Coffee Would Keep Me Awake: Sperber & Wilson’s Relevance Theory

Coffee Would Keep Me Awake: Sperber & Wilson’s Relevance Theory Marilynn Johnson April 9, 2019 Florida International University

Where does meaning come from? • Do handout with a partner

In order to mean something by an utterance, the utterer must intend the addressee, 1) to produce a particular response r 2) to think (recognise) that the utterer intends (1) 3) to fulfil (1) on the basis of his fulfilment of (2) (118)

Grice’s Cooperative Principle One should make one’s “conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which [one is] engaged” (Grice, 29).

Grice • - Quantity • - Quality • - Relation • - Manner

“At a genteel tea party, A says, 'Mrs. X is an old bag.' There is a moment of appalled silence, and then B says, 'The weather has been quite delightful this summer, hasn't it?'” (Grice, 35) Grice explains, “B has blatantly refused to make what he says relevant to A's preceding remark. He thereby implicates that A's remark should not be discussed and, perhaps more specifically, that A has committed a social gaffe” (Grice, 35).

“Dear Sir, Mr. X’s command of English is excellent and his attendance at tutorials has been regular. Yours, etc.” (Grice, 33) Grice then explains that the implicature here is that A “thinks Mr. X is no good at philosophy” (Grice, 33).

Sperber & Wilson’s Proposal Sharing an Impression: Mary and Peter are newly arrived at the seaside. She opens the window overlooking the sea and sniffs appreciatively and ostensively. When Peter follows suit, there is no one particular good thing that comes to his attention: the air smells fresh, fresher than it did in town, it reminds him of their previous holidays, he can smell the sea, seaweed, ozone, fish; all sorts of pleasant things come to mind, and while, because her sniff was appreciative, he is reasonably safe in assuming that she must have intended him to notice at least some of them. (1986: 55)

How much does relevance theory help with the cases on the handout? • Is this a good theory overall? • What can it explain and what can it not explain?

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V. Showing vs. Meaning One question that arises when we have the 3-D framework of meaning that I presented earlier is, “Why would someone choose to convey meaning in one coordinate or another?” That is, why would someone choose to convey some content by showing vs. meaning or by linguistic vs. non-linguistic means

V. Showing vs. Meaning The determinate vs. indeterminate continuum is about the nature of the content itself If someone chooses to express indeterminate content-- be it a metaphor, a poem, or an abstract painting—this is about the message (or here range of messages) themselves The decision to show or mean, via linguistic or non-linguistic means is a subsequent question about how to get that across

V. Showing vs. Meaning The decision to use linguistic or non-linguistic means is perhaps specific to situations I may hold up the letter 3 rather than speak it if I am in Croatia and do not know the language I may say “excuse me” loudly to someone who is in my way but looking in the other direction If I am a dancer or a visual artist, all of my work will be conveyed through non-linguistic means; vice-versa for a poet; their training is on one side of this continuum

V. Showing vs. Meaning What about the decision to show vs. mean? Why would someone, on an occasion, choose to provide direct evidence of some fact rather than expect that their communicative intention alone would be enough to cause some response, r, in the hearer? The answer has to do with how they expect they will be interpreted

V. Showing vs. Meaning As Davidson writes in “A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs”, An interpreter has, at any moment of a speech transaction, what I persist in calling a theory. (I call it a theory, as remarked before, only because a description of the interpreter’s competence requires a recursive account.) I assume that the interpreter’s theory has been adjusted to the evidence so far available to him: knowledge of the character, dress, role, sex, of the speaker, and whatever else has been gained by the speaker’s behavior, linguistic or otherwise. As the speaker speaks his piece the interpreter alters his theory. (260)

V. Showing vs. Meaning As Davidson writes, an interpreter decides how to interpret on the basis of assessing: character, dress, role, sex, of the speaker, and whatever else has been gained by the speaker’s behavior, linguistic or otherwise As he later notes, the speaker’s theory about the interpreter’s theory shapes how he chooses to attempt to convey his meaning

