Machiavelli -- ( 1 )

1. Machiavelli -- (1) Niccolo Machiavelli, 1469-1527

2. Machiavelli -- (2) • Lived esp. in the independent city-state of Florence • Diplomat for the regime, 1498-1507 • Regime he worked for driven from power, M. was never able to regain positions • retired, spent the rest of his life writing • (and trying to gain the favor of powerful princes • The Prince written for the Medicis (1513) • [it didn’t work, but it got a lot of later attention!]

3. Machiavelli -- (3) • A Note about “The Prince”: was it written tongue in cheek? • After all, M. was tortured by these very people!] • Whether or not so, we’ll take it at face value • The book is in the form of advice to princes • [compare with Aquinas “On Kingship” ...] • The sole premise is that they want to maintain and expand their power • principles, moral considerations, etc., are all subordinated to that end • “Whatever the form of government, Machiavelli held, only success and glory really matter.” [http://www.philosophypages.com/ph/macv.htm • Our big question: Is this interesting? If so, why? • .......

4. Machiavelli -- (4) • How to Govern formerly independent conquered places: • 1) - despoil them • 2) go there oneself • 3) allow independence • -> “a city used to liberty can be more easily held by means of its citizens than in any other way, if you wish to preserve it.” • “being the creature of the prince, it knows that it cannot exist without his friendship and protection, and will do all it can to keep them.” • note the reason for allowing independence - not that they have a right to it, but that it’s easier to hold on to it ...

5. Machiavelli -- (5) • “New Dominions Acquired by one’s own Arms & Abilities” • - easier to retain than acquire • “nothing more difficult to carry out, nor more doubtful of success, nor more dangerous to handle, than to initiate a new order of things.” • The reformer faces: • a) enemies in all who profit by the old order • b) only lukewarm defenders in those who would profit by the new order • this lukewarmness arising partly from fear of their adversaries, who have the laws in their favour • “his opponents attack with the zeal of partisans • “while the others defend him but halfheartedly,

6. Machiavelli -- (6) • “armed prophets have conquered, while unarmed ones failed. • Look at Moses, e.g. .... [ironic?] • Agathocles the Sicilian: • rose from the lowest private life to be King of Syracuse. • led a life of utmost wickedness through all stages • killed all the senators by trickery • and ruled happily ever after ... • Clearly, this man’s achievements were not due to fortune. • Nor virtue (killing fellow citizens, betraying friends...) • “without faith, pity or religion” • “ but by these methods one may indeed gain power, if not glory. • Agathocles compares in qualities of the soul to the most renowned captains. Still, his barbarous cruelty and countless atrocities disqualify him from the list of the most famous.

7. Machiavelli -- (7) • How did Agathocles succeed? (without revolt) • It’s a matter of exploiting one’s cruelties well or badly. • - Well done are the ones that are perpetrated just once • then exchanged for measures as useful to the subjects as possible. • - Ill-committed cruelties, on the other hand, increase rather than diminish with time. • Timing: the conqueror should “ commit all his cruelties at once” • “ Whoever does otherwise is obliged to stand always with knife in hand, and can never depend on his subjects.” • benefits, by contrast, should be granted little by little, so that they may be better enjoyed. • -- “hearts and minds” ...

8. Machiavelli -- (8) • The Civic Principality • - becoming prince “by being a favorite of his fellow citizens” • not necessarily by merit... but by “cunning, assisted by fortune” • “every city has two opposite parties: the great (few) and the small (numerous) • You can work on either one: • - currying favor with the former is hard, because they think they’re your equal • - doing so with the latter is easy because they don’t • it is impossible to satisfy the nobility by fair dealing and without inflicting injuries, • whereas it is easy to satisfy the mass of the people this way. • “For the aim of the people is more honest than that of the nobility.”

9. Machiavelli -- (9) • The conflict of aristocracy and the people • - has one of three effects: absolute government, liberty, or license. • Absolute government can be created by either party • - by aristocrats who want to oppress the people • - by the people, who want to avoid being oppressed • Easiest is to side with the People • but if you do the nobility, you should cater to the people while you’re at it • gain the favour of the people - which will be easy if he protects them. • “the prince can never insure himself against a hostile populace, because of their number, whereas he can against the hostility of the great, who are few.” • People who expect evil and receive good feel a greater obligation to their benefactor • [“it feels so good when he stops”!] • “I conclude that it is necessary for a prince to possess the friendship of his people, for otherwise he has no resource in time of adversity.”

