (futurate progressive) 

41. Future may with activity verb, default reading  Fig.11: Σfor example (17) ‘Lidia may go to a concert tomorrow evening’(epistemic possibility future)

42. (21) m3ae:r3i:I kh2ian n3iy3ai: Mary write novel

43.  Fig. 14:  for example (21) ‘Mary wrote a novel’ (regular past)

44. Capturing cross-linguistic differences Realis/irrealis future (Central Pomo): ACCΔ ├ Σ Consecutive tense (Swahili): WS + CPIpm

45. von Fintel and Matthewson (2009): • Compositionality is a semantic universal √compositionality of merger representations • Gricean principles of inference are a pragmatic universal. √CPI, SCWD

46. Conclusions • Merger representations of Default Semantics can represent temporal reference which is achieved in discourse in a variety of ways, not only through grammatical tenses and adverbials.

47. Conclusions • Merger representations of Default Semantics can represent temporal reference which is achieved in discourse in a variety of ways, not only through grammatical tenses and adverbials. • Cross-linguistic differences in expressing time can be explained by a universal semantics of temporality in terms of the underlying concept of epistemic modality ACCΔ ├ Σ .

48. Conclusions • Merger representations of Default Semantics can represent temporal reference which is achieved in discourse in a variety of ways, not only through grammatical tenses and adverbials. • Cross-linguistic differences in expressing time can be explained by a universal semantics of temporality in terms of the underlying concept of epistemic modality ACCΔ ├ Σ . • Compositionality is best understood as pragmatic compositionality, sought at the level of Σs rather than WS.

49. Conclusions • Merger representations of Default Semantics can represent temporal reference which is achieved in discourse in a variety of ways, not only through grammatical tenses and adverbials. • Cross-linguistic differences in expressing time can be explained by a universal semantics of temporality in terms of the underlying concept of epistemic modality ACCΔ ├ Σ . • Compositionality is best sought on the level of Σ rather than WS. • Temporality is not a primitive concept. It supervenes on the concept of epistemic detachment (ACCΔ ├ Σ’)from the truth of the merged proposition (Σ’)

50. An unresolved question (UQ) Jaszczolt, forthcoming a • ‘Degrees of detachment from certainty’ and ‘degrees of commitment to the (truth of the proposition representing an) eventuality’ are quantitative concepts. • The past/present/future distinction intuitively appears to be a qualitative one. If one founds the latter on the former, one has to either provide a way of correlating one with the other, or explain away the intuitive qualitative contrast between the past, the present and the future.