Palestinian Islamic Jihad

1. Palestinian Islamic Jihad By: Nathaniel McDanel Lyndsey Dennis Aralya Phinnith

2. Introduction • “The war will continue until Israel ceases to exist and the last Jew is eliminated from the world. Israel is entirely evil and must be wiped off the face of the earth”

3. History • Harakat al-Jihad al-Islami al-Filastini or Palestinian Islamic Jihad was founded in 1979 by Fathi Shqaqui and other extremist Palestinians in Egypt.

4. Shaqaqi was influenced to create PIJ during the Islamic Revolution in Iran and that he believed if he could united Arab and Muslim world that it would create a greater Islamic state of Palestine and bring about the downfall of Israel.

5. The Egyptian government expelled PIJ to Gaza after they learned about their involvement with a radical who killed President Anwar Sadat in 1981.

6. The first active cells of Islamic Jihad surfaced in Lebanon where they conducted terrorist attacks against Israel and kidnapped westerners in Lebanon.

7. Islamic Jihad has strengthened in power by forming alliances with other groups like Hamas, Hezbollah and has links with Al-Qaeda.

8. One notable member of Palestinian Islamic Jihad was Ramzi Yousef who attacked the World Trade Center in 1993, and today a lot members make up Al-Qaeda and are of Osama Bin Ladin’s inner circle like Ayman al-Zawahri and Morhammad Atef

10. Who & Why Finances Suicide Bombings

11. Who & Why • PIJ recruitment and operations - Much more secretive than other Terrorists groups. • Reoccupation of Israelis in many Palestinian urban • centers in first quarter of 2002. PIJ now receives more volunteers. • PIJ : Schools, Mosques, Social Services • for the poor. • Do not invest in the religious full time training • of children. - Ideological framework of PIJ: Fundamentally Nationalistic and focused on the struggle vs. Israel. United States Institute of Peace

12. Who & Why • Reasons why Individuals join PIJ - To ensure Palestine’s safety. • Constant attacks by Israeli artillery. - Economic Strangulation. - Constant harassment and humiliation. • Israeli’s former image of Suicide Bombers. • Young Muslim men. - Poorly educated. - Religiously zealous. Blanche, E. (2003). Cult of the kamikaze. Military & Government Collection, 334

13. Who & Why • Members of the PIJ - Do not come from impoverished families. • Not necessarily motivated by desperation or • religious fervour. • Affluent and well educated; at least at the general • public level. • Broad range of of social and professional • background. - Only religiously modest before, but after… • Not crazed or disgruntled loners! ! ! Blanche, E. (2003). Cult of the kamikaze. Military & Government Collection, 334

14. Who & Why • Radical Leaders - *Indoctrination Methods* “I think these groups are able to manipulate innate emotions… in much the same way that the fast food and porn industries manipulate innate desires… [This manipulation] creates a sincere commitment equal to the one a mother feels when she sacrifices herself for her child.” - Atran Blanche, E. (2003). Cult of the kamikaze. Military & Government Collection, 334

15. Finances • Economic Jihad • Concept: religious duty; if not by physically • fighting Islam’s enemies then by funding. • Quranic verse in Surah 9 Verse 41: • “Fight with your possessions and your souls in • the way of Allah.” • Several Islamist Spiritual leaders emphasizes • ‘Economic Jihad’ as a religious duty for all • Muslims. Levitt, M. (2005). Countering the theological case for ‘economic jihad’ is vital. The Washington Institute For Near East Policy. Retrieved from: http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/opedsPDFs/42a8bf8bbf6a6.pdf

16. Finances • Economic Jihad in America • U.S. based PIJ members and supporters: • Fundraising • Propaganda - Proselytizing activities Mueller, R. S. (2005). Congressional Testimony. Federal Bureau of Investigations. Retreived from: http://www.fbi.gov/congress/congress05/mueller021605.htm

