Moral Nihilism on War

1. Moral Nihilism on War 2006 Makoto Suzuki

2. Moral Nihilism (AKA Realism) on War • Wasserstrom examines the view that it is not possible to assess war and means of war in moral terms. • This nihilism is specific to war: it is not claimed that it is impossible to assess other matters in moral terms. • There are three ways to interpret this claim. • Descriptive: people do not care about morality in matters relating to war. • Analytic: using moral terms in the context of talking about war is a conceptual error. • Prescriptive: the interest of one’s own side, not morality, should determine matters in respect of war.

3. Descriptive and Analytic Interpretations • The descriptive interpretation of moral nihilism on war - people do not care about morality in matters relating to war – is a claim which empirical scientists can best answer. • And this claim is consistent with moral claims about war, e.g., “Attacking the innocent is wrong”, “Terrorism is permissible only when…” etc. • Thus, Wasserstrom as a philosopher sets it aside. (111-2) • The analytic interpretation – using moral terms in the context of talking about war is a conceptual error – makes it meaningless to say, e.g., “The US’s waging war in Vietnam is morally justified”, “The US’s waging war in Vietnam is morally wrong” etc. • It turns out to be like saying “Triangles’ having three sides is morally justified”, “It is morally wrong to rain” etc. • If the analytic interpretation is true, talking about “morality of war” will not even make sense.

4. A Reason against Analytic Nihilism (115) • Thus far we have seen that analytic nihilists have not presented plausible arguments for their position. • However, this does not show that analytic nihilism is incorrect. • Thus, Wasserstorm provides a reason to reject analytic nihilism. • That is, analytic nihilism eliminate every plausible moral distinction between various wars and means of wars. For example, according to this view, the US in WW2 is not more justifiable than Nazi Germany. • Genocide and massive rape campaign for mere fun are no less justifiable than, e.g., the soldiers’ defending citizens by conventional ways and means.

5. Prescriptive Nihilism (113-5) • The interest of one’s own side, not morality, should determine matters in respect of war. • The Instructor’s Caution: this view presupposes that morality is something more impartial than loyalty to one’s own side. • To many people in the ancient or feudal times, when loyalty to one’s own side is thought to be morality, this view might well sound incoherent. • However, for now we take the above view to be coherent and call it “prescriptive nihilism”. • We will come back to this point later.

6. Practical Implications (114) • According to this practical nihilism, it does not matter how much damage the opponent’s side suffers. In war, you should take into account only the net-benefits of one’s own side. • So if you can maximize the net-benefit of your side by invasion for looting, dropping nuclear bombs, using biochemical weapons, terrorism, genocide, massive rape campaign, torture, abusing the prisoners of wars, killing the innocent, treachery (like disguising soldiers to look like the Red Cross) etc., you should do so. • Pragmatic nihilists might try to ease the concern by claiming that using these means is always self-destructive in the long-term. This is an empirical claim to be examined.

7. Alleged Reasons for Prescriptive Nihilism • Wasserstrom examines only one alleged reason for prescriptive nihilism. That is: • The officials and soldiers (and to a lesser degree, citizens) of countries have the special obligations to attend to the interests of their countries, which are imposed by virtue of the position or role they fill. (114) • There are two other frequently alleged reasons. • If you are too moral in respect to war, you will be exploited by others more ruthless. Nice guys finish last. • A moralized and moralizing state and its inhabitants will offend other communities, which sport different values.

8. Wasserstrom’s Criticism of the First • What is his criticism of the argument for prescriptive nihilism that the officials and soldiers (and to a lesser degree, citizens) of countries have the special obligations to attend to the interests of their countries? • The conclusion (prescriptive nihilism) does not follow from the premise unless the special obligations always override every other obligation they have.

9. Wasserstrom’s Criticism • The officials, soldiers and citizens have the obligations that everyone has to one another. • And it does not seem that these obligations are always overridden by the special obligations imposed by their role and position. • An analogy to lawyers’ situation: • Lawyers have the special obligations to attend to the clients’ interests. However, they have other obligations that everyone has to one another – don’t lie, deceive, bribe, destroy unfavorable evidence, use threat, eliminate witnesses, and so on. The obligations usually override the special obligations. It seems that in the same way, the officials and soldiers (and citizens) have the obligations that everyone has to one another, and these obligations often override the special obligations to attend to the interests of their own countries.

10. A possible reply for prescriptive nihilism (114-5) • There is no obligation everyone has to everyone; people, for example lawyers and officials, have obligations not to lie etc. towards their co-nationals, but not towards aliens. • This is perhaps the view that many people in the ancient or feudal time hold. • Is this view plausible? • It seems that the exclusive concern with one’s own side or co-nationals is morally arbitrary; morality seems to be impartial to that extent.

11. The Examination of the 2nd Alleged Reason for Prescriptive Nihilism • If you are too moral in respect to war, you will be exploited by others more ruthless. Nice guys finish last. • Is this true? • Whether this is correct partly depends on what moral restrictions on war are. • Breaking moral restrictions on war might be more costlier, given that it can invite the retaliation and escalation of warfare. • Suppose it is true. Does this successfully support prescriptive nihilism? • If you are not sympathetic to egoism or self-serving rationalization, you will hesitate to say “yes”. • Further, if this line of reasoning is allowed to work as justification for everyone’s ignoring moral assessment, then the result might well be bad for everyone in the long term. (Consider overfishing, traffic jam, overpopulation in the third world, etc.)

12. The Examination of the 3rd Alleged Reason for Prescriptive Nihilism • A moralized and moralizing state and its inhabitants will offend other communities, which sport different values. • This premise, even if true, actually fails to support prescriptive nihilism. Why? • Because the premise presupposes a moral requirement, something like the obligation not to offend others (with self-righteousness), or the obligation of tolerance. It presupposes that we should care about a certain moral principle.