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AMS-02 Safety Summary

AMS-02 Safety Summary. AMS-02 Safety. Topics to be Discussed Payload Safety Review Panel Meeting History Summary Safety Analysis/Hazard Report Since Phase I Significant Changes Since Phase I Action Item Status Operational Controls Hazard Report/Pre-Review Discussion Results. AMS-02 Safety.

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AMS-02 Safety Summary

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  1. AMS-02 Safety Summary AMS-02 Phase II Flight Safety Review - May 21-25 2007

  2. AMS-02 Safety • Topics to be Discussed • Payload Safety Review Panel Meeting History Summary • Safety Analysis/Hazard Report Since Phase I • Significant Changes Since Phase I • Action Item Status • Operational Controls • Hazard Report/Pre-Review Discussion Results AMS-02 Phase II Flight Safety Review - May 21-25 2007

  3. AMS-02 Safety • Meeting History AMS-02 Phase II Flight Safety Review - May 21-25 2007

  4. AMS-02 Phase 0/I • 11 Unique Hazard Reports Reviewed • 1 Standardized Form 1230 Hazard Report Reviewed • All Approved at Phase I • 3 Action items assigned AMS-02 Phase II Flight Safety Review - May 21-25 2007

  5. AMS-02 Phase 0/I • Action Items Assigned: AMS-02 Phase II Flight Safety Review - May 21-25 2007

  6. Vacuum Jacket SDM • Topics Discussed: • Overpressurization of the Payload Bay During Ascent • Caused by Loss of Vacuum • Originally Total Loss of Vacuum (Instant) Was Assumed • Deemed Unrealistic – Credible Maximum Leak Sized Established • Action Item 3 from Phase 0/I Closed by S. Loyd AMS-02 Phase II Flight Safety Review - May 21-25 2007

  7. Gauss Limit SDM • Topics Discussed: • Acceptable Hole Size for Vacuum Loss Analysis • Agreement to: • Qualification and Acceptance Testing of AMS-02 Structural Test and Flight Units • Independent testing of Flight O-Rings of Vacuum Case • Monitoring of Vacuum Case Leading up to T-9 minutes. • Gauss Limits of EMU • Changing EMU limits to 300 Gauss AMS-02 Phase II Flight Safety Review - May 21-25 2007

  8. AMS-02 TIM • Topics Discussed: • Burst Disks • Certification as Equivalent of Single Fault Tolerant • Reverse Acting Circumferentially-Scored with Cutting Teeth Burst Disks • Venting due to Burst Disk Operation Causing Overpressurization of Payload Bay • Three Burst Disks Used in Series AMS-02 Phase II Flight Safety Review - May 21-25 2007

  9. Significant Changes In AMS-02 • Major Hardware No Longer Part of AMS-02 • Synchrotron Radiation Detector (SRD) • AMS-02 Crew Operations Post (ACOP) • ACOP Was Only ISS Interior Element of AMS-02 • Natural Design Evolution Presented in SDP/Presentations • Series/Reflown Hardware • No Elements or Systems of AMS-02 Are Considered Series or Reflown As They Were At Phase 0/I • All of AMS-02 Considered in the Unique Configuration and Environments of this Mission in Hazard Reports • Facilitates Integrated Safety Control and Verification Efforts AMS-02 Phase II Flight Safety Review - May 21-25 2007

  10. Significant Changes In AMS-02 • Zenith Radiators and Cryocooler Loop Heat Pipes added to design. • Lower Radiator Panels Removed (Still Visible in Some Graphics) • Folding ROEU Support Bracket Incorporated in the Design • Addition of Star Trackers and GPS Receiver • AMS-02 Tilted 12° for Clearance and Viewing • Weight Has Increased AMS-02 Phase II Flight Safety Review - May 21-25 2007

  11. Safety Analysis • After Phase I AMS-02 Project Revisited the Safety Analysis to Prepare the Phase II SDP • Three Year Effort to SDP Submittal • New System and Subsystem Level Safety Analyses Performed and Documented in SDP • Energy Analysis • Historical Comparative Analysis • Maintenance Safety Analysis AMS-02 Phase II Flight Safety Review - May 21-25 2007