17. Finances • Economic Jihad • PIJ activist Fawaz Damra called on supporters • in U.S. to support Economic Jihad. • Served as an officer of the Afghan Services • Bureau – a non profit organization in Brooklyn. • Contributed in fundraising for the PIJ. • Cleveland, Ohio 1991: • conducted an auction for a medal in honor of • a PIJ martyr, Nidal Zalloum. Levitt, M. (2005). Countering the theological case for ‘economic jihad’ is vital. The Washington Institute For Near East Policy. Retrieved from: http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/opedsPDFs/42a8bf8bbf6a6.pdf

18. Finances • Charitable front organizations • Disguised as humanitarian organizations/support. • Donors are also well aware of ‘Economic Jihad.’ • Donors feel that are fulfilling a religious obligation. Levitt, M. (2005). Countering the theological case for ‘economic jihad’ is vital. The Washington Institute For Near East Policy. Retrieved from: http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/opedsPDFs/42a8bf8bbf6a6.pdf

19. Finances • Iran • Frequently meets with other Terrorists groups. • Actively encourages destruction of peace processes. • Provides money : 1million – 100million. • Supplies arms, material support, training, and • operational guidance. Christopher, 1996. Fighting terrorism: challenges for peacemakers. United States Coast Guard. Retrieved from : http://www.uscg.mil/hq/gm/nmc/security/peace.htm National Commision of Terrorism. Countering the changing threat of international terrorism. United States Coast Guard. Retrieved from : http://www.uscg.mil/legal/homeland%5Flegislation/text/countering%5Fthe%5Fchanging%5Fthreat%5Fof%5Finternational%5Fterrorism.html

20. Finances • Iran • Most active state supporter. • Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps • Ministry of Intelligence and Security • Planning and execution of Terrorists acts. • provide funding, training, weapons, logistical • resources, and guidance. National Commision of Terrorism. Countering the changing threat of international terrorism. United States Coast Guard. Retrieved from : http://www.uscg.mil/legal/homeland%5Flegislation/text/countering%5Fthe%5Fchanging%5Fthreat%5Fof%5Finternational %5Fterrorism.html

21. Finances • Al-Qaeda and Osama Bin Laden • 1998 Ahmed al-Naggar. “The funding of the organisation came [primarily] through financial support from the Saudi Osama Bin Laden.” - Funded by Bin Laden’s personal fortune since early 90’s. • Also now considered part of Al-Qaeda’s network. Anoymous. (2001). Countering terrorism. Times-Newspapers. Retrieved from : http://www.infowars.com/saved%20pages/Prior_Knowledge/10_years_cell.htm

22. Suicide Bombings • Pioneered in early 80’s • Lebanon’s Shi’ite Muslim extremist group Hizballah • - inspired by Iran’s use of human minesweepers. • 1994: PIJ along with other terrorists groups. • Suicide bombings were controversial • 1996: 20% supported practice. • Today: 70% support suicide bombings. • Swamped with volunteers. Van Biema, D., Hamad, J., Moaveni, A., Radwan, A., Rees, M. (2001). Why the bombers keep coming. Military & Government Collection, 158.

23. Suicide Bombings • Jenin: Suicide bombing capital of the West Bank • Long history of militancy. • - Israeli-Palestinian war • - Izzadin Al Kassem • Refugee camps as focal point of Palestinian resistance. • PIJ are extremely popular in these areas. • More than a dozen suicide bombers. Hammer, J., Ephron, D. (2002). A war’s human toll. Newsweek, 139

24. Suicide Bombings • PIJ - most active in suicide bombings • Influence has spread: • Kurdistan, Pakistan, Kashmir, Chechnya, China, • Turkey, and across Southeast Asia. • Suicide bombings are very efficient • $ 1,000 . • Easily transported • Much more difficult to spot “ A suicide bomber is a two-legged missile. Once it’s launched, it’s very difficult to intercept.” - Uzi Landau, Israeli Internal Security Minister Van Biema, D., Hamad, J., Moaveni, A., Radwan, A., Rees, M. (2001). Why the bombers keep coming. Military & Government Collection, 158.

