The Delicate Balance of Terror: Nuclear Deterrence and MAD

1. The Delicate Balance of Terror: Nuclear Deterrence and MAD PO 326: American Foreign Policy

2. The Kennedy Approach: “Flexible Response” • Upon election, JFK sought to carry on the policy of containment • Like Ike, JFK believed that the best means by which to counter the spread of communism was to meet it on all fronts with the threat of armed force • Unlike Ike, JFK thought that a “full range of American instrumentalities” was necessary to accomplish this task, instead of just the economically-minded reliance on the threat of “massive retaliation” • The resulting doctrine, “flexible response,” sought to use whatever means was necessary to counter communism given particular situations

3. The Kennedy Approach: “Flexible Response” • The “flexible response” doctrine involved: • The perception (misperception?) of the USSR and the PRC as a monolithic threat • Aggressively countering the growth of Soviet missile strength (“missile gap” – myth?) • A focus on using aid and the threat of limited war to counter the spread of communism on the “periphery” • A focus on using aid and military backing for “nation-building” on the periphery, in order to establish pro-American governments there (“Alliance for Progress”) • Establishment of strong state institutions • Liberal and Wilsonian overtones, but not necessarily predicated upon the institution of democracy – pro-Americanism superseded this

4. The Kennedy Approach: “Flexible Response” • “Flexible Response” therefore necessitated a massive buildup of both nuclear and conventional forces, resulting in a massive increase in defense budget from Ike’s tenure • Guns vs. Butter tradeoff – diminished funds available for social programs important to Democrats • “Internal wrangle” for funds amongst various services (parochialism)

5. The Nuclear End of “Flexible Response” • We focus today on the role of nuclear threats in the “flexible response” doctrine, leaving consideration of activity on the periphery for later

6. The Nuclear End of “Flexible Response” • The Second Berlin Crisis, 1961 • At Vienna, Khrushchev threatened to end the German question by signing treaty with East Germany, establishing Berlin as “free city” under GDR control • US disapproves, draws up refutation – as State is slow in doing this, JFK makes public statement vowing defense, alerts military, calls up reserves, inaugurates national fallout shelter program (nuclear fears) • As East Germans leave Berlin in wake of crisis, USSR builds Wall (August 12) • By October, US and Soviet tanks had taken up positions 75 yards from one another; US troops apparently threatened to destroy the wall • Crisis ends when Khrushchev vows not to sign treaty with GDR • Cuban Missile Crisis

7. The Nuclear Question: First Strike and Soviet Parity • Recall that nuclear deterrence during the Eisenhower years was predicated in part on the credible first use of nukes by a weapons-superior US • This results in a distinct advantage in terms of diplomacy based on nuclear threat • By the early-to-mid 1960s, however, Truman’s fears had seemingly come true – the USSR was alleged to be approaching nuclear parity with US, and was becoming increasingly capable of delivering nukes from USSR • Makes first use doctrine incredible, thereby eliminating American advantage • Supposed Soviet parity, combined with massive absolute numbers of nukes possessed by both sides, sets the stage for a new, complex form of diplomacy based on nuclear threat

8. The Concept of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) • Enough nuclear weapons are built between the superpowers so that neither side can prevent the other from utterly destroying it • MAD is predicated upon a secure second strike capability (i.e., each state being able to absorb a nuclear first strike and still having enough weapons left over to destroy the enemy)

9. The Concept of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) • In an important sense, MAD diminishes the prospect of nuclear use • Recall that the US (especially in Ike’s doctrine of massive retaliation) sought to use the threat of first nuclear use to deter aggression • The credibility of this deterrent is largely based on one state’s monopoly on the ability to totally destroy others with nuclear weapons • When a key adversary develops a similar capability, however, the credibility of a first use threat is largely eliminated because of the costs resulting from retaliation in kind

10. The Concept of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) • HOWEVER – even when mutual destruction is assured, there exist incentives for leaders to manipulate the threat of MAD to gain benefits vis-à-vis an adversary • Leaders reason that their counterparts realize the folly of engaging in nuclear brinkmanship; they may use this “weakness” (their forbearance) to attempt to extract concessions from or embarrass them • When a leader seeks to do this, he is placing the welfare of both societies in his faith that his adversary will back down because of the immense costs of general nuclear war

11. The Concept of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) • Manipulating the threat of MAD (cont’d) • Such an attitude willingly places both leaders on a “slippery slope” toward annihilation • Game theorists (most notably, Thomas Schelling) have claimed that the logic underlying the game of “chicken” (a la James Dean in Rebel Without a Cause) is a reasonable representation of how the manipulation of the threat of MAD plays out

12. The Basic “Chicken” Game PLAYER 2 PLAYER 1

13. Nuclear Brinkmanship as a Game of “Chicken” – Rules for our Game • Two teams (“countries”); selected by nature – both possess second-strike capability • Assume existence of some basic, serious conflict of interest • Four iterations of the game • One team assigned a leader from their rank for the duration; the other team allowed to elect their leader and hold another election after the second iteration (all extra credit tied to leaders’ decisions) • First two iterations with no communication; next two with communication • Game score is cumulative, but game ends when general nuclear war occurs

14. Nuclear Brinkmanship as a Game of “Chicken” PLAYER 2 PLAYER 1