10. Machiavelli -- (10) • Concerning Ecclesiastical Principalities • they are acquired either by capacity or good fortune, and they can be held without either • for they are sustained by the ordinances of religion, which are so all-powerful, and of such a character that the principalities may be held no matter how their princes behave and live. • [example, Pope Julius (who had at least one illegitimate child and was generally believed to be a homosexual while he was at it) • (a) “greatness of the church” which “terrified” his enemies • (b) not allowing his enemies to have any cardinals [because cardinals foster the factions in Rome and out of it, and the barons are compelled to support them]

11. Machiavelli -- (11) • Militia and Mercenaries • The chief foundation of all states, old and new, are good laws and good arms. • - they go together [!] • Best: an army of your own [people] • mercenaries and auxiliaries are unreliable • nothing keeps them in the field beyond their wage • which isn’t enough to make them die for you • “They’re happy to be soldiers so long as you don’t make war, but when it comes, off they go” • Auxiliaries are the other useless arm - when a prince is called in with his forces to aid and defend • They are useful and good in themselves • but for him who calls them in they are bad: • losing, one is undone, and winning, one is their captive. • with mercenaries dastardy is most dangerous; in auxiliaries, valour

12. Machiavelli -- (12) • Duties of a Prince Regarding his Militia • war ... is the only art that is necessary to one who commands • But princes who think more of luxury than of arms soon lose their state. • Machiavelli’s Realism: • he who abandons what is done for what ought to be done will rather learn to bring about his own ruin than his preservation. • A man who makes a profession of goodness in everything must come to grief among so many who are not good. • So the prince must learn how not to be good, and to use this knowledge or not, according to the necessity of the case. • [modern saying: “No good deed goes unpunished”]

13. Machiavelli -- (13) • Liberality and Niggardliness • It is well to be considered liberal • liberality as the world understands it will injure you: • for if used virtuously and in the right way, it won’t be known, and you will incur as much disgrace as if you had been niggardly. • To get the reputation of liberality he must put on every kind of sumptuous display • which will consume all his means, • - so he will at last be compelled to impose heavy taxes etc • That will make his subjects hate him • and by this liberality, having injured many and benefited but few, he will also feel the first little disturbance and be endangered by every peril. • And if he tries to change his ways, he’ll incur the charge of niggardliness. • So the prince, if he is prudent, must not object to being called miserly.

14. Machiavelli -- (14) • Liberality and Niggardliness continued ... • he really is liberal to all from whom he does not take • - who are many! • and niggardly to all to whom he does not give, who are few • In our time, nothing great has been done except by those called niggardly - • the others were all ruined. • So a prince who wishes to avoid robbing his subjects must care little about having the reputation of a miser; this niggardliness is one of the vices that enable him to reign. • With his own, he must be sparing

15. Machiavelli -- (15) • Liberality and Niggardliness continued ... • Spend other people’s money -- • “the prince may either • (a) spend his own wealth and that of his own subjects, or • (b) the wealth of others. • In the first case, he must be sparing, but for the rest he must not neglect to be very liberal. “ • You can be pretty liberal by spending other people’s money • This liberality is necessary to a prince who marches with his armies and lives by plunder, sack, and ransom, and is dealing with the wealth of others, for without it, he would not be followed by his soldiers. • spending the wealth of others will not diminish your reputation; only spending your own resources will injure you.

16. Machiavelli -- (16) • Liberality and Niggardliness continued ... • Why being a miser is better than being a thief: • Nothing destroys itself so much as liberality • by using it you lose the power of using it • So it is wiser to have the name of miser • - which produces disgrace but not hatred • -- than to incur of necessity the name of being rapacious • - which produces both disgrace and hatred.

17. Machiavelli -- (17) • Of Cruelty and Clemency, and Whether it is Better to be Loved or Feared • A Prince must not mind incurring the charge of cruelty for the purpose of keeping his subjects united and faithful ... • Which is better? To be loved more than feared, or the reverse? • The reply is that one ought to be both, but as it is difficult for the two to go together, it is much safer to be feared than loved. • For it may be said of men in general that they are ungrateful, voluble dissemblers, anxious to avoid danger, covetous of gain; • Still, a prince should make himself feared in such a way that if he does not gain love, he at any rate avoids hatred; • A reputation for cruelty especially pays with the army ...

18. Machiavelli -- (18) • XVIII: In What Way Princes Must Keep Faith • two methods of fighting: law and force • “as the first is often insufficient, one must have recourse to the second” • The Fox and the Lion • “The prince must know well how to use both. • He must imitate the fox and the lion, • for the lion cannot protect himself from traps, • but the fox cannot defend himself from wolves. • One must therefore be a fox to recognize traps, and a lion to frighten the wolves.” • This metaphor is Machiavelli’s calling card as a political theorist! • Therefore, a prudent ruler ought not to keep faith when by so doing it would be against his interest, and when the reasons which made him bind himself no longer exist.

