Pavel Dufek Loughborough, 6th December 2012

1. Moral and Political Cosmopolitanism: Distinction Without a Difference?JusticeBetween Global Democracy and a World State Pavel Dufek Loughborough, 6th December 2012

2. Planofthepresentation 1. Context of Global Justice Theorizing 2. Moral and Political Cosmopolitanism: The Distinction 3. Moral Cosmopolitanism Proving Too Little 4. Moral Cosmopolitanism Proving Too Much 5. International Organizations and the EU 6. Towards a Proper Middle Ground

3. 1. Context of Global Justice Theorizing • Justice: What each human being (or collectivity) is dueas a matter of rights, needs, membership etc. • There are certain universal and general moral norms that should be best understood as norms of justice – that is, what every person or collectivity in the world is due – and that the institutionalisation of political activity on the supra-state level should reflect these norms • Guidelines for political action • Either extension of existing “domestic” theories/principles (esp. Rawls‘s) or formulating new ones – human rights as the usual proxy • Liberal egalitarianism • Critique of contemporary status quo (poverty, wars, HR violations, dictatorial regimes… state sovereignty, LIEO)

4. 2. Moral & political cosmopolitanism (about justice) • (A) Moral (MC): all human beings are ultimate units of moral concern; share certain morally relevant features that should always bear upon philosophical considerations about justice; at least some of our duties and obligations somehow concern all human beings and not only our compatriots; territorial state borders are morally arbitrary; all individuals are morally equal in some essential respect => moral community of mankind • Weakandstrongversions - scope or depth of moral considerations, as regards socioeconomic justice and equality, or the contents of the list of human rights • (B) Political (PC): realization of requirements of justice, as specified by moral cosmopolitanism, should be entrusted to global political institutions with legitimate coercive power, which in turn would rest on a global system of positive law => cosmo-polis(globalised modern state) Cosmopolitans: (a) and (b) both analytically andpractically separate and independent vs. Me: it is the very distinction that allows cosmopolitans to claim middle ground, and the distinction itself carries little difference if one retains strong MC

5. 2. MC & PC (about justice) • I. Kant – Categorical Imperative (corresponds with MC) as the philosophical embodiment of human dignity • Circumstances of justice: interaction and injury • A duty to enter into a „civil condition“ and defer to the decision-making and coercive powers of political authority • Dilemma of global right: Rights and freedoms of both individuals and states can be secured only through hard law backed by coercive power of a world republic (state) It is precisely by granting these unprecedented powers to the potential government of the “state of states”, or even a “universal monarchy”, that there arises the twin danger of global despotism (abusing power) and paternalism (disrespecting peoples’ right to autonomy, even if led by good intentions) • League of states • Right to/obligation of hospitality

6. B. Barry: „there is no inconsistency in counting the interests of everyone in the world equally and concluding that those interests will tend to be best advanced by a state-centered system with only weak international authority” • S. Caney: „cosmopolitan moral claims are compatible with, or even require, states or some alternative to global political institutions… [thus] critiques of a world state or global political authorities do not impugn the moral convictions that all persons are of equal moral worth and that everyone has duties to other human beings.

7. T. Pogge: „[M.C. is] a requirement that imposes limits upon our conduct and, in particular, upon our efforts to construct institutional schemes (...) [This is] a more abstract, and in this sense weaker [view] than legal cosmopolitanism.” • C. Beitz: „ there is no necessary link between moral and institutional cosmopolitanism (…) [moral cosmopolitans] are not necessarily committed to the belief that the world should be reorganized as a unitary or stateless political and legal order (…) the widely alleged undesirability of world government is [therefore] not a good reason to reject the ethical aspiration it represents”

8. What‘s wrong with the disctinction? • (1) MC proving too little • (2) MC proving too much

9. Label vs. Content: Proving Too Little • D. Miller: moral equality = platitudinous element in MC • „polite disinterest“ => set of negative duties plus minimal positive duties (hospitality, hunger…)? Objection: the retreat to negative duties makes ultimately no difference because upholding even the most basic of these (such as not physically harming, not exploiting or stealing, not using others for one’s own ends) would necessarily entail a radical transformation of international economic and political structures • (A) T. Pogge: a negativeduty not to participate in upholding unjust social-economic international order (Art. 28 of the UDHR) • => we are neither polite nor disinterested but causally responsible for poverty and suffering • => causal responsibility • (B) set of unconditional obligations: human rights, equality of opportunity…