  12. Hazard Reports • Hazard Report Generation • Phase I Hazard Reports (HRs) Served as Foundation for Phase II HRs • Reorganization and Additional HRs Required. • NEW Designators Assigned to HRs • Use Of Flight “F” Designator And A Two Digit Number To Differentiate Between Phase I And Phase II HRs AMS-02 Phase II Flight Safety Review - May 21-25 2007

  13. Hazard Reports • Custom Hazard Report Form • Compliant with NSTS/ISS 13830 • Grouping of Controls and Safety Verification Methods Together • New Control, Cause and Safety Verification Methods Numbering System • aa.bb.cc • aa – Cause Reference • bb – Control Reference • cc – Safety Verification Method and Status Reference AMS-02 Phase II Flight Safety Review - May 21-25 2007

  14. Hazard Reports AMS-02 Phase II Flight Safety Review - May 21-25 2007

  15. Hazard Reports Phase II • Two Standard Hazard Reports Used • Exterior Elements of the AMS-02(Shuttle Payload Bay, ISS Exterior Environment) • Interior Elements of AMS-02 (Present in Shuttle Habitable Environment) • 20 Unique Hazard Reports • 1 Withdrawn as Non-Hazardous Condition • Due to New Safety Analysis and Rewrite, Phase II SDP is Effectively Entirely New Package Compared to Phase I (Re Agreement 3.2 Phase I Safety Review) AMS-02 Phase II Flight Safety Review - May 21-25 2007

  16. Operational Hazard Controls • New Hazard Report Format Provides for Ready Identification of Operational Hazard Controls. • Last Column Indicates Operational Control Present and Vehicle Association • S – Shuttle, I – ISS, G – Ground AMS-02 Phase II Flight Safety Review - May 21-25 2007

  17. Operational Hazard Controls AMS-02 Phase II Flight Safety Review - May 21-25 2007

  18. Operational Hazard Controls AMS-02 Phase II Flight Safety Review - May 21-25 2007

  19. Operational Hazard Controls AMS-02 Phase II Flight Safety Review - May 21-25 2007

  20. Operational Hazard Controls AMS-02 Phase II Flight Safety Review - May 21-25 2007

  21. Operational Hazard Controls The following controls have been established subsequent to AMS-02 Phase II SDP submittal. AMS-02 Phase II Flight Safety Review - May 21-25 2007

  22. Launch Commit Criteria • One Safety Related LCC • During pre-launch activities, the status of the superfluid helium tank will be monitored for signs of loss of thermal isolation (vacuum case breach/leak). In the event that there is an increase in pressure indicating the loss of thermal isolation, launch will be scrubbed. Monitoring will continue at a minimum to within L-9 minutes. Credible loss of thermal isolation at L-9 minutes can not manifest to an over-pressurization of the Orbiter payload bay hazard in the time available. AMS-02 Phase II Flight Safety Review - May 21-25 2007

  23. Flight Rules • Flight Rules in Hazard Reports AMS-02 Phase II Flight Safety Review - May 21-25 2007

  24. Pre-Review Activity • In response to comments, working group discussions and new data on AMS-02 System, Hazard Reports have been updated • Six (6) were unchanged since submittal March 19th with safety data package. • Fifteen (15) were changes as a result of necessary modifications. AMS-02 Phase II Flight Safety Review - May 21-25 2007

  25. Unmodified Hazards • AMS-02-F02, “Toxic Material Offgassing “ • AMS-02-F10, “Flammable Materials in the Payload Bay” • AMS-02-F15, “Thermal Extremes from Cryogenics” • AMS-02-F18, “Rapid Safing/Payload Reconfiguration” • AMS-02-F20, “Crew Exposure to Coherent Light • STD-AMS-02-F02, Standard Hazard Report, Orbiter Interior Elements AMS-02 Phase II Flight Safety Review - May 21-25 2007

