Dr. Boris Kosoy Staatlice Akademie für Wärme- und Kältetechnik, Odessa, Ukraine

1. Deutsch-ukrainisches Symposium: Energie der Zukunft den 13. Oktober 2006 Potsdam, Potsdam-Institut für Klimafolgenforschung Die Folgen des Reaktorunglücks in Tschornobyl und eröffnet die Orangene Revolution in der Ukraine Chancen für eine Alternative in der Energiepolitik? Dr. Boris Kosoy Staatlice Akademie für Wärme- und Kältetechnik, Odessa, Ukraine

2. OUTLINE • Introduction • Chornobyl accident • Ukraine’s energy situation • The concept of non-nuclear development of the power industry of Ukraine • Conclusions

3. History of nuclear power engineering • The first power-generating unit that was connected to the electricity grid appeared on July 27, 1954 in Obninsk, USSR. • In 1970 there were 116 nuclear power generating units and in 1980 the number grew to 135. The next decade witnessed the fastest-ever increase in the number of nuclear reactors: their number reached 328 in 1990. In 2001 there were 438 operational nuclear reactors and 31 reactors were under construction or modernization. • Within this historically short period of time the nuclear power industry has made spectacular progress: as of today, 440 reactors have been built and 24 are under construction. It has become a real alternative to thermoelectric power stations.

4. How does it work? Fission: process where radioactive Uranium or Plutonium is bombarded with neutrons until the nuclei split into lighter elements, causing a chain reaction of splitting and releasing an incredible amount of heat energy. Like a fossil-fuel plant, nuclear plants heat a fluid which makes steam that spins turbine blades that drive an electrical generator.

5. Chornobyl accident On 25 April, prior to a routine shut-down, the reactor crew at Chornobyl-4 began preparing for a test to determine how long turbines would spin and supply power following a loss of main electrical power supply. Similar tests had already been carried out at Chornobyl and other plants, despite the fact that these reactors were known to be very unstable at low power settings. A series of operator actions, including the disabling of automatic shutdown mechanisms, preceded the attempted test early on 26 April. As flow of coolant water diminished, power output increased. When the operator moved to shut down the reactor from its unstable condition arising from previous errors, a peculiarity of the design caused a dramatic power surge.

6. Chornobyl accident The fuel elements ruptured and the resultant explosive force of steam lifted off the cover plate of the reactor, releasing fission products to the atmosphere. A second explosion threw out fragments of burning fuel and graphite from the core and allowed air to rush in, causing the graphite moderator to burst into flames.

7. The Chornobyl accident in 1986 was the result of a flawed reactor design that was operated with inadequately trained personnel and without proper regard for safety. The resulting steam explosion and fire released at least five percent of the radioactive reactor core into the atmosphere and downwind. 28 people died within four months from radiation or thermal burns, 19 have subsequently died, and there have been around nine deaths from thyroid cancer apparently due to the accident.

8. Immediate impact It is estimated that all of the xenon gas, about half of the iodine and cesium, and at least 5% of the remaining radioactive material in the Chornobyl-4 reactor core was released in the accident. Most of the released material was deposited close by as dust and debris, but the lighter material was carried by wind over the Ukraine, Belarus, Russia and to some extent over Scandinavia and Europe. In the years following the accident a further 210 000 people were resettled into less contaminated areas, and the initial 30 km radius exclusion zone (2800 sq.km) was modified and extended to cover 4300 sq. km.

9. Chornobyl today The Chornobyl unit 4 is now enclosed in a large concrete shelter which was erected quickly to allow continuing operation of the other reactors at the plant. However, the structure is neither strong nor durable and there are plans for its reconstruction. The international Shelter Implementation Plan involved raising US$715 million for remedial work including removal of the fuel-containing materials. Some work on the roof has already been carried out. In March 2001 a US$36 million contract was signed for construction of a radioactive waste management facility to treat spent fuel and other operational wastes, as well as material from decommissioning units 1-3. These will be the first RBMK units decommissioned anywhere. Workers and their families now live in a new town, Slavutich, 30 km from the plant. This was built following the evacuation of Pripyat, which was just 3 km away.