10. Ad (A): multicausal phenomenon; argument cuts both ways; difficult empirical calculations+ problems with counterfactual assessment: Getting the logic backwards; unintended consequences • Ad (B): stricter observation of existing rules • Fair trade vs. free trade vs. theft(Wenar& resource curse) • Question of social integration, motivation to uphold rules • It is the nature and scope of moral claims that are put forward on behalf of cosmopolitan justicethat count, not the label • Coercive power will have to be frequently deployed if MC visions are not to remain empty manifestos (resistance expected)

11. Label vs. Content: Proving Too Much • B. Barry: taxing rich people wherever they lived for the benefit of the poor whenever they lived” • advantages of entering such scheme of international cooperation and staying in there will be enough to ensure compliance via some kind of enlightened Hobbesian self-interested reasoning (although moral motivation has to come into play as well) • the extensive and even-expanding administrative apparatus of the modern state however yields at least a reason for doubting that administration of the global tax-based redistribution scheme would be possible without the parallel existence of global bureaucracy and global political authority which would provide both legitimacy and control for this proposed global “authoritative allocation of values” • EU • Conceptual link between taxation and sovereign political authority

12. Label vs. Content: Proving Too Much • D. Moellendorf: (a) global fair equality of opportunity; (b) globalized difference principle • armed intervention represents “a violation of sovereignty if and only if the intervention will not attempt to advance the cause of justice either in the basic structure of the state or in its international policies” • mere strengthening of democratic accountability of both the existing and future multilateral agreements and/or regimes insufficient, especially with regard to distributive justice • Centralized yet multi-level system of state, regional and global institutions subject to mechanisms of democratic accountability • Functionaldelegation of powers • Delegation of powers ultimately implies dependence • Who is “the people” who these institutions shall be accountable to – the regional people or the global people?

13. Label vs. Content: Proving Too Much • K.-C. Tan: goals of MC could be best achieved within the borders of national communities • Comprehensive liberalism: (a) moral autonomy; (b) rejection of toleration as fundamental principle; (c) liberal nationalism OK • Current institutional framework + yet undetermined set of institutional norms and institutions • Circumscription of cultural and moral pluralism, so that all communities will have acquired, prospectively, liberal (egalitarian) character • Tobin Tax, Global Resource Tax (Pogge), „bit tax“

14. Label vs. Content: Proving Too Much • Re: KC Tan • Tan’s moral ideal is in fact constituted by a global extension and application of Rawls’sprinciples of justice – especially the Difference Principle but also the Principle of Fair Equality of Opportunity • Strong moral conception, weakly changed structure • Retaining political autonomy? Example: Property rights • Interests of great powers not conductive • Sleight of hand?: While “moral cosmopolitanism” would cover all the ambitious moral ideals and principles of justice, which have not yet been realised even on the domestic (state) level, “weak” suggestions for institutional arrangements would seemingly support the asserted realistic nature of cosmopolitan theory by listing only moderate and relatively uncontroversial examples

15. Label vs. Content: Proving Too Much • S. Caney: (1) disaggregating the concept of sovereignty: legality – supremacy – territoriality – comprehensiveness • Cosmopolitan political structures: Democratic political institutions, economic super-organisation for coordinating the workings of the International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organisation and the World Bank, global volunteer force (perhaps under the UN auspices) and international courts of justice dealing with not only human rights but also corporate grievances and injustices • Absence of supremacy and comprehensiveness => spectre of a “sovereign world-state” is ruled out • (2) no duty to bring about a given moral ideal in its entirety • Above a basic minimum defined by protection of “fundamental interests” of human beings, conditions should be secured for fair mediation among rival ideals of global justice

16. Label vs. Content: Proving Too Much • Re: S. Caney • Previous concerns apply here • On the one hand, Caney speaks about “international institutions” or a “basic minimum” of cosmopolitan justice, in order to signal his opposition to over-ambitious institutional proposals. On the other, however, he loads his global system of governance with a plethora of sanctioning and enforcing tasks in all the mentioned areas, openly conceding that these institutions will have coercive powers to impose sanctions, levy fines, punish wrongdoers and so on • Implausible to assume consensus of all decisive agents on almost any of the hot issues, as there will always be “ruthlessly instrumental” or plainly stupid or irresponsible actors – not to mention those who “merely” pursue their national interests • The notion of “fundamental human interests” seems to be substantively on par with the full contemporary package of international human rights, and it is difficult to see how this might be considered a “basic minimum” of morality

