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Session 2.6 What happens when a SQP is no longer applicable

Regional Training Course on State Systems of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material for States in the Middle East with Limited Nuclear Material and Activities Amman, Jordan, 17 to 21 January 2010. Session 2.6 What happens when a SQP is no longer applicable. M. Derrough

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Session 2.6 What happens when a SQP is no longer applicable

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  1. Regional Training Course on State Systems of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material for States in the Middle East with Limited Nuclear Material and Activities Amman, Jordan, 17 to 21 January 2010 Session 2.6What happens when a SQP is no longer applicable M. Derrough Senior Inspector, Division of Operations B

  2. Criteria for an SQP (old) • State’s nuclear material holdings are less than or equal to the quantities specified in paragraph 37 of INFCIRC/153 (Corr.): • 1 kg in total of special fissionable material • 10 metric tonnes (MT) in total of natural uranium and depleted uranium (>0.5% 235U) • 20 MT of depleted uranium (≤0.5% 235U) • 20 MT of thorium • No nuclear material in a facility

  3. Criteria for an SQP (amended) • State’s nuclear material holdings are less than or equal to the quantities specified in paragraph 37 of INFCIRC/153 (Corr.): • 1 kg in total of special fissionable material • 10 metric tonnes (MT) in total of natural uranium and depleted uranium (>0.5% 235U) • 20 MT of depleted uranium (≤0.5% 235U) • 20 MT of thorium • No decision taken to construct or authorize construction of a facility

  4. Nuclear Facility Defined in Article 106 of INFCIRC/153 (Corr.) • conversion plant • isotope separation (enrichment) plant • fuel fabrication plant • reactor (critical assembly, research reactor, power reactor) • separate fuel storage facility • reprocessing plant • any location where nuclear material >1 eff. kg is customarily used

  5. Not Nuclear Facility • Mines, mills • Ore processing facilities • LoF: location outside facility (nuclear material <1 eff. kg)

  6. When eligibility criteria for an SQP are not met any longer, all provisions of the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement of the State will apply

  7. Model rescission letter

  8. CSA Articles in Force Articles related to scope & control (safeguards measures) • Starting point of safeguards (Art. 32-33) • Termination of safeguards (Art. 34) • Exemptions from safeguards (Art. 35-37) Articles related to subsidiary arrangements • Negotiation of subsidiary arrangements (Art. 38) • Entry into force (Art. 39)

  9. CSA Articles in Force Articles related to initial reporting • Initial report (Art. 40) Articles related to design information • Provision of information (Art. 41-44) • Examination and verification (Art. 45-47)

  10. CSA Articles in Force Articles related to reporting • Information on nuclear material outside facilities (Art. 48-49) • Records and Reports systems (Art. 50-68) Articles related to inspections • Purpose, scope, access (Art. 69-76) • Frequency and intensity (Art. 77-81) • Notification of inspection (Art. 82-84) • Inspector designation, visa (Art. 84, 85) • Inspectors conduct (Art. 86-88)

  11. CSA Articles in Force Article related to the Agency statements on verification activities (Art. 89) Articles on international transfers • Responsibilities (Art. 90) • Notifications and verifications (Art. 91-96)

  12. Subsidiary Arrangements

  13. Purpose Support the Agreement between the State and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

  14. Content Set of technical & administrative procedures designed to implement the safeguards procedure laid down in the Safeguards Agreement Consists of 2 parts: General Part Facility Attachments

  15. General Part / Codes 1-10 • Regular channels of communication • National system of accounting for and control of nuclear material • Provision of information by the State • Provision of information by the Agency • Publication of information by the Agency • Termination of, exemption from and reapplication of safeguards • Advance notifications of international transfers • Model inventory of nuclear material subject to safeguards • Inspections and inspectors • Report forms and explanations for their use

  16. General Part/Codes 11-18 Channels of communication Model forms Provision of information by (State) Complementary access Communications systems Provision of information by the Agency Instructions and formats for preparation and submission of information by (State) Legislation

  17. Facility Attachments Prepared for each facility or location outside facilities. Contains, inter alia: A short description of the facility A provision to submit in advance to the IAEA certain changes in the facility DI Accountancy measures for the facility A detailed description of the records and reports system Provisions for administrative procedures concerning the facility.

  18. Conclusion of Subsidiary Arrangements Not held in abeyance by SQP “…The State and the Agency shall make every effort to achieve their entry into force within 90 days of the entry into force of the Agreement, a later date being acceptable only with the agreement of both parties”.(CSA Art. 39)

  19. Design Information

  20. Timing of Provision of Design Information 1. Upon entry into force of Safeguards Agreement (for existing facilities) 2. New facilities • Preliminary DI when decision is made to construct or to authorise construction • DIQ based on preliminary construction plans, and updated until “as-built” design  3. Changes to design •  Safeguard significant changes in advance • Operational status change (i.e. throughout facility life cycle)

  21. General Content • Facility identification: characteristics, purpose, nominal capacity, geographic location, name and address • General arrangement of the facility • Form, location and flow of nuclear material • Layout of important items of equipment for using, processing, or producing nuclear material • Material accountancy:features and procedures • Organizational responsibility • Health and safety procedures • Modification relevant for safeguards purposes

  22. Importance of Design Information • Development of the SG approach for the facility • Preparation of the Facility Attachment • Determining MBAs for NM accountancy purposes and NM flows and inventories • Development of a verification plan covering the examination and verification activities to be conducted throughout all phases of the facility life cycle

  23. Conclusion

  24. Criteria for SQP eligibility vary depending on whether SQP based on old or modified text • Once criteria not met any longer, the State should notify the Agency • All provisions of the comprehensive safeguards agreement will apply and be implemented progressively

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