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Explore the history, motivations, obstacles, and implications of arms control measures in international security, from ancient times to modern bilateral and multilateral treaties.
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POSC 2200 – International Security, War and Strife Russell Alan Williams Department of Political Science
Unit Six: International Security, Warand Strife “Managing Insecurity” • Required Reading: • Mingst, Chapter 8. • Mueller, The Essential Irrelevance of Nuclear Weapons: Stability in the Postwar World, Mingst and Snyder, pp. 341-346. • Outine: • Arms Control • Collective Security • Balance of Power
1) Arms Control: • “Arms Control”: Restrictions on the research, manufacture and deployment of certain kinds of weapons systems • Reduce the spiral effect of arms races – limit growth • Prevent proliferation of dangerous weapons • Regulate the use of weapons • “Disarmament”: The Policy of eliminating states’ offensive weaponry • Reduce stockpiles of weapons - All, or some kinds • Assumes that reductions in the number of weapons increases security . . . Both key aspects of liberal approach to “managing insecurity”
Motivations? 1) Reduce tensions that lead to war . . . • General liberal belief that “security dilemma” can be reversed through cooperation • Fear that weapons generate their own “logic of use” 2) Save $$$$ • Periods of arms control correspond with financial problems 3) Reduce environmental and health hazards • E.g. Nuclear weapons testing
Obstacles? • Shadow of the future . . . • What threats will emerge in the future? • E.g. Post WWII US disarmament • Verification • How do we know arms control agreements are being followed? • Technological improvements? “Flyovers” • Doubts over the value of arms control • Arms control may not prevent war – the two are unrelated • Domestic political obstacles • National pride and “Military-Industrial complex”
History: • Some ancient examples – Athens and Sparta • Generally, arms control a 20th Century phenomenon Why? • Changing technology – weapons became increasingly lethal from WWI onwards . . . . • Est. 40,000,000 casualties
Washington Naval Conferences (1921-1922) • US, UK, Japan, France and Italy • Agreed to limit “tonnage” of battleships – response to “Naval Race” • Tied to number of oceans to defend • US and UK get large advantage but Japan cheats • Geneva Protocol (1925-1928): treaty prohibiting the use of chemical and biological weapons • E.g. Chlorine Gas • Effective???? Chemical & Biological weapons are hard to use . . .
Post WWII: Bilateral Strategic Nuclear Arms Control • Problem: Rapid growth in number of nuclear weapons • The “missile gap” • 25 Treaties since 1963
Treaties (US and USSR): “Strategic Arms Limitations Talks – SALT I & II” (1972 & 1979) • Tried to stop growth – stabilize arms race • Freeze in number of offensive weapons “Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty – ABM” (1973) • Agreed to stop developing missile defense systems • Systems would destroy incoming missiles • Thought to be destabilizing (e.g. Deterrence) • US withdrew in 2002 . . . .
End of Cold War – States intensify arms control efforts: “Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty – START I” (1991): • Nuclear warheads reduced to 6,000 each • 1,600 “delivery vehicles” “Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty – START II” (1993) • Nuclear warheads to be reduced to 3,000 each (2007) • “MIRV’s” banned • Treaty never ratified – Russian response to US missile defense initiatives
“Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty – SORT” (2002): • Further 2/3 reduction in number of warheads • No limitations on MIRV’s
Implications: • Success? • Number of warheads cut by at least 80% • Problems? • MAD doctrine remains in place • “Tactical” weapons unregulated • Many weapons “mothballed”
Multilateral Arms Control: • Focused on “proliferation” of dangerous weapons – WMD’s • Consistent with the security concerns of powerful states (!) 1) “Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty - NPT” (1968, renewed 1995) • Bans sales, acquisition and production of nuclear weapons in all states that were not recognized as nuclear powers: • US, UK, Russia, France and China (note the coincidence?) • “Non-nuclear states” subject to IAEA inspections
2)“Partial Test Ban Treaty” (1963): • Banned atmospheric and underwater testing of nuclear weapons • Number of tests higher after the treaty (!) • Did not ban underground tests 3) “Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty”(1996-?): • Proposed complete ban on nuclear weapons tests – supported by UN General Assembly • Legally binding if all 44 countries with atomic energy ratify treaty • Status = ? Undermined by existing nuclear powers • France, Britain, Russia all ratified • China, Israel, India, Pakistan and the US have not – though some not testing
Nuclear non-proliferation regime under strain? • New nuclear powers • Non-NPT members: • Indian and Pakistan • NPT Members (Lies, lies and more lies!!) • Israel? • Iran? • Libya and Iraq? • North Korea? • Proliferation is easy and it is the “fast track” to international power • However, most states have honored the treaty despite incentives to break it
Chemical and Biological Weapons: • Building on Geneva Protocol – International law already prohibit use of chemical weapons “Biological Weapons Convention” (1972): States agreed not to develop more, and to get rid of all biological weapons • E.g. Anthrax “Chemical Weapons Convention” (1993): All chemical weapons were to be destroyed by 2005 • 184 signed treaty by 2002 • Problems? • Iraq, Libya, North Korea and Syria refused – some in response to Israel's nuclear weapons • Hard to verify . . . • Bush administration withdrew some US compliance
New Areas – related to “human security”: • Antipersonnel landmines • Small arms
“Campaign to Control Small Arms” • NGO Campaign • E.g. “Project Ploughshares” • Supporting UN “Human Security” initiatives to limit spread of “small arms” • One person per minute killed Goals? A UN “Arms Trade Treaty” • Limit illicit spread of weapons • Regulate legal trade – where weapons likely to be used to violate human rights http://www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/ArmsTradeTreaty/html/ATT.shtml
2) Collective Security: • Key part of liberal strategy for managing insecurity • “Collective Security”: Concept that aggression against a state should be defeated collectively – because aggression against one state is aggression against all . . . . • League of Nations and UN – less effective • Assumes it easy to identify the aggressor and that the aggressor is always outside of international norms • Military Alliances – more effective • Can only work if aggressors come to believe that states will act against them
3) The Balance of Power: • Realist approach to managing insecurity =Ensure peace through the acquisition of military capabilities and alliances that make war with you undesirable • Arms control and collective security are for lawyers - Probably do more harm then good • E.g. Powers involved in the “Naval Race” were right! • Helped Britain win WWI
“Deterrence Theory”: Assumes that rational decision makers will avoid war where costs are going to be high • Seek peaceful resolutions • Key Claim: Effective military capabilities make the costs of war higher • Meaning . . . Arm your state and probably acquire WMD’s
Risks of deterrence theory: • Role of non-state actors in modern security environment • Problem of proliferation • Problem of “non-state armies” • Modern “imbalance of power” • Logic of deterrence and offensive realism suggests US “primacy” should be used • E.g. China’s Nuclear weakness . . . .
4) Conclusions – Security War & Strife: 1) Is conventional “general war” becoming obsolete? • Yes, but . . . mechanisms of preventing war focus only on these kind of conflicts – still a lot of wars 2) What is the impact of the advent of WMD’s on the nature of war? • Theoretical question – no consensus 3) Why is modern war a mainly “southern” phenomenon • Because southern states lack power to deter attack (Waltz) • Because northern states have a normative consensus against war with each other (Mueller) • Because southern states are “weak” and “artificial” – resolve internal political problems through violence
5) For Next Time . . . Unit Seven: International Political Economy Required Reading: • Mingst, Chapter 9. • Scott, The Great Divide in the Global Village, Mingst and Snyder, pp. 421-430.