17. Label vs. Content: Proving Too Much • J. Habermas: “constitutionalisation” of global politics • Avoids strong normative claims on the global level; also employs a multi-layered conception of political agency, dispersing political decision-making among the supranational, transnational and national levels • Functional distribution of decision-making powers, tied to the ideal of deliberative democratic structures and processes • W. Scheuerman: JH “appears to want to have the cake and eat it as well” - even if the reformed UN would be charged only with maintaining peace and securing human rights and would be refused formal monopoly of legitimate use of force, it would need “substantial political and military muscle” to bring uncooperative states into line • Issues of socioeconomic justice which are ordinarily cast in substantive and comparative terms (relative inequalities among countries and/or individuals) • How can the power of powerful, unjust, instrumental actors be dispersed, and power of the weak and vulnerable strengthened, unless one possesseseven greater power? • Kantian paradox of global right rides again

18. 5. International Organizations • M. Barnett, M. Finnemore (2004): IOs are bureaucracies of a necessarily hierarchical nature • They acquire agency, i.e. become partially autonomous actors. As agents possessing legitimate authority and capable of defining “problems” and mobilizing resources for their solution, IOs wield power(e.g. creating and enforcing obligatory rules regarding HR, or humanitarian intervention ). • Power of constitution (echo of their largely constructivist approach to international relations), but also power of domination, i.e. the ability to force other actors behave in a way they otherwise would not • If we set “huge, aspirational tasks” for global political structures, as strong MC unambiguously and consciously does, then these structures stand in need of much greater power than is presently the case with IOs • Problem of legitimacy and political accountability: by definition irrelevant to bureaucracies • Organizational pathologies – who is to take blame? • what use of a “world legislative body” and “global bureaucracy” without a world executive body?

19. The European Union • The example of an emerging postsovereign stateless polity with a cosmopolitan vision? • strong and centralized executive body, i.e. the Commission, which at the same time has a de facto monopoly over legislative initiative • EU law, as interpreted by the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU), is based on principles of supremacyand direct effect, meaning that if certain procedural conditions are met, European laws take priority over member states’ legislation • promoting and enforcing ambitious principles of justice, such as those proposed by moral cosmopolitans would require the given policy arenas (such as fiscal, social, or immigration policy) to be moved to the group of EU’s exclusive competence • It is controversial to take the EU as a model case of transnational democratic polity – issues of input legitimacy

20. 6. Towards a Proper Middle Ground • Dilemma of cosmopolitan justice: Either bite the bullet, retain strong MC and admit that the institutional solution points to a centralised global political authority, or back off from deep moral demands in the first place and keep flirting with the idea of a multilayered system of global governance with states as still the principal actors It precisely the overblown moral requirements of moral cosmopolitanism that lead to uncomfortable feelings of a “dead end” • the existing interstate system of governance should be supplemented, not subverted or supplanted by whatever institutional design comes with international (weak cosmopolitan) morality • The morality to be sanctioned and enforced by the system of international institutions should be decidedly weak or thin • Core subset of human rights (Walzer, Rawls, Miller) • Legislative and judicial globalization vs. legal polycentrism/pluralism: Only the former available for MC • Extra-statal sources and scope of law: stability and legitimacy depends on whether they conform to the actors’ expectations and normative convictions

21. Towards a Proper Middle Ground • My argument dopes not imply that a move towards some kind of transnational political authority backed by a system of law is intrinsically wrong • The promise of constructivism: the theoretical bridge between normative reasoning and empirical research? • too easily leads one to endorse strong forms of moral cosmopolitanism =>checks from both outside (logic of consequences) and inside (awareness of dilemmas) • Mutual interdependence of politics and morality • English School in IR: balancing justice and order • Epistemological scepticism + (Hartian) rules of respect for life, property, truth, keeping promises etc. • Problem of normative (public) justification

22. Diverting attention from substantive issues to “sterile” metatheoretical debates? If there is no thick normative consensus among the key actors of international or global politics, it seems prima facie reasonable to work our way up from some kind of minimal normative foundations – rather than trying to ram demanding moral principles down the throats of global humanity. Substantively weaker moral claims about the nature of a cosmopolitan political community are a more promising departure point when looking for an institutional “middle road” between the spectre of the status quo and the spectre of the world-state.