Figure 13.1

1. Figure 13.1 Tariff-inclusive price

2. Fig. 19.3

3. Fig. 19.4

8. Source: IMF WEO 07

11. Tariff Structures and Effective Protection The nominal tariff rate, t, is (13.1) Where p′ is the tariff-inclusive price p is the free trade price

12. Tariff Structures and Effective Protection The effective tariff rate, g, is (13.2) Where v′ is the value added per unit of output, inclusive of the tariff v is the value added per unit of output under free trade

13. Table 13.1

15. Table 19.4

16. Figure 13.3

17. Free trade bad for the poorest? • Panagariya’s six fallacies (World Economy, 2005) • Surprising facts neglected in the debate about Doha • No obvious political bias—some strange bedfellows • (Oxfam and the IMF MD both sign up to most of them) • Relates to current discussion about rising food prices and the poor. http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1467-9701.2005.00734.x?cookieSet=1

18. Panagariya’s six fallacies • Agricultural border protection and subsidies are largely a rich country thing • Rich country subsidies and protection …hurt the poorest countries most • …hurt the poor rural households in the poorest countries • …constitute the principal barrier to the development of the poorest countries • Agricultural protection reflects double standards and hypocrisy in the rich countries • Benefits of aid to the poorest countries are more than offset by the losses from developed countries

19. Panagariya’s six fallacies Implications: A Doha round fully liberalizing trade could badly damage the poorest countries Though it would be good for middle income countries And for the world as a whole, The poorest countries would need to be compensated for this loss

20. Different groups • Least Developed Countries • Most of Africa, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Cambodia, Nepal etc. • Cairns Group • With strong comparative advantage in Ag • Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Roca, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, South Africa, Thailand and Uruguay • Other developing countries • (mixed bag includes India, China….)

21. Panagariya’s six fallacies • Agricultural border protection and subsidies are largely a rich country thing • Rich country subsidies and protection …hurt the poorest countries most • …hurt the poor rural households in the poorest countries • …constitute the principal barrier to the development of the poorest countries • Agricultural protection reflects double standards and hypocrisy in the rich countries • Benefits of aid to the poorest countries are more than offset by the losses from developed countries

24. Panagariya’s six fallacies • Agricultural border protection and subsidies are largely a rich country thing • Rich country subsidies and protection …hurt the poorest countries most • …hurt the poor rural households in the poorest countries • …constitute the principal barrier to the development of the poorest countries • Agricultural protection reflects double standards and hypocrisy in the rich countries • Benefits of aid to the poorest countries are more than offset by the losses from developed countries

25. The Key Step in the Argument • Poorest countries already have free access under EBA • And therefore they benefit from measures that raise internal EU prices (such as export subsidies) • Importing LeastDCs also benefit from EU’s export and output subsidies (as they both lower the world price) • Lower import price; higher export price for LeastDCs • (But what about Cotton?)

26. EU output subsidies lower world price • EU is large enough to affect the world price • So exporters in the rest of the world selling their agricultural produce at the world price are made worse off by the EU output subsidy. • Importers in ROW benefit from EU output subsidy • For simplicity the figure shows things as if only an output subsidy exists – in fact there are also tariffs and export subsidies

27. EU ROW

28. EU export subsidies raise the internal EU price above world price • This benefits EU producers… …but also exporters from LeastDCs who can sell directly into the EU market without tariffs • It also lowers the world price, which is good for food importers in ROW • Losers are other exporters from outside the EU

29. EU ROW

30. At least in the short-run • Many of the poorest countries are net importers of food and of agricultural products • (But what about Cotton?) Yes, it’s an exception EU doesn’t produce it, so no big production subsidies And it is an important export of some LeastDCs • Another caveat: regulatory, sanitary and phytosanitary (plant health) requirements represent significant barriers • On the other hand: it’s not just the EU’s “Everything but Aid” initiative: US “Africa Growth and Opportunity Act” (among other regionally focused initiatives) also provides duty free access for a lot.

31. Many LICs are net importers of food

32. Many LICs are net importers of agric prods

33. In the longer run • Importers can become exporters • Maybe quite quickly… • Dynamic effects need to be taken into a/c • But internal conditions and policies key to ability of LeastDCs to take advantage

35. Panagariya’s six fallacies • Agricultural border protection and subsidies are largely a rich country thing • Rich country subsidies and protection …hurt the poorest countries most • …hurt the poor rural households in the poorest countries • …constitute the principal barrier to the development of the poorest countries • Agricultural protection reflects double standards and hypocrisy in the rich countries • Benefits of aid to the poorest countries are more than offset by the losses from developed countries The other “fallacies are a bit rhetorical, making the general point that over-concentration on trade liberalization could lead to a backlash in countries where the most crucial barriers to growth are non-trade

36. World Bank Global Economic Prospects 2005

40. Trading blocs in the global South

43. Regional preference within Africa? • Africa's non-oil exports are concentrated in a few products, none of them important regional imports. • There is relatively little intra-African trade and the mismatch between African exports and imports cannot quickly change. • Moreover, intra-African trade is highly concentrated, geographically, with almost no trade between East and West Africa. • This finding makes less compelling the arguments that regional trade can help overcome problems of small domestic markets. • Giving preference to imports from other African countries risks making your own exports uncompetitive in the world market • In short, regional trade agreements seem to present Africa with a "lose-lose" situation. Yeats, 1998

44. Nunn QJE 2008