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The Exam. Structure20 Multiple Choice1 mark each (no negative marks)Based on lectures: study lecture notes for this section5 short answer questions (4 marks each): Write a summary and your own assessment of 5 papers1 essay (20 marks)Requires understanding of Circuit theory and tabular approach
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1. Behavioural Finance Lecture 11 Part 1
Financial Instability Hypothesis
The Global Financial Crisis
2. The Exam Structure
20 Multiple Choice
1 mark each (no negative marks)
Based on lectures: study lecture notes for this section
5 short answer questions (4 marks each): Write a summary and your own assessment of 5 papers
1 essay (20 marks)
Requires understanding of Circuit theory and tabular approach to building models of credit dynamics
Use QED program to build models prior to exam
Closed book
3. Short answer questions: summarise & evaluate Kirman, AP 1992, 'Whom or what does the representative individual represent?', The Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 6, no. 2, pp. 117-36.
Sharpe, WF 1964, 'Capital asset prices: a theory of market equilibrium under conditions of risk', The Journal of Finance, vol. 19, no. 3, pp. 425-42.
Fama, EF & French, KR 2004, 'The Capital asset pricing model: theory and evidence', The Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 18, no. 3, pp. 25-46.
Minsky, HP 1977, 'The Financial instability hypothesis: an interpretation of Keynes and an alternative to ‘standard’ theory', Nebraska Journal of Economics & Business, vol. 16, no. 1, pp. 5-16.
Graziani, A. 2003, The monetary theory of production, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, pp. 1-32.
4. Essay question Does the repayment of debt destroy money?
Consider the verbal arguments for and against this proposition.
Construct two pure credit economy models with constant output (no economic growth), one in which debt repayment destroys money, and one in which it does not. Discuss the dynamics of the two models.
5. Recap Circuit model still skeletal
But already reaches different economic policy results to standard models
Model extended to multiple commodities
Will be extended to include fixed capital, government, and Financial Instability Hypothesis
This week
The Financial Instability Hypothesis
6. The Financial Instability Hypothesis Developed by Hyman Minsky on simple proposition:
Capitalism has suffered several Depressions
Depression every 20 or so years in 19th century
“Great Depression” of 1930s merely biggest
So since market economies can have Depressions…
“it is necessary to have an economic theory which makes great depressions one of the possible states in which our type of capitalist economy can find itself.” (Can "It” Happen Again? A Reprise)
Theory combined insights from Marx, Schumpeter, Keynes & Irving Fisher
Key foundation Fisher’s “Debt-Deflation Theory of Great Depressions”…
7. Fisher & Debt Deflation Irving Fisher the “Paul Krugman” of his time
Famous (neoclassical) economist
Developed early 1900 precursor to “Efficient Markets Hypothesis”
Wealthy as inventor of “Rolodex” card system
Columnist on New York Times
Stock Market “Bull”
Believed Market in 1920 reflected growth prospects for US economy
Heavily invested in market
Huge margin loans
Supported financial position with theory of finance
8. Fisher & Debt Deflation Theory extended standard neoclassical “supply and demand” model to finance
Rate of interest as “price in the exchange between present and future goods.” (Fisher 1930: 61),
Three forces determine price
Subjective preferences of individuals for present goods over future goods determines supply of funds
Objective possibilities for profitable investment determines demand for funds
Market mechanism brings these into equilibrium
9. Fisher & Debt Deflation Twist compared to standard supply & demand theory
In market for apples, supply is objective, demand subjective
Objective conditions of production determine supply curve for apples
Subjective preferences of consumers detemines demand curve for apples
But in finance
Objective factor determines demand
Subjective factor determines supply
Reverse of relationship for standard markets
10. Fisher & Debt Deflation Subjective preferences of individuals for present goods over future goods determines supply of funds
a low time preference
prefers to lend now rather than consume
most likely a lender
high time preference
prefers to consume now rather than later
most likely a borrower.
Borrowing how those with a high preference for present goods
acquire the funds they need now
at the expense of later income.
11. Fisher & Debt Deflation Objective side of the equation
Marginal productivity of investment or “marginal return over cost” (1930: 182)
Determines demand for funds
High return means high demand for funds
Low return means low demand
Willingness to borrow/lend not enough
must be opportunities for borrowed money to be invested and earn a rate of return
12. Fisher & Debt Deflation Market equates subjective and objective forces
Supply: High rate of interest
even those with high time preference will lend
supply of funds will be quite high
Low rate of interest
only those with low time preference will lend
supply of funds will be small
Demand: High rate of interest
most investments will be unviable
demand for funds will be low
Low rate of interest
most investments have positive net present value
demand for funds will be high
13. Fisher & Debt Deflation So far sounds just like standard supply & demand:
Supply & demand set equilibrium interest rate
But still one curly problem:
Standard market model ignores time
However time explicitly part of exchanges in finance
Borrow money now, repay later
So Fisher extended standard timeless supply & demand model with two assumptions:
“(A) The market must be cleared—and cleared with respect to every interval of time.