10. Nuclear power in Ukraine Ukraine is heavily dependent on nuclear energy - it has 15 reactors generating half of its electricity. Ukraine receives most of its nuclear services and nuclear fuel from Russia. In 2004 Ukraine commissioned two large new reactors. The government plans to build up to eleven new reactors by 2030. A large share of primary energy supply in Ukraine comes from the country's uranium and substantial coal resources. The remainder is oil and gas, mostly imported from Russia. In 1991, due to breakdown of the Soviet Union, the country's economy collapsed and its electricity consumption declined dramatically from 296 billion kWh in 1990 to 170 in 2000, all the decrease being from coal and gas plants. Total electricity production in 2004 amounted to 181 TWh, and total capacity in 2004 was 52.7 GWe.

12. The most serious societal concerns

13. Opinions on different sources of electric power

14. Nuclear power industry and energy dependence

15. Safety of Ukrainian nuclear power plants

16. The life extension of operational nuclear reactors

17. Prospects for construction of 11 new reactors and public awareness

18. Ukraine’s energy situation and trajectory since independence Ukraine’s energy situation since independence has been characterized first and foremost by two elements: • the country’s dependency on imported energy sources – especially on Russian ones; • its low levels of energy efficiency.

19. High levels of dependency on imported energy Ukraine’s total energy dependency is one of the highest in the Central-East European (CEE) region (see Table). This is the result of declining domestic production and inefficient energy use, among other factors. According to a study by the Ukrainian Centre for Economic and Political Studies, should current trends continue, Ukraine’s total energy import dependency could rise to 65-70% by 2020.

20. Changes in Ukraine’s energy import dependency as compared to decreases in energy consumption

21. Inefficient energy production system and high energy intensity Both Ukraine’s energy production system and its economy as a whole are sorely outdated. Fifty-four percent of Ukraine’s pipelines – built for a normal exploitation period of 25 years – are twenty-one years old or older, and their state of disrepair increases the possibility of accidents. Moreover, pipe-line gas pumping units are in particularly bad condition, which means increasing amounts of gas are needed to pump gas through the pipelines. In addition, Ukraine exhibits very low levels of energy efficiency. Not only does Ukraine have one of the highest levels of energy intensity (energy consumption per unit of GDP) in the world, but it actually increased by almost 50% from 1991 to 2004. Low energy efficiency also affects Ukraine’s exports, lowering their competitiveness in the long term.

22. Ukraine’s GDP energy intensity trends by international comparison (1989 =100)

23. Ukraine’s lack of progress in energy diversification Ukraine’s high levels of energy import dependency are made worse by its problems in energy supply diversification. It is generally accepted that energy diversification is guaranteed by receiving significant energy supplies from at least three different geographical sources. Ukraine is far from this situation, as an overwhelming share of its energy imports comes from Russia. Lack of a proactive energy policy The track record since independence is also one of a lack of a clear, proactive and widely accepted energy policy. This refers to both rules for the day-to-day organization of the sector, and to a more long-term energy policy. Unpredictable and often-changing rules for the organization of the energy market (and the gas market in particular) have made it difficult for medium- or long-term planning to take place, for the system to work smoothly or for serious investors to take an interest in the market.

24. Domestic consequences • As a result of the way Ukraine’s energy policy-making system has worked, many costs are shifted, in a non-transparent manner, to the state. This has been the case, for example, when the state has assumed the debts of energy traders, or when it absorbs losses related to energy waste. As a result, the state is robbed of valuable resources it could use in other areas.

25. Consequences in terms of the relationship with Russia Ukraine’s blatant energy dependency on Russia, together with the government’s inability to take a strong policy stance on energy issues, makes the country especially vulnerable to price fluctuations and dependency on Russia and further complicates both countries’ already difficult relationship. Energy remains both a bottleneck in the country’s economic development and Ukraine’s Achilles’ heel in its relationship with Russia, a relationship which, in a reflection of Ukraine’s own foreign policy wavering between Russia and the West, remains a highly ambiguous one at the political, military and economic levels. In the context of Ukraine’s currently strained relationships with other foreign partners, such dependency leads to increased pressure for closer economic and political integration with Russia.

26. Transparency Lack of transparency in the Ukrainian energy markets not only creates opportunities for corruption and abuse of power, but actually invites corruption by creating opportunities for quick enrichment through shady energy deals. Non-transparent systems also offer fertile ground for the appropriation of significant “rents of dependency” at the expense of the state as a whole. Because of the centrality of the energy sector for Ukraine’s economy as a whole, such trends, once started in the energy sector, spread easily to the rest of the economy. Corruption and the general lack of transparency in the system also keep Western investors away, creating a situation that makes Ukraine more open to Russian economic penetration and influence.