25. Purposeof the PIJ • Opposition to Palestinian authority policy and the sentiments of the majority of the Palestinian population • Concentrates entirely on armed revolt Goals • Destruction of the State of Israel (source of moral and spiritual corruption) • Liberation of Palestine & pan-Islamic revival

26. “Al-amaliyyah al-istishhadiyyah”“The death of a martyr for the sake of Allah”

27. What have they done? • 1990’s- tried to sabotage the Oslo peace process. • 2003- Tried to end “cease fire” (hudna) achieved by Israel & Palestine's • May 19, 2003- Shopping mall 3 dead, 83 wounded • October 4, 2003- Maxim Restaurant 21 dead, 60 wounded The PIJ claimed responsibility through a televised video cassette and threatened that there would be thousands more. • February 25, 2005- suicide bombing attack in Tel Aviv. 5 dead, 50 wounded

28. Recruits • PIJ has a student wing • Actively recruits women in Northern West Bank Universities, towns, and villages. • Once a prospective suicide bomber is found the organization invests considerable effort in convincing women that this activity does not contradict Islamic principles nor “the daily duties of Muslim women. The suicide bomber responsible for the attack in Tel Aviv.

29. Women Suicide Bombers • The shopping mall incident – 19 yr. old student Heiba Daragmeh detonated an explosive devise that was strapped to her body. • The Maxim restaurant – Hanadi Jaradat 29 yr. old trainee lawyer. Her brother and cousin had been killed by Israeli forces and she was not yet married. “With the strength and heroism of Allah, I decided to become the sixth female suicide bomber to turn her body into shrapnel which will penetrate the heard of every Zionist settler in my country… (Al-Arabia TV, October 5, 2003)

30. Other helpers • 16 yr. old Tamer Khuweir - apprehended by Israeli security forces on March 9, 2004 as he prepared to carry out a suicide attack. Tamer’s brother claims he was brainwashed • Dr. Sami Al Arian- Computer engineering professor at the University of Southern Florida. Arrested on February 20, 2003 and indicted with 50 “terrorism” related charges. He is the North American head of the PIJ.

31. Plans for the Future • Have not yet directly targeted U.S. interests (although U.S. citizens have died in attacks), continue to direct attacks against Israeli interests. • Remains a relatively small movement • According to opinion polls, only 4-5% of Palestinian population supports PIJ because it lacks the institutional networks like those built by Hamas. • Enables PIJ to concentrate on ideological goals and disregard politics!

32. References • www.intelligence.org (February 2005) • http://enwikipedia.org • http://library.nps.navy.mil (April 2005) • http://www.ict.org.il • www.military.com

33. References Anonymous. (2001). Countering terrorism. Times-Newspapers. Retrieved from: http://www.infowars.com/saved%20pages/Prior_Knowledge/10_years_cell.htm Blanche, E. (2003). Cult of the kamikaze. Military & Government Collection, 334. Christopher. (1996). Fighting terrorism: challenges for peacemakers. United States Coast Guard. Retrieved from: http://www.uscg.mil/hq/gm/nmc/security/peace.htm Hammer, J. Ephron, D. (2002). A war’s human toll. Newsweek, 139. Levitt, M. (2005). Countering the theological case for ‘economic jihad’ is vital. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Retrieved from: http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/opedsPDFs/42a8bf8bbf6a6.pdf Mueller, R. S. (2005). Congressional Testimony. Federal Bureau of Investigations. Retrieved from: http://www.fbi.gov/congress05/mueller021605.htm National Commission of Terrorism. Countering the changing threat of international terrorism. United States Coast Guard. Retrieved from: http://www.uscg.mil/legal/homeland%5Flegislation/text/countering%5Fthe%5Fchanging%5Fthreat%5Fof%5Finternational%5Fterrorism.html Oreck, A. (2005). Palestinian islamic jihad. Jewish Virtual Library. Retrieved from: http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Terrorism/PIJ.html

34. References United States Institute of Peace. (2002). Islamic extremist: how do they mobilize support. Retrieved from: http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr89.html Van Biema, D., Hamad, J., Moaveni, A., Radwan, A. & Rees, M. (2001). Why the bombers keep coming. Military & Government Collection, 158. Weisberg, A. (2003). Islamic jihad. FrontPage Magazine. Retrieved from: http://www.frontpagemag.com/Articles/Readarticle.asp?ID=7614

35. The End