(B) The debts must be paid.” (1930: p. 495)
Great assumptions to make in 1930—Not!
14. Fisher & Debt Deflation As well as one of world’s most prominent economists, Fisher was also a newspaper columnist (a risky business...)
On Wednesday, October 15, 1929, Fisher comments “Stock prices have reached what looks like a permanently high plateau.
I do not feel that there will soon, if ever, be a fifty or sixty point break below present levels, such as Mr. Babson has predicted.
I expect to see the stock market a good deal higher than it is today within a few months.”
On October 23rd, 1929, Black Wednesday: Dow Jones loses almost 10% in a single day
4 years later, the broad market was 1/6th of its peak, and Irving Fisher had lost over $10 million.
15. The Wall Street Crash
16. From Sage to Laughing Stock… Fisher’s reputation destroyed by wrong predictions
In aftermath, developed theory to explain the crash
“The Debt Deflation Theory of Great Depressions”
based on rejection of conditions (A) and (B) above
Previous theory assumed equilibrium
but real world equilibrium short-lived since
“New disturbances are, humanly speaking, sure to occur, so that, in actual fact, any variable is almost always above or below the ideal equilibrium.” (1933: 339)
Disequilibrium the rule in economy & finance markets
Fisher realised a disequilibrium theory needed too
17. Debt Deflation Theory of Great Depressions Key disequilibrium forces are debt and prices
The “two dominant factors” which cause depressions are “over-indebtedness to start with and deflation following soon after”
“Thus over-investment and over-speculation are often important; but they would have far less serious results were they not conducted with borrowed money.
That is, over-indebtedness may lend importance to over-investment or to over-speculation. The same is true as to over-confidence.
I fancy that over-confidence seldom does any great harm except when, as, and if, it beguiles its victims into debt.” (Fisher 1933: 341; emphasis added!)
18. Debt Deflation Theory of Great Depressions When overconfidence leads to overindebtedness, a chain reaction ensues:
“(1) Debt liquidation leads to distress selling and to
(2) Contraction of deposit currency, as bank loans are paid off, and to a slowing down of velocity of circulation. This contraction of deposits and of their velocity, precipitated by distress selling, causes
(3) A fall in the level of prices, in other words, a swelling of the dollar. Assuming, as above stated, that this fall of prices is not interfered with by reflation or otherwise, there must be
(4) A still greater fall in the net worths of business, precipitating bankruptcies and
19. Debt Deflation Theory of Great Depressions (5) A like fall in profits, which in a "capitalistic," that is, a private-profit society, leads the concerns which are running at a loss to make
(6) A reduction in output, in trade and in employment of labor. These losses, bankruptcies, & unemployment, lead to
(7) Pessimism and loss of confidence, which in turn lead to
(8) Hoarding and slowing down still more the velocity of circulation. The above eight changes cause
(9) Complicated disturbances in the rates of interest, in particular, a fall in the nominal, or money, rates and a rise in the real, or commodity, rates of interest.” (1933: 342)
20. Debt Deflation Theory of Great Depressions Theory fundamentally nonequilibrium in nature
Fisher’s statement is a powerful argument for disequilibrium analysis in macroeconomics and finance:
“9. We may tentatively assume that, ordinarily and within wide limits, all, or almost all, economic variables tend, in a general way, toward a stable equilibrium…
10. Under such assumptions … it follows that, unless some outside force intervenes, any "free" oscillations about equilibrium must tend progressively to grow smaller and smaller, just as a rocking chair set in motion tends to stop…
11. But the exact equilibrium thus sought is seldom reached and never long maintained.
21. Debt Deflation Theory of Great Depressions New disturbances are, humanly speaking, sure to occur, so that, in actual fact, any variable is almost always above or below the ideal equilibrium…
Theoretically there may be—in fact, at most times there must be—over-or under-production, over-or under-consumption, over-or under-spending, over-or under-saving, over-or under-investment, and over or under everything else.
It is as absurd to assume that, for any long period of time, the variables in the economic organization, or any part of them, will “stay put,” in perfect equilibrium, as to assume that the Atlantic Ocean can ever be without a wave.” (Fisher 1933, p. 339; emphases added)
22. Debt Deflation Theory of Great Depressions Two classes of far from equilibrium events explained
Ordinary cycles
Deflation or debt but not both
Depressions
Both debt and deflation…
23. Debt Deflation Theory of Great Depressions Cycles, when one occurs without the other
with only overindebtedness or deflation, growth eventually corrects problem; it is …
“more analogous to stable equilibrium: the more the boat rocks the more it will tend to right itself. In that case, we have a truer example of a cycle” (Fisher 1933: 344-345)
Great Depression: overindebtedness and deflation
with deflation on top of excessive debt, “the more debtors pay, the more they owe. The more the economic boat tips, the more it tends to tip. It is not tending to right itself, but is capsizing” (Fisher 1933: 344).