27. Clear and consistent energy policies Whether the system in place allows for the development of consistent, long-term energy policies will affect diversification issues because, given the high cost of and other difficulties involved in following an energy diversification policy (given the strength of Soviet legacies and of structural factors such as Russian-centered oil and gas pipeline systems), such diversification only has a chance if it is part of a long-term, consistent energy policy. The general system of power in Ukraine has affected the system’s ability to pursue clear and consistent energy policies through two elements: 1) through the widespread “capture” of state companies and institutions by particularistic interests; 2) through the constant “balancing” needed to keep the system in place from the president’s perspective, which gets in the way of the development of clear and consistent national policies.

28. Democratically controlled energy policies The general system of power in Ukraine has affected the issue of democratic control over energy policy through the fact that de facto policy decisions are often made not through elected representative institutions, but through informal networks. What are some of the effects of this on energy policy? This lack of a democratically controlled energy policy process makes actual energy policies easy prey for political and social contestation. It also creates important hurdles on the way to energy diversification, because only a democratic and generally accepted energy diversification policy has the chance to be followed despite the hardship involved in its implementation, as is often the case in the former Soviet area.

29. The Concept of Non-nuclear Development of the Power Industry of Ukraine

30. Main indicators of predicted development of the economy and power industry, according to the Energy Strategy The Energy Strategy of Ukraine up to 2030 defines three periods of economic development up to 2030: • up to 2010 — the period of innovations-based restructuring; • 2011—2020 — the period of outpace development of the traditional services sector of the Ukrainian economy. These periods of development should result in establishment of foundations of a post-industrial economy. • In the period from 2021 to 2030, the country is expected to complete its transition to a post-industrial society with relevant structural changes in the economy.

31. The Energy Strategy of Ukraine up to 2030: Expected GDP growth (UAH billion)

32. The Energy Strategy of Ukraine up to 2030: Expected dynamics of consumption of primary energy resources, accounting for levels of structural and technological energy conservation by 2030 (million tons EF)

33. The Energy Strategy: the structure of consumption of primary energy resources in Ukraine

34. Risks of the “nuclear” scenario of development of the power industry of Ukraine

35. Ukrainian NPPs as future exporters of electric energy to Russia? • Technological and economic risks of the “nuclear renaissance” • Dependence of the “nuclear” scenario of development of the power industry of Ukraine on Russia • Security of NPPs operations: old and new risks

36. The Energy Strategy of Ukraine stipulates huge investments into development of nuclear power sector by 2030 (UAH 198.3 billion plus UAH 21.7 billion for development of the nuclear fuel cycle). These funds are allocated as follows: • modernization, reconstruction and improvement of safety standards of operational NPPs, management of RW and INF — UAH 5.5 billion; • extension of service life of NPPs — UAH 6.4 billion; • decommissioning of NPPs reactor units — UAH 7.0 billion; • commissioning of new reactor units and decommissioning of reactor units that exceeded their design service life and the extended service life terms — UAH 179.4 billion; • development of uranium and zirconium production facilities, ensuring production of uranium concentrate at the level of full demand of NPPs — UAH 20.4 billion; • construction of a plant for production of nuclear fuel — UAH 1.3 billion.

37. Energy strategies of European countries • Development of renewable energy in EU counties is facilitated by “White paper” program and a series of EC Directives on: • doubling the share of renewable energy in the overall energy consumption of EU countries (from 5.4% in 1997 to 12% in 2010); • facilitation of growing shares of electric energy generation from renewables, from 14% in 1997 to 21% in 2010 in 25 EU countries (Directive 2001/77/EC); • facilitation of growing shares of transport bio-fuels to 5.75% by 2010 to 20% by 2020 due to replacement of mineral diesel oil and petrol (Directive 2003/30/EC) and by granting tax exempt status to bio-fuel producers (amended Directive on taxation in the sphere of power industry and electric power generation (Directive 2003/96/EC)).

