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Realism II: Modern Approaches. Lecture 3 – Tuesday, 21 February 2012 J A Morrison. John Mearsheimer. Kenneth Waltz. John Mearsheimer. Admin. Attendance Sheet IP Facebook Group Reading Packet: Download Version 2. Lec 3: Modern Realism. Realism Old & New The Waltzian Paradigm
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Realism II: Modern Approaches Lecture 3 – Tuesday, 21 February 2012J A Morrison John Mearsheimer Kenneth Waltz John Mearsheimer
Admin • Attendance Sheet • IP Facebook Group • Reading Packet: Download Version 2.
Lec 3: Modern Realism • Realism Old & New • The Waltzian Paradigm • The Distribution of Power • Do States Play Offense or Defense? • Hegemonic Stability Theory
Lec 3: Modern Realism • Realism Old & New • The Waltzian Paradigm • The Distribution of Power • Do States Play Offense or Defense? • Hegemonic Stability Theory
Last Thursday, we found that classical realism hit upon three major themes…
Major Themes of Realism • Relationship between Power & Morality • Role of Anarchy in Shaping IP • Mutual Exclusivity of States' Interests
You'll see that many of these issues persist in our discussions of international politics today.
So, as we work through these "modern" approaches, ask yourselves:Do we ask different questions today? Or do we consider the same issues but merely offer different answers?
What, if anything, serves to distinguish our "classic" approaches from the "modern" approaches we take today?
Lec 3: Modern Realism • Realism Old & New • The Waltzian Paradigm • The Distribution of Power • Do States Play Offense or Defense? • Hegemonic Stability Theory
Much of the study of IP in the last 30 years has pivoted around Kenneth Waltz.Most studies have either been written in the Waltzian paradigmor self-consciously in response to that paradigm.
II. The Waltzian Paradigm Domestic Versus International Politics Hallmarks of the Waltzian Paradigm
In 1979, Kenneth Waltz argued that international politics (IP) was qualitatively different from domestic politics (DP)...
"The difference between national and international politics lies not in the use of force but in the different modes of organization for doing something about it…A national system is not one of self-help. The international system is." -- Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (1979), pp 103-104.
Waltz's Logics of Order • Hierarchy: logic of order in domestic politics • Sovereign monopolizes use of violence • Stability and cooperation follow • Anarchy: logic of order in international politics • There is no sovereign to protect weak states, enforce agreements, ensure stability • Self-help: states must help themselves • Results: predation, violent dispute resolution, instability
You should recognize these conclusions from Hobbes & Bull…Politics works very differently in domestic politics (under a sovereign) than in international politics (in anarchy).
Waltz argued that these differences between domestic and international politics require us to think about each realm of politics on their own distinct terms.
The Waltzian paradigm specifies howwe should theorize about international politics.It assumes that theories of DP aren't useful for understanding IP.Instead, we need to develop entirely new theories of IP appropriate to this distinct realm of politics.
Waltz developed his own specific theory of international politics; and we'll consider those specifics shortly.But Waltz's manner of theorizing gave rise to a paradigm in which many other theories were formed.
III. The Waltzian Paradigm Domestic Versus International Politics Hallmarks of the Waltzian Paradigm
Theories of IP in the Waltzian Paradigm generally share several traits…
First, they incorporate anarchy as a key starting point. In these theories, states' capacities to maximize their interests depends on their ability to help themselves.With no superintending sovereign, states can do what they will.
Second, they focus on systemic-level influences on state-behavior. Here, the characteristics of individual units (regime type, ideological orientation, &c.) matter less than the pressures exerted by the system.
Third, they assume convergent evolution follows. In biology, isomorphismis the tendency of organisms with different ancestries to evolve similar responses to similar environmental pressures.For instance, both bats and insects evolved wings for similar reasons.
"The close juxtaposition of states promotes their sameness through the disadvantages that arise from a failure to conform to successful practices. It is this 'sameness,' an effect of the system, that is so often attributed to the acceptance of so-called rules of state behavior. Chiliastic rulers occasionally come to power. In power, most of them quickly change their ways." -- Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (1979), pp 128.