V. Showing vs. Meaning The relationship of such assessments to how we choose to communicate has been discussed at length in work by Miranda Fricker. Fricker calls “testimonial injustice” when “prejudice causes a hearer to give a deflated level of credibility to a speaker’s word” (2007: 1)

V. Showing vs. Meaning This “credibility excess” and “credibility deficit” result when speakers are perceived to be have a certain “dress, role, sex… behavior, linguistic or otherwise” that makes them more or less likely to be believed When a speaker is systematically not taken to be credible (to use Fricker’s term) he or she will move from meaning to showing

V. Showing vs. Meaning I recently had a student who told me that she had to miss class because of jury duty. I said that was fine and that she should get the notes from another student. She later emailed me a photo of her jury summons. I did not require extra evidence to believe that she had jury duty. However, she felt the need to show me direct evidence.

V. Showing vs. Meaning Recall that manifestness is an explicitly epistemic notion, the extent to which, for any given proposition, the interlocutor “is likely to some positive degree to entertain it and accept it as true” (Sperber and Wilson 2015: 134) The fact that I was given additional evidence by this student meant that she thought her verbal utterance was not enough to make manifest that she had jury duty

V. Showing vs. Meaning Testimonial injustice—understood here and a move down the showing vs. meaning continuum—is an instance of a speaker learning that recognition of her intention has not in her experience been sufficient to induce the intended response in the hearer The potential for Fricker’s epistemic injustice theory to be applied to language is made evident by Sperber and Wilson’s framework, as well as by their clear spelling out of manifestness as an explicitly epistemic notion

VI. Returning to Consciousness The account I have presented here has further consequences for how we are to understand what motivates speakers to engage in certain acts It is often presumed that communication is costly for both the speaker and the hearer Many explanations of why we engage in communicative acts attempt to account for this cost.

VI. Returning to Consciousness The key problem for efficient short-term information processing is to achieve an optimal allocation of central processing resources. Resources have to be allocated to the processing of information which it likely to bring about the greatest contribution to the mind’s general cognitive goals at the smallest processing cost…Our claim is that all human beings automatically aim at the most efficient information processing possible. (Sperber & Wilson 1986: 48-49)

VI. Returning to Consciousness Here is an example from animal signaling theory: …the sender derives no personal benefit from communication. She already has noticed the predator. In fact, giving the alarm call may very well expose the sender to more danger than she would otherwise experience. The call may, if noticed, direct the predator’s attention to her. Giving the call may delay slightly…

VI. Returning to Consciousness …her own defensive response to the predator. The receiver has ample motivation to extract information from the signal, but why should the sender take the trouble to put it in? (Skyrms 1996: 94)

VI. Returning to Consciousness A focus on the costliness of expression is not an appropriate focus for communication of affective states That is, for the expression of affective states our default does not seem to be not to communicate. Expression of affective states is difficult to suppress (Argyle 1975: 111-112).

VI. Returning to Consciousness Because of this the explanation for why we produce language that reveals affective states should be understood to be different from language that is costly To put it in Sperber & Wilson’s terms: the revealing of affective states does not seem to follow the Presumption of Relevance.

I. The Problem of Grice & Consciousness • His focus is on non-natural meaning, which is roughly that by some “utterance” x, some person meant something • Those three rings of the bell mean the bus is full • By “He couldn’t get on without his trouble and strife, Smith meant he finds his wife indispensable”

I. The Problem of Grice & Consciousness • With non-natural meaning, there is an intention on the part of the speaker to mean something by an utterance. • However, this first intention alone isn’t enough to pick out what Grice has in mind.

I. The Problem of Grice & Consciousness • I might leave B’s handkerchief near the scene of a murder in order to induce the detective to believe that B was the murderer; but we should not want to say that the handkerchief (or my leaving it there) meantNN anything or that I had meantNN by leaving it that B was the murderer. Clearly we must at least add that, for x to have meantNN anything, not merely must it have been “uttered” with the intention of inducing a certain belief but also the utterer must have intended an “audience” to recognize the intention behind the utterance.