  26. Modified Hazard Reports • AMS-02-F01, “Structural Failure of Hardware” • SVM/STATUS Updates • Editorial Clarification on Definition of Structural Fasteners in Control and SVM • Updated Attached Tables for Main and Tracker Radiators AMS-02 Phase II Flight Safety Review - May 21-25 2007

  27. Modified Hazard Reports • AMS-02-F03, “Rupture of Superfluid Helium Tank, Vacuum Case and/or Cryosystem Pressurized System Element” • Added Description of BD18 to Note and Tables. • Editorial – Added Acronyms to List • Updated Cryosystem Pressure System Tables • Updated Cryosystem Schematic for Warm Helium System Update. • Updated References in Pressure Tables AMS-02 Phase II Flight Safety Review - May 21-25 2007

  28. Modified Hazard Reports • AMS-02-F04, “Overpressurization of Orbiter Payload Bay ” • Deleted Oscillating Heat Pipe from Hazard Report • Editorial fixes • Added clarification to powered status during ascent • Updated Schematics with Latest Revisions (Warm Helium Update) AMS-02 Phase II Flight Safety Review - May 21-25 2007

  29. Modified Hazard Report • AMS-02-F05, “Rupture of AMS-02 Pressurized Systems …” • Revised Warm Helium System MDP • Removal of High Pressure Burst Disk • Removal of Oscillating Heat Pipe • Updated TTCS Accumulator Heat Pipe MDP • Corrected description in control of heater control for TRD tank heaters. • Editorial Changes • Updated Pressure Tables to reflect new and corrected values. • Updated Schematics AMS-02 Phase II Flight Safety Review - May 21-25 2007

  30. Modified Hazard Report • AMS-02-F06, “Excessive Thrust/Overturning Moments” • Corrected electrical bus references in control • Updated Schematics • AMS-02-F07, “Excessive Field Strengths: EMI, Magnetic (DC Field)” • Editorial Corrections, change wording to remove “radiated” from magnetic descriptions. • Clarified SSRMS Power Bus Reference • Clarified to have UMA separated for SSRMS Grapple AMS-02 Phase II Flight Safety Review - May 21-25 2007

  31. Modified Hazard Report • AMS-02-F08, “Electric Shock/Discharge” • Added Bonding/Grounding Diagrams for PDS and CAB • AMS-02-F09, “Exposure of the Crew to Excessive Ionizing Radiation” • Closed SVM 1.1.1 • Clarified JSC Form 44 will have to be resubmitted, opened SVM Status, added note • Added Description of composite straw/tube within calibration tube isolating Fe55 further • Clarified graphic error in JSC Form 44 • Added/Updated graphics AMS-02 Phase II Flight Safety Review - May 21-25 2007

  32. Modified Hazard Report • AMS-02-F11, “Mechanism Failure” • Editorial Change • Clarified Open Status of SVM 5.4.3, 5.4.4 • AMS-02-F12, “Mate/Demate of Connectors” • Change, SSRMS will demate prior to UMA being connected. Update Control and added SVM. AMS-02 Phase II Flight Safety Review - May 21-25 2007

  33. Modified Hazard Report • AMS-02-F13, “Battery Failure (Leakage/Rupture)” • SVM Status with “Closed” Status and TBD Document Reference was changed to “Open” • AMS-02-F14, “EVA/EVR Hazards” • Editorial Clarifications • Added ISS Flight Rule to require AMS-02 to have magnetic field removed prior to EVA to AMS-02. AMS-02 Phase II Flight Safety Review - May 21-25 2007

  34. Modified Hazard Report • AMS-02-F16, “Shatterable Material Release” • Added Control to State there are no glass materials in proximity to EVA translation paths that may be impacted by EVA tools. • AMS-02-F17, “Electrical Power Distribution Damage” • Added Control to preclude interconnecting different RPCM Buses, UMA to SSRMS AMS-02 Phase II Flight Safety Review - May 21-25 2007

  35. Modified Hazard Report • STD-AMS-02-F01, Standard Hazard Report, Exterior Elements • Editorial Changes • Ignition Source Table Updated • Cryosystem Vacuum Pump speed and mass updated in table AMS-02 Phase II Flight Safety Review - May 21-25 2007

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