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Security in WAP

Security in WAP. Sanket Naik, Ameya Varde CS590F Fall 2000. Motivation and Goals. To study the security issues in WAP To analyze an existing implementation and implement enhancements To investigate security holes in the implementation and WAP in general To suggest improvements for both.

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Security in WAP

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  1. Security in WAP Sanket Naik, Ameya Varde CS590F Fall 2000

  2. Motivation and Goals • To study the security issues in WAP • To analyze an existing implementation and implement enhancements • To investigate security holes in the implementation and WAP in general • To suggest improvements for both

  3. Implementation • WAP stack from Kannel (www.kannel.org) • An on-going open source project implementing the WAP stack • No WTLS support • WTLS layer from 3ui.com (www.3ui.com) • We identified 2 security enhancements: • SSL connection between WAP gateway and Content (HTML) server • Authentication of the WAP gateway by the WAP client • Both missing in WTLS patch from 3ui

  4. Kannel architecture

  5. Security Enhancements

  6. Development tools • Platform – Linux • OpenSSL crypto library (http://www.openssl.org) • NOKIA WAP Toolkit (http://www.forum.nokia.com) • Simulates a web-enabled NOKIA 7110 phone

  7. WTLS optimizations • Why optimize? • Low bandwidth • Less processing power • Less memory • Weaker power supply • The optimizations • Abbreviated handshake – using pre-master secret from previous session • Optional steps – Client can send NULL reply to Certificate request, Anonymous key exchange etc.

  8. The flaws • Encryption not truly end-to-end • Abbreviated handshake susceptible to replay attack • Chosen plain-text attack: IV for each packet = Sequence number XOR Original IV • DOS attack: Alerts are unauthenticated • Man-in-the-middle attack: 40 bit XOR MAC allows even bit changes • Impersonation: Anonymous key exchange methods allow key generation w/o Authentication (Kannel WTLS has only anonymous key exchange methods!) • Weaker encryption mechanisms due to export regulations

  9. Suggestions • WAP specifications • Enforce Client authentication rather than keep it optional • Make WTLS layer mandatory whether people use it or not. • Implementation • Provide Gateway authentication in WAP clients • Add stronger algorithms, keys and key exchange methods to the cipher suites

  10. Conclusions • WTLS Specs propose weak security • Developers and Manufacturers are deploying WAP stacks which do not meet even these weak security requirements • Mostly due to lack of security expertise • Open source exposing these weaknesses • Yet additional code review required • Our 2 bits should be checked in soon…

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