Categorizing Mesh Action Frames

1. Categorizing Mesh Action Frames Authors: Date: 2009-09-20 Meiyuan Zhao, Intel Corporation Slide 1

2. Abstract • This document explain the new categorization for mesh action frames • Propose resolution to comments CIDs 125, 352, 630, 782, 1172 Meiyuan Zhao, Intel Corporation

3. Frame Categorization Issues • Current mesh action frames do not have explicit categorization as required by robust action frame protection in 11w • Public Action frames—public to any STA (in/out BSS) • Robust Action frames—assumes completely established security association (SA) • Protected Dual of Public Action frames—not protect with no SA and protected like Robust Action frames when SA established • Mesh peering management action frames are special since they can be sent before, during, and after security association establishment Meiyuan Zhao, Intel Corporation

4. Proposed Resolution • All mesh action frames, except mesh peering action frames, are categorized as “Robust” • These frames can only be sent and received after mesh TKSA is established between the two mesh STAs • Relying on “Management Frame Protection” by 802.11w Robust frame protection mechanism to protect these frames • Define a new category: Self Protected Action • Protection mechanism should be provided by specific protocols that use these frames • Categorize Mesh Peering Management frames as “Self Protected” • Clarify MPM frames protection • Protected by AMPE when used by AMPE protocol • Protection not enabled when used by MPM protocol Meiyuan Zhao, Intel Corporation

5. Rationale for Self Protected Action Category • Mesh Peering Management frames cannot be in “Robust” category • Robust action frames assume existence of a completely established security association • MPM frames are used for creation and destruction of SA, whether or not established yet • Mesh Peering Management frames cannot be in “Public” category • Public action frames are defined to allow inter-BSS and AP to unassociated-STA communications • Public action frames are not used for associated STAs; hence remain public to any STA; should not be protected • If define MPM frames as “public”, we introduce a dangerous concept that an action frames can be defined as “public”, but expect protection • MPM frames are meant to be used for creation and destruction of mesh peering (equivalent to association in BSS), whether or not established yet • The public nature of MPM frames is incidental • Mesh Peering Management frames cannot be in “Protected Dual of Public Action” category • Protection on these frames is off when Management Frame Protection is not negotiated • Protection on these frames relies on “Management Frame Protection” mechanism • MPM frames needs protection even before Management Frame Protection is negotiated • AMPE provides integrity protection on MPM frames when executed Meiyuan Zhao, Intel Corporation

6. Summary of Text Changes • Insert new category definition in Clause 3 (Definitions) • Update Table 7-24 (Category Values) • Insert a new category “Self Protected” • Mark all other mesh action frames as “Robust” • Insert new subclause 7.4.9b to define Self Protected Action frames • Mesh Peering Open, Mesh Peering Confirm, Mesh Peering Close frames in this new category • New text to specify protection on these frames • Update clause 7.4.12 to reflect changes of categorization Meiyuan Zhao, Intel Corporation

7. References • Draft 802.11s D3.03 • Draft 802.11w D10.0 • Draft 802.11REVmb D1.0 • Doc.:P802.11-09/0962r0 (Normative Text) Meiyuan Zhao, Intel Corporation