LBNL Office of Independent Oversight Preparations – Red Team Review

1. LBNL Office of Independent Oversight Preparations – Red Team Review

2. Overview • Cross-Cutting • Things to keep doing • Observations and things to focus on in the next 46 days • HSS Planning visit is in 26 days • HSS Field visit is in 46 days • Program or Division Specific • Things to keep doing • Things to focus on in the next 46 days

3. HSS review Tips • Identify known weaknesses and corrective actions and present at in brief • Do an in-brief for HSS team • Present issues identified by your feedback mechanisms • Present accomplishments and planned corrective actions • Should encompass BSOs feedback to lab…and beyond

4. Cross-Cutting Observations • Inconsistent articulation by personnel of role of JHA as basis for work authorization and personal safety • Evidence of hazardous waste staging areas for SAAs • Inconsistent understanding and implementation of PPE policy, postings and practices • Inconsistent implementation of safety requirements for guests/students (i.e., equivalency, time on-site under supervision) • The expectations for OJT in the work authorization process are not institutionalized

5. Recommendations • Minimize new requirements or initiatives – between now and review • Mentor personnel on clearly articulating role of JHA role in work authorization • Implement SAA compliance self-review (labels, start dates, in-process management) • Implement PPE as posted • Close overdue high/mod risk action items

6. Material Sciences Division - Doug Observations • “Certified User List” for specialized equipment • Example of localized safety improvements – relocation of workstations outside laser areas • Consistent understanding of stop work authorization • Division distribution of lessons learned cited as positive aspect • Inconsistent understanding of JHA as work authorization • Inconsistent understanding of new PPE policy • Use of “Radiation Control Area” sign as laser block • Inadequate labeling of hazardous waste – flammable waste cans

7. Material Sciences Division Recommendations • Communicate latest PPE policy requirements and expectations – consistency with area signage • Conduct Satellite Accumulation Area (SAA) compliance walk-throughs • Reinforce role of JHAs, AHDs, certified user lists as authorization basis • Reinforce methods to readily obtain MSDS for chemicals – LBNL internet search services

8. Environmental Energy Technologies Division - Doug Observations • Individual ownership of JHA evident – removal of inappropriate hazards in process • Co-location of lab activities controlled by clear area ownership • Exposed contacts between power source and glovebox – verify <50 volt limitation of electrical hazard • Co-location of laboratory/office introduces PPE/food concerns • CO alarms internal to room – buddy system requirement only emergency response mechanism • Effective retrieval of MSDS not demonstrated

9. Environmental Energy Technologies Division Observations (cont.) • SAA container nearing 9-month storage limitation, management of wastes being analyzed/sampled • Access limitations prohibit review of JHAs for other division personnel

10. Environmental Energy Technologies Division Recommendations • Communicate latest PPE policy requirements and expectations – consistency with area signage • Evaluate oxygen deficiency hazards and controls in combustion lab • Conduct SAA compliance walk-throughs • Reinforce methods to readily obtain MSDS for chemicals – LBNL internet search services • Verify understanding of <50-volt limitation of electric hazard • Ensure JHAs appropriately cover all area hazards (hot surfaces) and can be viewed for visiting personnel

11. Hazardous Waste Management - Doug Program Review and assessment of HW facility Observations • Individual understanding of JHA content demonstrated • Program requirements documented in PUB-3000 and other procedures • Clear understanding of stop work requirements (refuse pick up) and authority to request exposure assessment • Requests to collect excess items overwhelming group • Inconsistent understanding of new PPE policy • HW group personnel not directly involved in HW determinations for new processes

12. Hazardous Waste Management Recommendations • Communicate latest PPE policy requirements and expectations – consistency with area signage • Prioritize pick-up and processing of hazwaste based on accumulation start date • Long-term: Consider expanding role of generator assistants to include evaluation of new processes for HW generation/ characterization