24. Debt Deflation Theory of Great Depressions Fisher’s new theory ignored
Old theory made basis of modern finance theory
Debt deflation theory revived in modern form by Minsky
Fisher’s macroeconomic contribution (which emphasised the need for reflation and “100% money” during the Depression) overshadowed by Keynes’s “General Theory”
Many similarities and synergies in Keynes and Fisher, but different countries meant one largely unaware of others work
25. Keynes and Debt-deflation Some discussion of debt-deflation when discussing reduction in money wages (neoclassical proposal):
“Since a special reduction of money-wages is always advantageous to an individual entrepreneur ...
a general reduction … may break through a vicious circle of unduly pessimistic estimates of the marginal efficiency of capital …
On the other hand, the depressing influence on entrepreneurs of their greater burden of debt may partially offset any cheerful reactions from the reductions of wages.
Indeed if the fall of wages and prices goes far, the embarrassment of those entrepreneurs who are heavily indebted may soon reach the point of insolvency—with severe adverse effects on investment.” (Keynes 1936: 264)
26. Keynes and Debt-deflation “The method of increasing the quantity of money in terms of wage-units by decreasing the wage-unit increases proportionately the burden of debt; whereas the method of producing the same result by increasing the quantity of money whilst leaving the wage-unit unchanged has the opposite effect.
Having regard to the excessive burden of many types of debt, it can only be an inexperienced person who would prefer the former.” (1936: 268-69)
Keynes’s focus here more physical and macro (impact on investment) than Fisher; Keynes’s main contributions on finance relate to
Dual Price Level hypothesis
Analysis of expectations and behaviour of finance markets
27. Keynes and the Dual Price Level Hypothesis In most of General Theory, Keynes argued that investment motivated by relationship between marginal efficiency of investment schedule (MEI) and the rate of interest
In Chapter 17 of General Theory, “The General Theory of Employment” and “Alternative theories of the rate of interest” (1937), instead spoke in terms of two price levels: commodities (cost price) & assets (speculative)
investment motivated by the desire to produce “those assets of which the normal supply-price is less than the demand price” (Keynes 1936: 228)
Demand price determined by prospective yields, depreciation and liquidity preference.
Supply price determined by costs of production
28. Keynes and the Dual Price Level Hypothesis Two price level analysis becomes more dominant subsequent to General Theory:
The scale of production of capital assets “depends, of course, on the relation between their costs of production and the prices which they are expected to realise in the market.” (Keynes 1937a: 217)
MEI analysis akin to view that uncertainty can be reduced “to the same calculable status as that of certainty itself” via a “Benthamite calculus”
whereas the kind of uncertainty that matters in investment is that about which “there is no scientific basis on which to form any calculable probability whatever. We simply do not know.” (Keynes 1937a: 213, 214)
So how do investors form expectations?
29. Keynes and the Dual Price Level Hypothesis Given incalculable uncertainty, investors form fragile expectations about the future
These are crystallised in the prices they place upon capital asset
Given fragile basis for expecations, asset prices are subject to sudden and violent change
with equally sudden and violent consequences for the propensity to invest
Seen in this light, the marginal efficiency of capital is simply the ratio of the yield from an asset to its current demand price, and therefore there is a different “marginal efficiency of capital” for every different level of asset prices (Keynes 1937a: 222)
30. Keynes on Uncertainty and Expectations Three aspects to expectations formation under true uncertainty
Presumption that “the present is a much more serviceable guide to the future than a candid examination of past experience would show it to have been hitherto”
Belief that “the existing state of opinion as expressed in prices and the character of existing output is based on a correct summing up of future prospects”
Reliance on mass sentiment: “we endeavour to fall back on the judgment of the rest of the world which is perhaps better informed.” (Keynes 1936: 214)
Fragile basis for expectations formation thus affects prices of financial assets
31. Schumpeter on Cycles & Credit Joseph Schumpeter leading “Evolutionary Economist”
Applying theory of evolution to economics
His “Theory of Economic Development” emphasised cyclical nature of capitalism
Credit played important role in cycle
Supervised Minsky’s PhD
direct influence on Minsky’s thought
Rejected neoclassical view of money
“veil over barter”
“Money neutrality: Double all prices & incomes, no-one better or worse off”
Nonsense assumption in a world with debt…
32. Schumpeter’s model: money has real effects Schumpeter accepts neoclassical view as true for existing products, production techniques, etc., in general equilibrium
But new products, new methods, disturb “the circular flow”. Money plays essential role in this disequilibrium phenomenon
Affects the price level and output
Doubling all prices & incomes would make some better off, some worse
Those with debts would be better off
Including entrepreneurs…
33. Schumpeter’s model: money has real effects Conventional theory suffers from “barter illusion”
Existing producers using existing production methods exchanging existing products
“Walras’ Law” applies
Major role of finance is initiating new products / production methods etc.;
For these equilibrium-disturbing events, classic “money a veil over barter” concept cannot apply.
