710 likes | 1.07k Views
Iwo jima. FEBRUARY – MARCH, 1945. BACKGROUND. IWO JIMA : LOCATION: 750 mi. SOUTH OF TOKYO CONSIDERED ONE OF JAPAN’S “HOME ISLANDS” (define) USED BY JAPANESE AS PART OF “INNER” DEFENSE LINE (unlike Tarawa, Guadalcanal, etc.) OCCUPIED & FORITFIED BY JAPANESE MILITARY SINCE 1930’s
E N D
Iwo jima FEBRUARY – MARCH, 1945
BACKGROUND • IWO JIMA: • LOCATION: 750 mi. SOUTH OF TOKYO • CONSIDERED ONE OF JAPAN’S “HOME ISLANDS” (define) • USED BY JAPANESE AS PART OF “INNER” DEFENSE LINE (unlike Tarawa, Guadalcanal, etc.) • OCCUPIED & FORITFIED BY JAPANESE MILITARY SINCE 1930’s • AFTER THE BATTLE OF THE PHILIPPINE SEA(1944): • JAPAN REALIZES IWO JIMA GARRISON MUST BE STRENGTHENED • BECAUSE…A U.S. ATTACK ON HOME ISLANDS IS IMMINENT (define) • SO… • MORE TROOPS SENT • MORE EQUIPMENT SENT • FORTIFICATIONS STRENGTHENED • RESULT? • IJA/IJA TROOP STRENGTH (February,’45) = 22,800 (approx.) • MASSIVE UNDERGROUND TUNNEL/BUNKER NETWORK • JAPANESE DEFENSES: MIXTURE OF… • HEAVY ARTILLERY • LIGHT WEAPONS • MORTARS • CONCEALED BUNKERS / “MURDER HOLES”
BACKGROUND (cont’d.) • LATE ‘44/EARLY ‘45: • U.S. MILITARY INCREASES AERIAL BOMBING CAMPAIGN ON HOME ISLANDS • U.S. NEEDS TO CONTROL IWO JIMA (& other islands – ex. OKINAWA) • WHY? • IWO HAS LARGE AIRFIELD COMPLEX • AIRSTRIPS WOULD PROVIDE… • BASE FOR U.S. BOMBERS TARGETING JAPAN • SHORTEN AERIAL DISTANCE TO JAPAN • PROVIDE EMERGENCY LANDING STRIPS FOR DAMAGED U.S. AIRCRAFT • BASE FOR LONG-RANGE FIGHTER ESCORTS • JAPANESE WERE USING ISLAND FOR AERIAL ATTACKS ON U.S. FLEET • ISLAND WOULD BE USED AS A NAVAL / AIR / SUPPLY BASE FOR INVASION OF JAPAN
ORDER OF BATTLE • IJA / IJN FORCES: 23,000 (approx.) • IWO GARRISON HAS NO NAVAL SUPPORT • VERY LITTLE / IRRELEVANT AIR FORCE • U.S. • 70,000 – MOSTLY USMC & USN LANDING FORCES • U.S. HAS COMPLETE AIR & NAVAL SUPERIORITY • JAPANESE STRATEGY: • HOLD FIRE UNTIL SIGNIFICANT NUMBERS OF U.S. FORCES HAVE LANDED • INFLICT AS MANY CASUALTIES AS POSSIBLE • NO RELIEF FROM MAINLAND EXPECTED • NO SURRENDER
LT. GENERAL TADAMICHI KURIBAYASHI, IJACOMMANDING OFFICER, JAPANESE FORCES, IWO JIMA, FEB. – MARCH, 1945
GENERAL HOLLAND M. “HOWLIN’ MAD” SMITH, COMMANDINGOFFICER, FLEET MARINES, U.S.M.C.
THE BATTLE • BATTLE LASTS OVER 1 MONTH: • FEBRUARY 19 - MARCH 26, 1945 • FEW JAPANESE REMAIN AFTER MARCH 11th • Mt. SURIBACHI – TAKEN ON FEB. 23-24TH • MADE FAMOUS FOR “FLAG RAISING” • FIGHTING: BATTLE DOESN’T HAVE SOME OF THE CHARACTERISTICS TYPICAL OF PACIFIC FIGHTING • EX. – FEW, IF ANY, ORGANIZED BANZAI CHARGES BY JAPANESE • JAPANESE OFTEN USE SMALL UNIT NIGHT ATTACKS • SMALL ARMS (rifles, etc.) INEFFECTIVE AGAINST JAPANESE BUNKERS/TUNNELS • USMC USES FLAMETHROWERS, EXPLOSIVES, GRENADES, ETC. EXTENSIVELY • AIRSTRIP(s) ARE USED BEFORE BATTLE IS OVER (unlike Tarawa) • FEW PRISONERS (ON EITHER SIDE) TAKEN
ORIGINAL FLAG BEING REPLACED BY THE SECOND FLAG (right)MARINES POSE WITH THE SECOND FLAG (below)
FINAL RESULTS • CASUALTIES: • IJA / IJN: • KIA/MIA: 22, 500 (APPROX.) • POW: 216 (APPROX.) • USMC / USN: • KIA: 6,812 • WIA: 19, 217 • IWO AIRSTRIPS ARE NOW OPEN FOR AERIAL SUPPORT • AERIAL BOMBING CAMPAIGN vs. JAPAN IS ACCELERATED • IWO IS ALSO USED FOR SUPPLY BASE & EMERGENCY LANDINGS