February 10, 2011

1. Group C’s Diagnostic Techniques Summary of Secretary Powell’s Presentation to the UN Security Council February 10, 2011

2. Outline Introduction/Summary – Antonia Shull Key Assumptions Check – Amber Marriott Quality of Information Check – Brandon Payne Indicators or Signposts of Change – Hadis Dashtestani Analysis of Competing Hypotheses – Chuck Barber

3. Diagnostic Techniques Diagnostic techniques allow analyst to identify key theories, uncertainties, intelligence gaps, and consider multiple hypotheses (even the unlikely ones) in order to make a sophisticated and credible intelligence assessment. The four techniques are: • Key Assumptions Check – listing the key assumptions that underlie the analysis by thinking critically about each assumption and making the assumption stronger or weaker • Quality of Information Check – evaluating the completeness and soundness of available information sources in order to detect possible deception or intelligence gaps • Indicators or Signpost of Change – identifying a set of competing hypotheses by listing supporting evidence, reviewing, and identifying the most likely hypotheses • Analysis of Competing Hypotheses – weighing of alternative explanations that involves identifying a complete set of alternative explanations or outcomes then systematically evaluating each and selecting the best fit

4. Preface of the Address • Nov. 8, 2002 - U.N. Security Council Resolution 1441 was passed (unanimously) • Offered Iraq “a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations” that they had been found guilty of for over 12 years • Iraq was in material breach of its obligation under previous resolutions, which included: • Manufacturing WMD • Violating ceasefire terms • Construction of prohibited types of missiles • Purchases and import of prohibited armaments • Refusal of Iraq to compensate Kuwait for the widespread looting • Goals of Resolution 1441 were to: • Give Iraq one last chance to be compliant or they will face serious consequences • To verify the existence or destruction of Iraq’s remaining unaccounted for WMD • Allow inspectors from UNMOVIC/IAEA to perform inspections with full cooperation • November 13, 2002 – Iraq agreed to Resolution 1441 • November 27, 2002 – UNMOVIC/IAEA inspectors returned to Iraq

5. Key Assumptions Check • Intelligence gathered from human sources is accurate and true. • Experts (imagery analysts, translators, etc.) provided accurate representations. • Iraq has a “Duty to Comply” with the UN’s resolution 1441 and inspectors. • Iraq’s actions have been in “bad faith” rather than more benign reasons. • Information outside of existence of WMDs, precursors, or other related items is indicative of Iraq’s possession of WMDs.

6. Key Assumptions Check • Precursors, parts, past possession and current knowledge translate into possession of physical WMDs. • Iraq’s “Higher Committee for Monitoring the Inspection Teams” is there to inhibit the inspectors. • The 12,200 page declaration is poor in information and devoid of new evidence. • Link to terrorist cells relates to possession of WMDs.

7. Quality of Information (QoI) “My colleagues, every statement I make today is backed up by sources, solid sources. These are not assertions. What we are giving you are facts and conclusions based on solid intelligence.” - Colin Powell, February 5 2003

8. QoI - Observations • Conviction and confidence of presentation – Persuasive language • Perceptual Bias (expectation) • e.g., because Saddam Hussein is doing a, b and c, that must imply z. • Intelligence Acquisition: • Variety of Sources? • Reliable Sources?? • Web of lies?

9. QoI - Interpretation • The Price of Ambiguity • A “decade of proof that [Saddam] remains determined to acquire nuclear weapons.” • “If we knew today or knew then what we know today that there were no WoMD…the justification would not have been there.” – Colin Powell on Meet the Press, June 10, 2007 • The “sinister nexus between Iraq and the al-Qaida terrorist network.” • According to Secretary Powell, there had been a “decades long experience with respect to ties between Iraq and al-Qaida” … • …Even though Al-Qaida had only been formed between 1988 and 1989, and these ties were not what he was led to believe. • And once again on sources… • Ibn al-Sheikh al-Libi – Referred to as “Senior terrorist operative” currently being held in detention. • Libyan national, apprehended in Pakistan in 2001 • Subjected to torture at US base in Afghanistan • Fabricated story?

