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MIPS 2009 Debrief

MIPS 2009 Debrief. 23 February 2009. Agenda. Brief Summary of Speaker Presentations Co-opted version of TF 150 Maritime Security Operations Operational Update Q&A. Presentations. MIP ConOps Critical Infrastructure Protection Understanding the Threat US Global Infrastructure Strategy

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MIPS 2009 Debrief

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  1. MIPS 2009 Debrief 23 February 2009

  2. Agenda • Brief Summary of Speaker Presentations • Co-opted version of TF 150 Maritime Security Operations Operational Update • Q&A

  3. Presentations • MIP ConOps • Critical Infrastructure Protection • Understanding the Threat • US Global Infrastructure Strategy • Infrastructure Security Development • Creating a Common Operating Picture • The Danish Model: VTS and AIS • CTF 150 Operations • USCG Contributions • Identity Management Initiatives • MSSIS Update • Addressing WMD threats • Panels and Scenario

  4. Task Force 150 Maritime Security Operations Operational Update Commander Thomas Stig Rasmussen RDN Branch Chief Operations Danish Task Group 4 FEB 2009

  5. Aim of Brief Bridging the gap by explaining: • What we did • How we did it • Why we did it • Did it work?

  6. Geo Strategic Situation 1000 NM 1000 NM 14 regional coastal nations 3 chokepoints 16.8 million km2 23.000 ships passing the Gulf of Aden Fragile and failed states with porous coast lines 1000 NM

  7. CTF 150 is to counter or defeat acts of violent extremism, aggression and associated terrorist networks in littoral and maritime TF 150 AOR. Work with regional, joint and other partners to improve overall security, stability and regional nations maritime capabilities. Be ready to respond to full range of crises, including environmental and humanitarian events until further notice in order to achieve secure and stable maritime environment free from terroristactivity CTF 150 mission

  8. Actively prevent smuggling of narcotics Deter and disrupt piracy Safeguarding traffic and explore pattern of life Protect vulnerable shipping Theatre Security Cooperation Crisis Response DNK CTF 150 Campaign Effects Schematic

  9. Piracy • Key to long term solution is ashore in Somalia. Remove the motivation • Establish conditions that preclude criminal activity at sea and ashore • Stability, security, economic prosperity, governance, rule of law • Piracy is about money – no proven link to terrorism. But could inspire terrorists future actions • Impact of Al Shabaab? Stopping piracy or using piracy for funding? • No ransom no piracy • Pirates are not fanatic. They are not willing to die for the “case” • Definitions of piracy • Hijackings • Attacks • Attempts • Armed robbery

  10. Hijackings per Month What is the threat? Has the problem moved?

  11. A problem out of control? According to IMB: • Risk of being attacked: 1: 340 • Risk of being hijacked: 1: 907 Media hype?

  12. Acts of Piracy 2008 As of 31 DEC 08 GOA 112 TOTAL 130 HOA 18 Categorization

  13. Piracy Areas DAROD CLAN GROUP CALUULA • Darod Clan Group • AOO Sea: GOA • AOO Ashore:Bosasso  Eyl • Base: Eyl • FOB: Caluula and Bargaal • Hawiye Clan Group • AOO Sea:Somali East Coast • AOO Ashore:Hobyo Mogadishu • Base: Harardera & Hobyo BOSASSO BARGAAL EYL HARADHERE HOBYO HARARDERA MOGADISHU HAWIYE CLAN GROUP

  14. Typical Piracy Event (Darod) Attack Stopover areas CALUULA XABO BARGAAL BOSSASSO EYL Anchorage area GARACAD

  15. Traffic in GOA (MAR 08)

  16. Traffic in GOA (JAN 09)

  17. Piracy Activity 15 SEP 2008 – 12 JAN 2009 62 events of which 20 were successful

  18. New Transit Corridor The old corridor The new corridor

  19. Claim: A combination of international focus, naval forces passive deterrence, offensive disruption and improved self protections measures from ships is now to some degree keeping the piracy in Gulf of Aden at bay But an enduring solution must be linked to improved situation ashore in Somalia TF 150 Anti-piracy Ops

  20. Most targets are slow moving ships with low freeboard (tankers and bulk carriers) Few examples of attacks on containerships or cruise liners Almost all attacks in GOA in daylight Direct connection between sea state and piracy Piracy characteristics & tactics

  21. Pirates use different kinds of mother ships (skiffs, dhows, tugs etc.) to support operations One team consisting of one or two skiffs with 5 or 10 pirates Up to five teams observed operating simultaneously. Normally no more than two teams Piracy characteristics & tactics

  22. Pirates have become more determined, but not more violent When met with with overwhelming force pirates in small skiffs are willing to surrender. Only dhow mother ships have resisted apprehension Leaders know they are “safe” when onboard and in control of M/V Reappearance of pirates not observed Piracy characteristics & tactics