Hallmarks of Theories in Waltzian Paradigm • Incorporate anarchy as key starting point • System-level variables are most significant determinants of state behavior • Systemic pressures convergent evolution & isomorphism
OK. So, system-level variables are supposed to matter a lot.What are these all-important system level variables?…
"If there is any distinctivelypolitical theory of international politics, balance-of-power theory is it." -- Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (1979), pp 117.
Waltz insists that the “balance of power” is the key system-level variable that determines the bulk of international politics.To avoid confusion, we’ll talk in terms of the distribution of power.(Which might be balanced or imbalanced!)
Lec 3: Modern Realism • Realism Old & New • The Waltzian Paradigm • The Distribution of Power • Do States Play Offense or Defense? • Hegemonic Stability Theory
We usually consider both military and economic power.Obviously, the two can be related, but they don't need to be. (Consider Japan today or China in 1990.)
Distributions of Power • Unipolar/Hegemonic: single state controls disproportionate amount of power • E.g. Britain was political (military) hegemon in 1815 • E.g. Postwar US was economic hegemon • Bipolar: two largest states share roughly equal amounts of power • E.g. US & USSR in Cold War • Multipolar: several large states share roughly equal amounts of power • E.g. Britain, Germany, France, Austro-Hungarian Empire, Ottoman Empire, & Russia in 1914
The distribution of power is frequently suggested to be the most important systemic cause.Why? How would this matter?
The distribution of power shapes the incentives states face in ordering their foreign policies!
For instance, having a hegemon—a single, dominant power—might make international politics work more like domestic politics.After all, the hegemon might operate like Hobbes’s leviathan—securing cooperation by ensuring that all resistance is futile.
Or perhaps a balanced order is better.In this case, the smaller powers can play the major powers off of one another—thus “keeping them honest.”
Lec 3: Modern Realism • Realism Old & New • The Waltzian Paradigm • The Distribution of Power • Do States Play Offense or Defense? • Hegemonic Stability Theory
IV. Do States Play Offense or Defense? Waltz's Defensive Realism Mearsheimer's Offensive Realism
According to Waltz, how do states pursue survival in conditions of anarchy?
By pursuing a balance of power!"Balance-of-power politics prevail wherever two, and only two, requirements are met: that the order be anarchic and that it be populated by units wishing to survive." -- Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (1979), pp 121.
"Because power is a means and not an end, states prefer to join the weaker of two coalitions. They cannot let power, a possibly useful means, become the end they pursue. The goal the system encourages them to seek is security…If states wished to maximize power, they would join the stronger side, and we would see not balances forming but a world hegemony forged. This does not happen because balancing, not bandwagoning, is the behavior induced by the system. The first concern of states is not to maximize power but to maintain their positions in the system." -- Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (1979), pp 126.
Waltz, of course, suggests that the international system has caused states to develop this response.In order to survive, states become risk-aversesecurity-maximizers.
IV. Do States Play Offense or Defense? Waltz's Defensive Realism Mearsheimer's Offensive Realism
Mearsheimer challenges Waltz's characterizations about states' levels of risk aversion and their goals…
"The sad fact is that international politics has always been a ruthless and dangerous business, and it is likely to remain that way. Although the intensity of their competition waxes and wanes, great powers fear each other and always compete with each other for power. The overriding goal of each state is to maximize its share of world power, which means gaining power at the expense of other states. But great powers do not merely strive to be the strongest of all the great powers, although that is a welcome outcome. Their ultimate aim is to be the hegemon—that is, the only great power in the system." -- John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (2001), p 2.
Mearsheimer agrees with Waltz that the international system pressures states to adopt a standard response to their environment. But he thinks that states' preferences are such that that response is the very opposite of the response Waltz described…
"Offensive realism parts company with defensive realism over the question of how much power states want. For defensive realists, the international structure provides states with little incentive to seek additional increments of power; instead it pushes them to maintain the existing balance of power. Preserving power, rather than increasing it, is the main goal of states. Offensive realists, on the other hand, believe that status quo powers are rarely found in world politics, because the international system creates powerful incentives for states to look for opportunities to gain power at the expense of rivals, and to take advantage of those situations when the benefits outweigh the costs. A state's ultimate goal is to be the hegemon in the system." -- John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (2001), p 21.