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A Strategic Dominance Argument for Retaining § 5

A Strategic Dominance Argument for Retaining § 5. David Epstein Sharyn O’Halloran Columbia University. Should Section 5 Survive?. The arguments against retaining Section 5 fall into three categories: Section 5 has done its work and is no longer needed (it’s a “victim of its own success”)

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A Strategic Dominance Argument for Retaining § 5

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  1. A Strategic Dominance Argument for Retaining §5 David Epstein Sharyn O’Halloran Columbia University

  2. Should Section 5 Survive? • The arguments against retaining Section 5 fall into three categories: • Section 5 has done its work and is no longer needed (it’s a “victim of its own success”) • Section 5 will be enforced in such a way as to hinder further progress (it’s “at war with itself”) • In this new, partisan era Section 5 creates too great a temptation for partisan “mischief” • We deal only with the latter argument

  3. Limits on Mischief • We build a formal model of the Section 2/ Section 5 policy making process • We then use the model to analyze the consequences of Section 5 administration • Question: Is Section 5 too powerful a tool to be left in partisan hands (worst case scenario)? • Answer: No • The worst outcomes with Section 5 are just as good as the best outcomes without it. • Strategic dominance argument for retaining Sec. 5

  4. Actors’ Preferences • States submit plans; DOJ can preclear or not • Plans can help or hurt minorities • Preferences over plans reflect actors’ racial preferences as well as partisan interests • When partisan effects are small or absent, act according to racial preferences • With significant partisan effects, partisan considerations can take over • Partisan effects can go either way, making actors more pro- or more anti-minority • Game tree…

  5. Informational Structure • States and DOJ know the exact effects of the state policy proposal • Courts observe these effects only imperfectly • Three regions: • Definitely help minorities • Definitely harm minorities • Unclear • This is where Section 5’s higher burden of proof comes into play

  6. Possible Policy Outcomes SQ=0 Anti-Minority Pro-Minority • Unidimensional policy space

  7. Possible Policy Outcomes SQ=0 S>0 Anti-Minority Pro-Minority • Unidimensional policy space • Policy can give minorities either more or less utility, relative to the status quo

  8. Possible Policy Outcomes S<0 SQ=0 S>0 Anti-Minority Pro-Minority • Unidimensional policy space • Policy can give minorities either more or less utility, relative to the status quo

  9. Possible Policy Outcomes • States might choose a policy like this: • Because they have anti-minority preferences; or • Because they have partisan preferences, and this policy hasanti-minority effects (like packing now). S<0 SQ=0 S>0 Anti-Minority Pro-Minority • Unidimensional policy space • Policy can give minorities either more or less utility, relative to the status quo

  10. Possible Policy Outcomes Clearly Pro-Minority UncertainEffects Clearly Anti-Minority -J +J SQ=0 Anti-Minority Pro-Minority Court can only distinguish different categories

  11. Possible Policy Outcomes Upheld Under Section 5 Clearly Pro-Minority UncertainEffects Clearly Anti-Minority -J +J SQ=0 Anti-Minority Pro-Minority Impact of the burden of proof Section 5: State has to prove no harm to minorities

  12. Possible Policy Outcomes Upheld Under Section 2 Upheld Under Section 5 Clearly Pro-Minority UncertainEffects Clearly Anti-Minority -J +J SQ=0 Anti-Minority Pro-Minority Impact of the burden of proof Section 5: State has to prove no harm to minorities Section 2: Plaintiff has to prove harm to minorities

  13. Possible Policy Outcomes Upheld Under Section 2 Upheld Under Section 5 Clearly Pro-Minority UncertainEffects Clearly Anti-Minority -J +J SQ=0 Anti-Minority Pro-Minority If precleared, will survive §2

  14. Possible Policy Outcomes Upheld Under Section 2 Upheld Under Section 5 Clearly Pro-Minority UncertainEffects Clearly Anti-Minority -J +J SQ=0 Anti-Minority Pro-Minority If precleared, will survive §2 If not precleared, court won’t overturn on §5 grounds

  15. Possible Policy Outcomes Upheld Under Section 2 Upheld Under Section 5 Clearly Pro-Minority UncertainEffects Clearly Anti-Minority -J +J SQ=0 Anti-Minority Pro-Minority If precleared, will survive §2 If not precleared, court won’t overturn on §5 grounds Range of DOJ discretion

  16. Possible Policy Outcomes Upheld Under Section 2 Upheld Under Section 5 Clearly Pro-Minority UncertainEffects Clearly Anti-Minority -J +J SQ=0 Anti-Minority Pro-Minority DOJ Discretion

  17. Equilibrium • When DOJ is strongly pro-minority, get full-information outcomes: • States with S ≥ 0 enact their ideal point • States with S < 0 enact the status quo • As DOJ becomes more partisan, states with S < 0 get outcomes closer to their ideal points • Still, outcomes are never worse than they are in the Section 2 subgame alone • Retaining Section 5 is a dominant strategy

  18. Variations • Review of Positive Preclearance Determinations • Helps if DOJ is anti-minority, hurts otherwise • Would increase DOJ workload • “Expedited Injunctions,” a la Gerken • Same: helps if and only if DOJ is anti-minority • Would decrease workload on DOJ, but increase burden on groups • Reducing DOJ discretion • Region 2 measure discretion in the model • Always improves outcomes to lower the value of J

  19. 2D 2D D D D = Range of state proposals -J 0 J 1) Strongly pro-minority DOJ -J 0 D+J/2 J 2) Moderately pro-minority DOJ -J 0 J/2 J 3) Anti-minority DOJ

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