38. Electric energy generation in Germany

39. Main energy conservation measures • application of renewable energy sources; • introduction of cogeneration technologies; • reduction of heat and electric energy losses in the course of energy generation, transportation and consumption; • utilization of discharge heat of boilers; • utilization of industrial gases; • utilization of coalbed methane; • reconstruction of gas transportation systems; • utilization of pressure of natural gas. Implementation of all these measures would result in direct reduction of natural gas consumption for more than 21 billion m3/year, or in replacement of planned NPPs generation capacity. Overall, these measures would allow replacing about 71 million tons EF. Necessary associated investments would reach about UAH 302 billion (including about UAH 176.5 billion, already stipulated by the Energy Strategy). Therefore, the additional costs reach only UAH 125.5 billion or much lower that the amount of necessary investments, allocated in the Strategy for development of nuclear power and the nuclear fuel cycle (UAH 220 billion in total).

40. Renewable energy sources Expected utilization of renewables in Ukraine up to 2050

41. Expected replacement of fossil fuel and nuclear power by renewable energy in Ukraine up to 2050

42. Bio-energy Potential energy capacity of biomass and peat in Ukraine corn cobs and cornstalls, sunflower stems and husk

43. Wind power Conditions for development of wind power at the territory of Ukraine are rather favorable. In many regions annual average wind velocities reach 5—5.5 m/sec at the standard height of 10 m over the surface. The range of the most promising regions for construction of large wind power plants incorporates Crimea, Carpathian region, coastal areas of the Black sea and the Sea of Azov, Donbass.

44. Solar heaters Use of solar energy is often considered mainly appropriate for local hot water supply in summer seasons. The heat energy generation capacity of solar energy is estimated at the level of 32 TWh*hours/ day. However, in climate conditions of Ukraine, solar energy may be used for residential heating and for year-round district heating systems. Similar technical solutions have been already introduced in many countries, located further north from Ukraine. Solar-thermal methods utilize panels or “collectors” that heat a fluid, which is in turn used for heating (solar-thermal)(1) or for generating electricity (solar-power)(2).

48. Photovoltaics From the technical point of view, there are fairly favorable conditions for application of photovoltaics in Ukraine. Ukraine inherited main silicon production facilities (about 80%) of the former USSR. Ukraine controls 8% of the global silicon production capacity, but it is poorly utilized now. The technical capacity of photovoltaic energy generation is estimated at the level of 16 TWh*hours/year, or about 3.3 m2 of photovoltaic panels per resident with annual generation of 100 kWh*hours/m2/year. In the case of use of modern and energy efficient appliances, the above generation capacity might meet main household demands. The technically feasible capacity would allow to generate 2 TWh*hours/year by photovoltaic panels in 2030, in 2050 this figure may raise to 9 TWh*hours/year. Geothermal energy Ukraine has a substantial geothermal capacity. The most promising regions include Trans-Carpathia, Crimea, Prikaprattya, Kharkiv, Poltava, Donetsk, Lugansk and Chernigiv oblasts, as well as some other regions. The Ministry of Environment officially estimates reserves of geothermal water at the level of 27.3 million m3/day.

49. Hydropower • In comparison to other renewables, hydropower is a well known and technologically advanced method of electric energy generation. At the Dnieper, seven high-capacity HEPs and 1 HESP operate with the overall generating capacity of 3907 MWh and annual electric energy generation of 10—12 TWh*hours/ year. In 1983, Dniester HES was commissioned at the Dniester river with generating capacity of 702 Wh and with annual generation of electric energy at the level of about 1 TWh*hours/year. In addition, 50 minor HEPs are operational, with the overall generating capacity of about 100 MWh and annual generation of electric power of about 0.25 TWh*hours/year. Falling water, our largest renewable resource next to wood, has been used as an energy source for thousands of years. First used in early 1900’s, today it provides a fourth of the world’s electricity. Very inexpensive. Cheapest source of power.

50. Cogeneration means combined generation of heat and electric energy. Main benefits of cogeneration include substantial (in 4 times) decrease of fuel consumption, comparatively to separate generation of the same amount of heat and electric energy. The overall capacity of construction of a distributed network of cogeneration power plants is assessed to reach 16,000 MWh. At the first stage it is appropriate to utilise 5000 MWh (inc. 3000 MWh in the housing and utilities sector and 2000 MWh in industry.) Implementation of a distributed network of cogeneration plants would ensure: Cogeneration • high energy efficiency and low costs of heat and electric energy; • substantial reduction of environmental releases of greenhouse gases and other pollutants; • energy independence and security of individual facilities and regions; • reduction of energy transmission losses; • ability to operate in reactive and peak load modes; • opportunities to use local fuel and alternative energy sources in the framework of an integrated highly efficient technological process.