  23. Pirates may de-conflict actions Coordination rarely observed Pirates are using spoofing Piracy characteristics & tactics

  24. Operations – 23 SEP BADR IROQUOIS VIL. D. QUEBECK CHATHAM OAK HILL MALAYSIAN TG CDT BIROT COURBET ABSALON Port Visit ASSOCIATED SUPPORT TO CTF150 DIRECT SUPPORT TO CTF150 NATIONAL TASKING

  25. Operations – 18 DEC MVP KARLSRUHE TIPPU SULTAN MASON TOWADA ARIAKE NORTHUMBL. WAVE KN. DILIGENCE PORTLAND PSARA. YELNYA NEUSTRASHIMY SRI INDERA SAKTI MYSORE ABSALON PRE M LHER JEAN DE VIENNE NIVOSE ABHA GORKOVA GOKOVA Port Visit ASSOCIATED SUPPORT TO CTF 150 DIRECT SUPPORT TO CTF 150 NATIONAL TASKING EU

  26. Legal Framework • UNCLOS • UNSCR 1816 • UNSCR 1838 • UNSCR 1846 • UNSCR 1851 • But no legal frame-work to handle detaines

  27. Most effective efforts are provided by the M/V themselves After successful hijacking little we can do Find and board when tripwires met Measurement of success? Number of attacks versus number of successful hijackings? Counter Piracy

  28. The traffic corridor enables naval forces to concentrate resources, but pirates know where the targets are Naval forces are spread along the corridor, ready to react with Helo Quick reporting by M/V is essential. The golden 30 minutes Air surveillance is crucial to success Convoy/escort operations only part of solution Best solution is combined escort and disruption operations Counter Piracy

  29. 04 NOV: ABS disarms 10 pirates. 20 OCT: ABS helo and rhib fires warning shots. Pirates looses skiffs, ladder and RPG. 13 DEC: MYS detains 12 pirates. 17 DEC: ABS disarms 9 pirates. 07 NOV: CMB disarms 8 pirates. 19 DEC: JDV disarms 7 pirates. 20 SEP: ABS disarms 10 pirates. DEU CTF October November December January 25 DEC: KAR foils attack and disarms 4 pirates. 03 NOV: ABS disarms 10 pirates. 02 OCT: BRT disarms 12 pirates. 04 DEC: ABS disarms 7 pirates. 17 SEP: ABS detains 10 pirates. 18 NOV: TAB destroys Ekawatnava 5. 01 JAN: LHR detains 8 pirates Piracy activity 02 JAN: MYS disarms 7 pirates 1 – 4 JAN 48 pirates disarmed of which 32 were detained 11 NOV: CMB disarms a total of 31 pirates in 2 incidents. CAN CTF September 04 JAN: JDV detains 19 pirates 02 JAN: ABS detains 5 and disarms 19 pirates 30 NOV: JDV disarms 4 pirates. 16 NOV: Update to Commanders guidance and intent for MSPA operations. Kinetic encounter Hijacking Failed Attack

  30. Encountered pirates

  31. Encountered pirates Of the 177 pirates encountered: 063 were handed over to authorities 107 were released after disarming 002+ died 005 are still in custody No confirmed reappearance by any of the 177, but not all had their biometrics registered

  32. Co-ordination with Non coalition Forces • Malaysian units (1-2 units since SEP 2008) • Russian units (2-3 units since OCT 2008) • Indian units (1 unit since NOV 2008) • TF 169 (Chinese Force) (2-3 units since JAN 2009) • TF 432 (NATO Force) (4-6 units OCT – DEC 2008) • TF 465 (EU Force) (3-4 units since DEC 2008)

  33. Welcome paperwork Staff visit – explaining about pattern of life Exchange of SITREPs including area allocation for units, convoy schedules, and reports on any actual piracy activities Daily summery of activities, intelligence information and assessments (classified, but releasable to all military forces) De facto tactical coordination including tasking of units, aircraft and alert helicopters Communication crucial Co-ordination with Non coalition Forces • Each force provider will have a requirement to promote own presence, which must be accepted and respected

  34. Conclusion • Combined Maritime Forces / Navies and international organizations have taken actions: • Maritime Security Patrol Area and traffic corridor established • Vulnerable shipping provided escorts • Naval Forces assigned to deter, disrupt, capture, and destroy pirate equipment • Coordinate, de-conflict, share intelligence / information • UNSCRs passed, providing robust legal mandate for military actions • Most important factor is merchant ships self defense and information sharing • Need to focus on counter piracy alone. CTF 151 do just that • Legal framework to deal with apprehended pirates crucial. Significant movements observed • CTF 150 will revert to “old” mission • Operations are having effect. Problem contained but not eradicated. When is security good enough? Need to convince commercial shipping • Improvement of conditions ashore in Somalia is the long term solution

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