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Database Integrity The issue for making RNAV a real success

Database Integrity The issue for making RNAV a real success. Capt. Jürgen Schadt Chief Technical Pilot Capt. A-320 Lufthansa German Airlines Chief Technical Pilot Office, FRA OY. Motivation. GPS/FMS equipment with accuracies better then 0,3 nm is standard today

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Database Integrity The issue for making RNAV a real success

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  1. Database IntegrityThe issue for making RNAV a real success Capt. Jürgen SchadtChief Technical Pilot Capt. A-320 Lufthansa German Airlines Chief Technical Pilot Office, FRA OY

  2. Motivation • GPS/FMS equipment with accuracies better then0,3 nm is standard today • GPS/FMS-RNAV SIDs and STARs have positive impact in TMA-Ops in all aspects • GPS-NPAs are the primary NPA-procedures over outdated (offset) NDB/VOR approaches • Conventional Procedures are flown on regular basis with use of FMS/GPS („managed modes - VNAV“)

  3. Motivation • GPS is the system for ermerging airports with "problematic" infrastructure---> CIS: see Samara - UWWW AFI: see Addis Abbeba • Operators experience every AIRAC - Cycle Nav-database problems

  4. Motivation The primary motivation for any "Database controlled approach" is - enhanced flight safety - economic benefits - positive environmental impact

  5. Definition: Database Integrity Database Integrity describes the probability for source data to be stored "correct" inside the FMC ---> afterit ran through the process of final database- generation.

  6. 1. Plausibility checks Process owner: Database supplier 2. internal Integrity checks Process owner: Database supplier Feedback loop to Database supplier „Reports“ 3. Integrity checks during "packing" Process owner: FMC - Manufacturer 4. "Fly the database" Process owner: Airline Medium: Pilot report Database quality management Future Goal Zero Reports X

  7. Problems of Database Integrity RTCA DO-200A "The end-user is responsible for the integrity of the data" • Navigational data are generated today and in short to medium future by unsecure/uncertified processes • no "usable" standards exists for generation of databases with guranteed integrity---> RTCA DO-200A cannot be implemented today (even if JAA TGL-9 is regulating implementation) Section 1.4 - Application of Standard

  8. Problems of Database Integrity • there will be no fully implementable procedures for database integrity available for the next years by any non airline organisation. • Even a mandate will not change the situation due to non complianceNegative example: Implementation of WGS-84

  9. Problems of Database Integrity • there will be no fully implementable procedures for the implementation of GPS/FMS-RNAV procedures (or conventional procedures used with RNAV - equipment), which depend on the availabilty of procedures to ensure database integrity ---> the use of RNAV - equipment is the business case of the future

  10. Database process plus DbIT™ Database generation 1. AIP 2.Databse supplier 3. Database packer 3. User ---> Airline "UNSECURE" PROCESS Databaseintegrity check DbIT™non RTCA-178 SoftwareNEW "UNSECURE" PROCESS TogetherSecure Process

  11. Database Integrity for Operators To ensure a high level of database integrity ---> GPS - NPA, GPS/FMS-RNAV - (+ Overlay -) procedures.---> 5 level integrity concept ("multilayered system") 1. Training for all pilots Tool: simulator, aircraft, training handouts Time: permanent ---> all fleets 2. Check of NavDatabase prior effectivity to detect changes of “Ops - critical" data incl. an immediate reaction scheme Tool: DbIT™ (Database Integrity Tool) ---> inservice 08/2000 Time: 2 - 5 days priordatabase effectivity

  12. Database Integrity for Operators 3. Check of "critical" data prior starting the procedure (e.g. GPS-approach) by the flightcrew Tool: charts, crew operating procedures Time: 10 - 15 minutes prior starting approach 4. Plausibilty check during approach Tool: charts, crew ops. procs., training Time: during approach 5. Administrative seperation of database integrity- checks and data handling ---> Flightops Tool: internal organisation Time: permanent ---> all fleets

  13. JAA TGL - 3 ---> GPS Procs. "Notification of certification and operations of GPS - receivers" ---> primary certification document for LBA I.6.2 Use of GPS for NPABullets (a) to (g) describe the requirements for GPS-NPA Database integrity ---> (h):"The approach procedures has to be used as stored inside the navdatabase. The database must contain the offical published procedure"

  14. JAA TGL - 10 ---> PRNAV 10.6. Database Integrity10.6.1: Database has to be obtained by RTCA DO-200A certified database supplier 10.6.2: If supplier not certified additional checks have to be carried out through software or approved manual means (for all procedures below MOCA) by the operator 10.6.4: Operators should consider additional checks even if database is obtained by certified supplier ---> JAR Ops 1.035 Quality System 10.6.5: See Annex B for specification of database integrity software

  15. RNAV(GPS)* - Procedures Speciman * also to be used in general with conventional procedures flown database controlled

  16. Implementing Database Integrity 1. Flight Crew Procedures ---> Databaserequirement according TGL-3, I.6.2 (h) 2. Additional Integritychecks ---> Softwaretool ---> Databasesintegritysoftware: DbIT™ TGL-10, Section 10.6.2 ... the operator must implement navigation database integrity checks using appropriate software tools or approved manual procedures to verify data relating to waypoints below the applicable minimum obstacle clearance altitude...

  17. DbIT™- (Database Integrity Tool) Goal Ensure database integrity in regard of “Ops critical" data prior database effectivity (applicable to RNAV andnon RNAV procedures) WayImplementation and maintenance of a reference- database, which will be run by flightops. All changes in comparison to the referencedatabase will rated as "critical" or "non critical". "Philosophy" Detected data changes of critical data will lead to immediate disauthorization of the applicable procedures. Parallel the database supplier will be informed and required to present a solution.

  18. DbIT™- Main Screen www.database-integrity.com

  19. DbIT™- Input Database Input Database Screenshot Lufthansa Proprietary Website: www.database-integrity.com

  20. DbIT™- Reference Database Input Database Screenshot Lufthansa Proprietary Website: www.database-integrity.com

  21. DbIT™- Edit Ref Waypoint Input Database Screenshot Lufthansa Proprietary Website: www.database-integrity.com

  22. DbIT™- Critical Data Report Critical Data Report ---> CDR

  23. Sum up ---> DbIT™ • automated check of any database against a reference database ---> database quality index • reference database contains "flight critical" data • check of RNAV and non RNAV procedures possible • automated generation of "Critical Data Report" • action scheme in terms of checklist augments DbIT™ • full encrypted log file for reference data control DbIT™ is available for any operator

  24. Conclusion - Operators are forced to act due to the increasing number of published RNAV + Overlay Procedures and insufficient database integrity processes - Operators even have to apply higher standards in respect of less experience with RNAV procedures and database integrity issues - Training in all respects for all involved personel is vital for the success of RNAV - One incident or accident stops the whole „RNAV Movement“

  25. Point of contact Lufthansa German Airlines Jürgen SchadtChief Technical Pilot, Capt. A-320 Chief Technical Pilot Office, FRA OY Lufthansa German Airlines Phone: +49-69-696-2360 Fax: +49-69-696-7070 E-Mail: Juergen.Schadt@dlh.de DbIT™ - Infos: www.database-integrity.com TGL - Infos: www.ecacnav.com ---> document library

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