13. Chemical Management - Doug Program Review Observations • Program requirements documented in PUB-3000 and other procedures • Housekeeping in lab spaces generally good • Line ownership of Chemical Tracking System (CTS) • Initiation of CTS assessments • Continued improvement of JHA questionnaire • Inconsistent line understanding of new PPE policy • Inconsistent line understanding of MSDS availability

14. Chemical Management Recommendations • Communicate latest PPE policy requirements and expectations – consistency with area signage • Communicate availability of MSDS using search engines subscribed to by LBNL • Review/update chemical life cycle presentation for appropriate use during upcoming audit

15. Engineering - Arnold____________________________________________ Keep Doing Good work planning and authorization execution Appropriate use of PPE (noted without exception) Frequent line management field presence Good integration across adjacent work areas Effective coordination between Work Groups and EH&S teams Appropriate control and communication with temporary work groups (e.g. contractors, facilities) performing tasks in Engineering Focus on Ensure all signage is accurate and current Ensure separation of work and food/drink areas by removing vending machines from work area (noted in one location).

16. Physics - Arnold____________________________________________ Keep Doing Good understanding and practical application of ISM Clean and well controlled work areas; access controlled Frequent line management field presence Focus on Improve work lead’s understanding of requirements and responsibilities for required tests and inspections of the hazardous gas systems Improve positive control of gas cabinets by using existing locks on the cabinet doors and removing the keys Review emergency actions and procedures with area occupants Ensure control of vendors consistent with new expectations

17. Life Sciences - Bob Observations • Clear access control requirements • Very engaged and supportive Work Leads and Division Safety Coordinators (DSC) • Housekeeping very good • Scientific staff understand Stop Work authorities • Most scientific staff understand line management authorities (Work Leads are “go to persons”) • Scientific staff can generally describe JHA and training processes (in some instances, some degree of prompting required) • PPE policy is changing (Lab coats not required if not working in laboratory spaces)

18. Life Sciences Observations (con’t) • Role of OJT essentially a pre-condition (requirement) to begin work; relationship to work authorization process could be clearer • Use of SOPs a key hazard control mechanism; relationship to JHA process could be clearer Recommendations • Clarify what elements are needed for line management to authorize work (JHA, BUA, RWA, SOPs, OJT) • Provide coaching on overall work authorization process (JHA, BUA, OJT, RWA)

19. Chemical Sciences - Bob Observations • Excellent access control process • Clear and unambiguous PPE policy • Good understanding and demonstration of line management responsibility, JHA process • Good understanding of overall work authorization process (including roles and responsibilities) as it applies to actinide chemistry R&D • Stop Work authorities and responsibilities well understood • Formal work authorization and access control process for non-Division personnel who work in laboratory areas

20. Chemical Sciences Observations (con’t) • Clear and formal process for maintenance personnel who require access to laboratory areas • Housekeeping very good Recommendations • Clarify role and importance of OJT in work authorization process for students • Improve precision of responses to questions regarding work authorization • Establish process for examining “Near Misses” in collective fashion (including understanding the “why” and the “what”)

21. ALS - Arnold ____________________________________________ Keep Doing Beam line scientists demonstrated good understanding and application of work authorization process. Appropriate control of User activity at beam line stations Thorough analysis of hazards associated with test specimens Positive access controls for Users. Personnel in beam line stations have good awareness of hazards in adjacent areas. Frequent line management/authorizing individual presence in the beam-line experimental area. Focus on: Better segregation of work and areas where food/drink is allowed. Implement LBL PPE policy in uniform and consistent manner. Consider control room access controls.