10. Tracking potential for Iraq having weapons of Mass Destruction TopicsIndicators Iraq deadly behavior - Using mustard & nerve gas against Kurds - Conducting ethnic cleaning against the Shia Iraqis Iraq terrorist network - Nexus between Iraq & Al-Qaida (terrorist network) Deadly weapons history - Biological weapons (confession of having it in 1995) - Producing VX - Chemical weapons - Nuclear weapons Satellite images - Housecleaning: banned materials have moved from Iraqi weapons of mass destruction facilities (ex. Taji) - Existence of decontamination vehicles - Especial security facilities

11. Tracking potential for Iraq having weapons of Mass Destruction TopicsIndicators Iraq dishonesty - Iraqi’s UAV range (declared 80 Km, actual range: 500 Km) - Hiding equipments - Evacuating things - Hiding people (displacing weapon experts with other military men) - Replacing hard drives in weapon’s facility - Train how to deceive inspectors Iraq violation from its - Refusing to permit U-2 reconnaissance flights obligations - Refusing to provide a comprehensive list of scientists - Refusing to allow access to all official persons - Iraq has made no effort to dissarm

12. Analysis of Competing Hypotheses Hypotheses • H1: Saddam Hussein and his regime are concealing efforts to produce WMD • H2: Iraq is attempting to maintain a semblance of power in a threatening neighborhood • H3: Iraq is simply incompetent of accounting for its weapons with no malicious intent

13. Analysis of Competing Hypotheses Evidence E1: Previous violations over 16 previous resolutions and 12 years • Iraq has not accounted for the biological agent and weapons it admitted to having • Chemical weapons not accounted for and a history of use. • Human rights violations and ethnic cleansing E2: Attempts to hide information from inspectors • Two recordings on November 26, 2002 and January 20, 2003 about evacuating equipment and ammunition, then hiding the fact. • Dr. Blix pronounced the 12,200-page declaration rich in volume but poor in information. • Orders to hide correspondence with the Organization of Military Industrialization (oversees WMD activities. • Ordered removal of all prohibited weapons from palace complexes • Hiding items in the homes of government officials, scientists and cars driven around the countryside • Iraq did not provide a comprehensive list of scientists associated with its weapons of mass destruction programs. • Pressure on interviewees and hiding persons of interest. • Photo of unusual activity and witness claiming chemical weapons moved “Al Musayyib” E3: Evidence of Chemical, Biological and Nuclear weapons • Inspectors found 12 empty chemical warheads on Jan 16, 2003 • Satellite photos of weapons facilities • Trucks cleaning out close to 30 facilities prior to inspectors arriving • Creation of transportable production facilities and dispersal methods • Intercepted communication about nerve agents • Repeated covert attempts to acquire high-specification aluminum tubes from 11 different countries for enriching uranium E4: Attempts to comply with UN Resolution • On Jan 20, Iraq promised inspectors it would search for more • General Sadi publicly pledged that Iraq was prepared to cooperate unconditionally with inspectors. • Declaration of December 7, 2002, permitted weapons E5: Actions of a Sovereign Power • Higher Committee for Monitoring the Inspection Teams • Iraq refused to permit U-2 recon flights • Pressure on interviewees and hiding persons of interest. E6: Increase Weapons’ Capability • Possession of missiles and UAVs that violate the 150-km delivery limit

14. Analysis of Competing Hypotheses UN Violations in Iraq • Recommend development of indicators to distinguish H1 and H2 • H3 is unlikely with majority of evidence pointing to malicious intent

15. Conclusion Unfortunately, these diagnostic techniques do not seemed to have been applied. • March 17, 2003 - President Bush launched a second Gulf War despite multiple opinions questioning the integrity of the underlying intelligence information • September 30, 2004 – A report from the Iraq Survey Group came out stating that Iraq had • No deployable WMD as of March 2003 • No production since 1991 • No proof of any biological weapons since 1991 • No nuclear program since 1991 • 2008 - Senate Intelligence Committee found that the Bush administration had "misrepresented the intelligence and the threat from Iraq". • President Bush later said that the biggest regret of his presidency was "the intelligence failure" in Iraq If they would have used these diagnostic techniques they would have: • Challenged conventional wisdom (thought outside the box) • Identified mental mindsets • Managed and defined uncertainties • Assessed the impact of information gaps/deception