I. The Problem of Grice & Consciousness “In order to mean something by an utterance, the utterer must intend the addressee, 1) to produce a particular response r 2) to think (recognise) that the utterer intends (1) 3) to fulfil (1) on the basis of his fulfilment of (2)” (118)

Herod presents Salome with the head of St. John the Baptist on a charger…

I. The Problem of Grice & Consciousness Here we seem to have cases which satisfy the conditions so far given for meaningNN. For example, Herod intended to make Salome believe that St. John the Baptist was dead and no doubt also intended Salome to recognize that he intended her to believe that St. John the Baptist was dead…Yet I certainly do not think that we should want to say that we have here cases of meaningNN.

I. The Problem of Grice & Consciousness “In order to mean something by an utterance, the utterer must intend the addressee, 1) to produce a particular response r 2) to think (recognise) that the utterer intends (1) 3) to fulfil (1) on the basis of his fulfilment of (2)” (118)

II. Sperber & Wilson’s Proposal Sharing an Impression: Mary and Peter are newly arrived at the seaside. She opens the window overlooking the sea and sniffs appreciatively and ostensively. When Peter follows suit, there is no one particular good thing that comes to his attention: the air smells fresh, fresher than it did in town, it reminds him of their previous holidays, he can smell the sea, seaweed, ozone, fish; all sorts of pleasant things come to mind, and while, because her sniff was appreciative, he is reasonably safe in assuming that she must have intended him to notice at least some of them, he is unlikely to be able to pin down her intentions any further. (1986: 55)

II. Sperber & Wilson’s Proposal Sharing an Impression: If asked what she intended to convey in this case, one of the best answers Mary could give is that she wanted to share an impression with Peter. Thus, at one end of the paraphrasability continuum are cases where the speaker’s meaning is fully determinate, and at the other are those involving the communication of impressions, where the communicator’s meaning cannot be paraphrased without loss. (2015: 122)

II. Sperber & Wilson’s Proposal Manifestness When some content p is shown or meant, this is the sort of thing that makes p more manifest on the Sperber & Wilson picture. Manifestness = epistemic strength + salience (2015: 133) 'Salience' here is what they called 'accessibility' in Relevance (133)

II. Sperber & Wilson’s Proposal Manifestness “A proposition is manifest to an individual at a given time to the extent that he is likely to some positive degree to entertain it and accept it as true” (134). Manifestness is an epistemic notion. “...the notion of mutual manifestness is more realistic, more psychologically relevant, and at least as cogent as the notions of mutual knowledge, common knowledge, or common ground” (135).

II. Sperber & Wilson’s Proposal Manifestness Question: Because manifestness is spelled out in terms of getting a particular proposition across does it only apply to those instance of meaning or showing that have fully determinate content? (Or can a metaphor be made manifest? How can someone “believe or accept it as true” that Juliet is the sun?)

IV. On Showing Let us consider some cases that put pressure on this point. Imagine that there is a man who has a bandaged leg, but despite this bandage, wants to play squash Let's say that his boss plays squash every Saturday and the man has recently acquired a regular invitation, which he takes as an indication that a promotion is imminent

IV. On Showing His boss sees him at work on Friday and checks that they are still on for the following day. Scenario 1: The man has a large bandage that goes over his pants and can plainly be seen, although he attempts to hide it under his desk when the boss approaches. He believes that if he does not play squash his promotion will be in jeopardy and is willing to further damage his leg despite his injury. However, while walking past, the boss sees his bandage under the desk and takes it to mean that he can't play squash.

IV. On Showing Scenario 2: The man has a medium-sized bandage that is only noticed if attention is drawn to it. After the boss asks, the man gestures in a way that draws attention to the bandage. The boss takes him to mean he cannot play squash.

IV. On Showing Scenario 3: The man has a large bandage that can plainly be seen if he wears regular pants. He has decided to wear parachute pants to work all week to conceal the bandage, in addition to hiding his leg under the desk. The boss does not see his bandage and does not take it to mean that he can't play squash.

Coffee Would Keep Me Awake: Sperber & Wilson’s Relevance Theory