“From this it follows, therefore, that in real life total credit must be greater than it could be if there were only fully covered credit. The credit structure projects not only beyond the existing gold basis, but also beyond the existing commodity basis.” (101)
“Walras’ Law” false for growing economy…
34. Schumpeter’s model: credit has real effects “[T]he entrepreneur needs credit …
[T]his purchasing power does not flow towards him automatically, as to the producer in the circular flow, by the sale of what he produced in preceding periods.
If he does not happen to possess it … he must borrow it… He can only become an entrepreneur by previously becoming a debtor…
his becoming a debtor arises from the necessity of the case and is not something abnormal, an accidental event to be explained by particular circumstances. What he first wants is credit.
Before he requires any goods whatever, he requires purchasing power. He is the typical debtor in capitalist society.” (102)
35. Schumpeter’s model: credit has real effects In normal productive cycle, income from production finances purchases; credit can be used, but not essential
“[T]he decisive point is that we can, without overlooking anything essential, represent the process within the circular flow as if production were currently financed by receipts.” (104)
Effectively, Say’s Law applies: “supply creates its own demand”
Aggregate demand equals aggregate supply (with maybe some sectors above, some sectors below)
But credit-financed entrepreneurs very different
Expenditure (demand) not financed by current receipts (supply) but by credit
Aggregate Demand exceeds Aggregate Supply
36. Schumpeter’s model: credit has real effects Credit finance for entrepreneurs thus endogenous: not “deposits create loans” but “loans create deposits”:
“[I]n so far as credit cannot be given out of the results of past enterprise …
it can only consist of credit means of payment created ad hoc, which can be backed neither by money in the strict sense nor by products already in existence...
It provides us with the connection between lending and credit means of payment, and leads us to what I regard as the nature of the credit phenomenon.” (106)
37. Schumpeter’s model: credit has real effects Say’s Law & Walras’ Law apply in circular flow, but not entrepreneurial credit-financed activity:
“In the circular flow, from which we always start, the same products are produced every year in the same way.
For every supply there waits somewhere in the economic system a corresponding demand, for every demand the corresponding supply.
All goods are dealt in at determined prices with only insignificant oscillations, so that every unit of money may be considered as going the same way in every period.
A given quantity of purchasing power is available at any moment to purchase the existing quantity of original productive services, in order then to pass into the hands of their owners and then again to be spent on consumption goods.” (108)
38. Aside: “Marx with different adjectives” Schumpeter here similar to Marx’s “Circuits of Capital”
Commodity—Money—Commodity
Equivalent to Schumpeter’s “circular flow”
Essentially Say’s Law applies
Sellers only sell in order to buy
Money—Commodity—Money
Equivalent to Schumpeter’s entrepreneurial function
Say’s Law doesn’t apply: “The capitalist throws less value in the form of money into the circulation than he draws out of it...
Since he functions ... as an industrial capitalist, his supply of commodity-value is always greater than his demand for it. If his supply and demand in this respect covered each other it would mean that his capital had not produced any surplus-value...
His aim is not to equalize his supply and demand, but to make the inequality between them ... as great as possible.” (Marx 1885: 120-121)
39. Schumpeter’s model: credit has real effects So Schumpeter’s dynamic view of economy
Overturns “money doesn’t have real effects” bias of neoclassicals/monetarists
Breaches “supply creates its own demand” Say’s Law view of self-equilibrating economy
Breaches Walras’ Law “if n-1 markets in equilibrium, nth also in equilibrium” general equilibrium analysis
Links finance and economics: without finance there would not be economic growth, but
Finance can affect economic growth negatively as well as positively (if entrepreneurial expectations fail)…
40. Integration: Financial Instability Hypothesis Minsky combined concepts of
Fisher: debt deflationary mechanism,
Role of commodity price inflation
Schumpeter: entrepreneurial role of credit
Keynes & “2 price levels” analysis
Expectations formation under uncertainty
Behaviour of financial markets
Finance ? Investment ? Savings causal loop
(Also Kalecki: Finance as limit on investment)
Marx: Tendency to cycles & crisis in capitalism
To produce Financial Instability Hypothesis