19. Machiavelli -- (19) • A prince must take great care that • nothing goes out of his mouth which is not full offive qualities: • Mercy, faith, integrity, humanity, and religion. • And nothing is more necessary than to seem to have this last quality, • Everybody sees what you appear to be, few what you are; and • in the actions of princes • -- from which there is no appeal • -- the end justifies the means. • Let a prince therefore aim at conquering and maintaining the state, and • - the means will always be judged honourable and praised by all....

20. Machiavelli -- (20) • the prince must consider • avoid those thingswhich will make him hated or contemptible: • - rapacious, • - a violator of the property and women of his subjects, from both of which he must abstain. • And when neither their property nor honour is touched, the majority of men live content • he has only to contend with the ambition of a few, whom he can curb with ease in many ways. • it is contemptible to be considered • fickle, frivolous, effeminate, mean-spirited, irresolute, • - from all of which a prince should guard himself as from a rock; • In private dealings with his subjects • let him show that his judgments are irrevocable • - maintain himself in such reputation that no one can hope either to deceive him or to get round him.

21. Machiavelli -- (21) • on the side of the conspirator, there is nothing but fear, jealousy, prospect of punishment to terrify him; • but on the side of the prince there isthe majesty of the principality, the laws, the protection of friends and the state to defend him; • so that, adding to all these things the popular goodwill, it is impossible that any one should be so rash as to conspire. • - as princes cannot help being hated by someone, they ought, in the first place, to avoid being hated by everyone • and when they cannot compass this, they ought to endeavour with the utmost diligence to avoid the hatred of the most powerful.

22. Machiavelli -- (22) • And here it should be noted that • hatred is acquired as much by good works as by bad ones • therefore, as I said before, a prince wishing to keep his state • is very often forced to do evil • for when that body is corrupt whom you think you have need of to maintain yourself —people or the soldiers or the nobles — you have to submit to its humours and to gratify them, and then good works will do you harm

23. Machiavelli -- (23) • Roman emperors had to put up with the cruelty and avarice of their soldiers • - a matter so beset with difficulties that it was the ruin of many • because the people loved peace, and for this reason they loved the unaspiring prince, • whilst the soldiers loved the warlike prince who was bold, cruel, and rapacious • - which qualities they were quite willing he should exercise upon the people, so that they could get double pay and give vent to their greed and cruelty. • whereas it was then more necessary to give satisfaction to the soldiers than to the people, • it is now more necessary to all princes .. to satisfy the people rather than the soldiers • because the people are the more powerful. ... • [Is this a main argument for democracy?]

24. Machiavelli -- (24) • XXV: What Fortune Can Effect In Human Affairs, And How To Withstand Her • I hold it to be true that Fortune is the arbiter of one-half of our actions, but that she still leaves us to direct the other half, or perhaps a little less. • a prince may be seen happy to-day and ruined to-morrow without having shown any change of disposition or character. • 1 ... the prince who relies entirely upon fortune is lost when it changes • 2 - he will be successful who directs his actions according to the spirit of the times - and if not, he won’t. • Because men are seen, in affairs that lead to • the end which every man has before him, namely, glory and riches • they get there by various methods; one with caution, another with haste; one by force, another by skill; one by patience, another by its opposite; and • each one succeeds in reaching the goal by a different method.

25. Machiavelli -- (25) • two men working differently bring about the same effect, and of two working similarly, one attains his object and the other does not. • having always prospered by acting in one way, he cannot be persuaded that it is well to leave it; • it is better to be adventurous than cautious, because fortune is a woman • if you wish to keep her under it is necessary to beat and ill-use her • and it is seen that she allows herself to be mastered by the adventurous rather than by those who go to work more coldly. • She is, therefore, always a lover of young men, because they are less cautious, more violent, and with more audacity command her. • Closes with “an exhortation to Liberate Italy From The Barbarians” • interesting!

26. Machiavelli -- (26) • Summarizing Machiavelli • (1) Everything is a matter of means to one’s ends • (2) those ends are, one’s own wealth and power • (3) you maintain power by keeping the most important people on your side, - or by suppressing them ... • (4) the “most important people” are usually The People, because they’re so much more numerous • (5) so keeping the people on your side is your best move of all • (6) morals and religion are appearances that you can use to advantage • (7) You have to know when to be the lion and when the fox ... it depends on circumstances. • “All cities that ever, at any time, have been ruled by an absolute prince, by aristocrats, or by the people, have had for their protection force combined with prudence, because the latter is not enough alone, and the first either does not produce things, or when they are produced, does not maintain them. Force and prudence, then, are the might of all the governments that ever have been or will be in the world.” • Is Thrasymachus going to end up a good guy after all??