22. Construction - Gus • Keep doing • Flow Down of DOE Safety Requirements • Apply Best Practices from other Labs • Priority on Improving Safety on Small Projects

23. Focus on: Sharing best practices across Lab Visitor Orientation Material Movement Daily Planning Meetings JHA At Transition to Commissioning & Operations Increase oversight of small projects to ensure LBNL expectations for work planning, authorization and safety requirements are implemented Construction

24. Maintenance - Gus • Keep Doing • Use of Task Change Request for review and approval of work when the task has changed • Open dialog between workers and supervisors • Effective exchange of information including safety at Shift Change Meetings • Focus On • Organize the recently occupied Preventive Maintenance Administrative Area • Remove legacy signs and posters • Remove excess supplies and materials • Ensure good housekeeping

25. Earth Sciences - Glenn Observations • Good understanding and use of JHA as work authorization process – but line responsibility needs to be clearly articulated • “Guests” treated essentially same as employees • New PPE policy appears to be implemented • PPE and food issues associated with offices connected to lab spaces • Excess equipment needs to be moved in one space reviewed – otherwise housekeeping good • Hand built electrical devices need to be certified as safe – need compensatory measures during interim • Waste management practices during clean out need improvement – no “pre-staging”

26. Earth Sciences Recommendations • Management needs to clarify that JHA is line management means of authorizing work and that other authorizations are also necessary in specific instances before work can begin • Review other areas where clean-out of hazardous materials is occurring for pre-staging of materials • Evaluate need for compensatory measures for hand-built electrical instruments

27. Radiation Protection – Pit Storage - Glenn Observations • Very clear on JHAs as authorization of work • Good processes and systems appear to be in place to control radioactive materials • Clear authorization necessary before radioactive material is transferred

28. Accelerator and Fusion Research Division (AFRD) - Kyle Observations • Excellent understanding and use of JHAs • Coordination across organizations • Linkage with Activity Hazard Documents – especially regarding training • Applied to students and guests as well • “Pre-job briefings” held for infrequently performed tasks • Supervision in workplace on frequent basis • Clear understanding of stop work authority and responsibility • Demarcation of areas that may require PPE is confusing and practices are not always consistent with postings

29. AFRD Recommendations • Clarification of PPE requirements and practice what is posted • Consider some documentation of pre-job briefings when held

30. Physical Biosciences (PBD) - Kyle (Donner) - Observations • Very good understanding and articulation of personal safety constructs by some personnel • Clear focus on JHA as basis for work authorization and personal safety requirements not evident • Some students not familiar/comfortable with all individual safety basis concepts • Lack of clarity in applying LBNL safety requirements to visiting students

31. Physical Biosciences (PBD) (Donner) – Recommendations • Emphasize importance of JHA as basis for personal safety and work authorization • Formalize basis for ensuring & documenting visitor/guest/student safety • Ensure all laboratory personnel are familiar with and can articulate basic safety concepts (personal safety, work authorization, actions to be taken when unexpected conditions or changes are encountered)

32. 88-inch Cyclotron (NSD) - Kyle Observations • Formal basis for coordinating JHAs with other divisions • Operations and safety basis governed by accelerator order and SAD • Key-controlled access to injector and vault areas • Use of JHA as basis for work authorization and personal safety requirements not strong • Evidence of formality in operations (e.g., configuration control, work planning) as illuminated in review not readily demonstrated • Ambiguity in radiation area/contamination postings

33. 88-inch Cyclotron (NSD) Recommendations • Emphasize to staff operational, work planning and configuration controls in authorization basis documents (SAD, ASE) • Ensure postings are clear: • Radiation areas during various operational modes • Radiation postings vs. monitoring locations • Eye protection requirements • Ensure work is appropriately proceduralized given risks and relation to authorization basis

34. Red Team Members • Craig Ferguson, SLAC • 650.926.3106 • Arnold Clobes, LLNL/NIF • 925.455.4027 • 925.980.7408 (cell) • August Kugler, UC (retired) • 509.783.2604 • 925.818.5885 (cell) • Bob McCallum, McCallum-Turner • Kyle Turner, McCallum-Turner • Glenn Hoenes, McCallum-Turner • Doug Schlagel , McCallum-Turner