Levels of Analysis; or Where ’ s the Action?

Levels of Analysis;or Where’s the Action? Bruce Russet Kenneth Waltz J A Morrison Lecture 5 Tuesday, 22 February 2011

Admin • Plan for this Week • Today: Unit-level Analysis • Thursday: Constructivism • Discussion: Goldstein & Keohane • Constructivism is Tough • Take “layered” approach • Thursday lecture will help

Lec 5: Levels of Analysis • Grouping Theories of IP • Levels of Analysis • Deploying the Levels • Several Unit-Level Analyses

Remember that the traditional way to organize theories of IP is into the three major schools. This assumes that all the theories cluster around one another into three clear groups: Liberalism, Realism, and Constructivism.

But, as we saw in our discussion, there are any number of dimensions along which we can arrange these theories of IP.

Here are some of the ways you suggested...

Optimism/Pessimism Hobbes Athenians Keohane Axelrod Carr Mearsheimer ? Optimists Pessimists Waltz Jervis = It Depends

Absolute/Relative Gains Hobbes Keohane Axelrod Melians Mearsheimer Athenians ? Prefer Absolute Gains Prefer Relative Gains Waltz ? Carr

Discount Rate/Time Horizon Hobbes Keohane Axelrod Melians Mearsheimer Athenians ? Long Time Horizon Short Time Horizon Waltz ? Carr

Morality and Power Hobbes Athenians Carr Waltz Mearsheimer Melians (Grotius) Keohane Axelrod Jervis IR Can & Should be Moral Might Makes Right

So, here’s the moral of the story: The groupings you get depend on the issues you use to organize them. Our traditional schools might not be particularly useful!

There is, however, yet another way to slice and dice these theories of IP. We might also organize the theories based on the level of analysis.

In Man, the State, & War (1959), Ken Waltz described the three “images of international relations.” These were “defined according to where one locates the nexus of important causes.” Waltz, K. Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis. Columbia University Press, New York: 2001. See p 12.

Where is all of the action? The “level of analysis” question is really: At what level do we find the variables that have the greatest influence on outcomes in IP?

Ken Waltz’s 3 “Images” 1st Image: Individual-Level 2nd Image: State/Unit-Level 3rd Image: System/Structural-Level

Here’s an example: What was the primary cause of the Second World War?

The Individual Level… - Adolph Hitler was crazy - Winston Churchill hated Germans - Chamberlain had the wrong perceptions of Hitler’s intentions, and he miscalculated

The State/Unit Level… - Autocracies + Democracies = War - Hitler wanted economic stimulus - German pride was wounded  nationalism

The System Level… - Bad distribution of power - Offense dominance - Lack of rigorous international regimes - Economic (dis)integration

Where do we look to explain IP outcomes? • At the crucial statespersons and diplomats? • At the character and properties of the states themselves? • At the environment in which states operate?

Where did Waltz think we should look?

How would we arrange the analyses we’ve seen so far?

Levels of Analysis Individual Level ? Carr ? Athenians Melians Unit Level ? Waltz Mearsheimer Keohane Axelrod Jervis System Level

You’ll notice that all of the theories in the tradition of the Waltzian Paradigm emphasize systemic variables. (No, duh!) But we haven’t always thought about IP that way…

And an increasing number of scholars are looking within states—are “opening Waltz’s black boxes.”

Levels of Analysis Today, we’ll focus on this level: the unit level. Individual Level ? Carr ? Athenians Melians Unit Level ? Waltz Mearsheimer Keohane Axelrod Jervis System Level

(On Thursday, we’ll consider constructivism, which can examine all three levels.)

IV. Several Unit-Level Analyses Russett: Electoral Politics Rogowski: Special Interests BGW: Domestic Political Institutions

“The best single predictor of the governing party's electoral fortunes is the direction and rate of change in real (that is, inflation-adjusted) disposable income during the nine or twelve months preceding the election, perhaps mostly only the last three months.”(Russet, 27) It’s the Economy, Stupid

“Economic conditions, however, often cannot be controlled sufficiently to insure electoral success. Fine-tuning of a complex modern economy is less than an exact science…The business cycle thus is substantially less controllable than the policy cycle, and less predictable than the electoral cycle.”(Russet, 29-30) But Controlling the Economy is Hard

Political leaders, however, have much more control over the military. And they can use this authority to both influence the economy and distract attention from it.

“What is clear is that seeming tough rarely hurts much, at least in the short run. Given the benefit of the doubt often accorded to a president when acting in the arcane arena of foreign affairs, manipulation of foreign crises for domestic political purposes may be less visible than similar manipulation of macroeconomic policy.”(Russet, 37)

How do they do this? • Pursuit of national economic interests –capitalist imperialism • “Pump-priming” – stimulate economy through military expenditure • Distraction – Blame the foreigners; rally ‘round the flag

The Domestic Economy & War The economy matters… …but the economy can be hard to manage. But with military policy… …politicians enjoy greater control. Under electoral pressure… …politicians might use military policy toward economic ends.

“The timing of international disputes is related to domestic economic conditions, and to the election cycle.”(Russet, 49) The Implication  Is that a unit-level analysis, or what?

Foreign economic policy has significant implications for domestic interest groups. For instance… In the US, free trade tends to hurt low-skill workers and benefit capitalists.

As a result, political cleavages often develop along the lines of economic interests. (Republicans tend to support trade liberalization while Democrats are more suspicious.)

Political Cleavages & IPE • Foreign economic policies depend partly on rivalries between domestic groups (e.g. land, labor, capital) • Distribution of power between groups is shaped by: • changes in policy • exogenous changes in conditions

Exogenous Change in Conditions Foreign policy interacts with domestic political empowerment. The Implication

But Rogowski forgets about domestic institutions! After all, domestic political institutions shape which interests are represented in the policymaking process.

Bailey, Goldstein, & Weingast cite the 1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act (RTAA) as an important example…

Who Sets Trade Policy Matters • US Constitution delegates tariff-setting authority to Congress • Congress traditionally prefers high tariffs • Party: Protectionist Republicans dominate after Civil War • Structure: Smaller districts  parochial interests  logrolling • President prefers low tariffs • Party: FDR is a Democrat! • Structure: Larger district  broader interests  broad-based policy

What did the 1934 RTAA do?

BGW: Key Institutional Shift • President given power to negotiate trade agreements • Satisfying Congress with Reciprocity • Reciprocity created export opportunities • Now: Broadened Range of Acceptable Tariff Cuts • Later: Exporters become entrenched advocates of liberalization • Conclusion: RTAA jumpstarted export industry which never looked back

Levels of Analysis; or Where ’ s the Action?