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Foucault's Will to Non-knowledge. INTRODUCTION : SUB-ISSUES. Identity, also that part that is personal-subjective, is socially constructed.Power. I contend that it is more useful and not inconsistent with Foucault to see his power conception (which I call power-2) as a critique of the more conve
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1. Foucault’s Will to Non-knowledge INTRODUCTION Non-knowledge is a metaphor for the attempt of reaching beyond the limits of so-called ’received’ or ’accepted’ knowledge, a knowledge that has its measure a pristine and imitable universal rationality.
Foucault uses and objectifies (historically) his own manner of analysis.
It is my claim that Foucault’s objectification of the level that makes knowledge possible is inherently self-referential, and that the purpose (if not central purpose) of Foucault’s work is a suspension in self-reference while objectifying social knowledge.
Non-knowledge is a metaphor for the attempt of reaching beyond the limits of so-called ’received’ or ’accepted’ knowledge, a knowledge that has its measure a pristine and imitable universal rationality.
Foucault uses and objectifies (historically) his own manner of analysis.
It is my claim that Foucault’s objectification of the level that makes knowledge possible is inherently self-referential, and that the purpose (if not central purpose) of Foucault’s work is a suspension in self-reference while objectifying social knowledge.
2. Foucault’s Will to Non-knowledge INTRODUCTION : SUB-ISSUES The social context to which Power-2 refers is like the context of “wetness” for a fish underwater.
Can the concept “wet” (vĺdt) be explained to a fish underwater?
Power-2 refers directly to the social construction of identity through internalized knowledge that is exercised (like through the confession) on the subjects possessing it without these subjects recognizing that they are both objects and subjects of their own knowledge practices.
An example of the social construction of identity is given by Foucault in his genealogy of sexuality. The manifestation of modern sexuality (1950’s-1960’s) can be understood through the ’unintended’ proliferation of the discourse on sexuality. I latter take up the nuance between ego and non-ego oriented psychoanalysis, in this regard.
The social context to which Power-2 refers is like the context of “wetness” for a fish underwater.
Can the concept “wet” (vĺdt) be explained to a fish underwater?
Power-2 refers directly to the social construction of identity through internalized knowledge that is exercised (like through the confession) on the subjects possessing it without these subjects recognizing that they are both objects and subjects of their own knowledge practices.
An example of the social construction of identity is given by Foucault in his genealogy of sexuality. The manifestation of modern sexuality (1950’s-1960’s) can be understood through the ’unintended’ proliferation of the discourse on sexuality. I latter take up the nuance between ego and non-ego oriented psychoanalysis, in this regard.
3. Foucault’s Will to Non-knowledge INTRODUCTION : SUB-ISSUES
4. Foucault’s Will to Non-knowledge STRUCTURALISM & ARCHAEOLOGY (Chap II + III) episteme = linguistic value or Levi-Strauss’s set of mythemes that make up second order conceptual field.
But the episteme is more of a third order epistemological level identifying the playing ground for second order conceptualizations, like Levi-Strauss’s mythemes.
In this way Foucault is inspired by structuralism, but also attempts to reach beyond it, and as such does so.
In this chapter I tried to make plausible that knowledge and ‘non knowledge’ belong to separate but reciprocal ‘processes’.
(a) Human discontent with current knowledge shapes the unfolding of new knowledge.
(b) The character of our discontent, which can be a description of the disposition of ‘non knowledge’, that is the constructor of the actual expression of our lack
But what shapes what we know of our discontent?
Our current state of knowledge.
This argument is an attempt to show how a notion of non knowledge or ’unthought’ can be thought to be reciprocal to knowledge.
This argument is influenced by a psychoanalytic explanation of the unconscious.
episteme = linguistic value or Levi-Strauss’s set of mythemes that make up second order conceptual field.
But the episteme is more of a third order epistemological level identifying the playing ground for second order conceptualizations, like Levi-Strauss’s mythemes.
In this way Foucault is inspired by structuralism, but also attempts to reach beyond it, and as such does so.
In this chapter I tried to make plausible that knowledge and ‘non knowledge’ belong to separate but reciprocal ‘processes’.
(a) Human discontent with current knowledge shapes the unfolding of new knowledge.
(b) The character of our discontent, which can be a description of the disposition of ‘non knowledge’, that is the constructor of the actual expression of our lack
But what shapes what we know of our discontent?
Our current state of knowledge.
This argument is an attempt to show how a notion of non knowledge or ’unthought’ can be thought to be reciprocal to knowledge.
This argument is influenced by a psychoanalytic explanation of the unconscious.
5. Foucault’s Will to Non-knowledge Phenomenology & the AF (chap IV)
6. Foucault’s Will to Non-knowledge Nietzsche & Genealogy (chap V) Foucault’s predilections (given by his a priori viewpoints) function as preconceived pseudo-transcendental understandings.
Again Foucault, in genealogy, is self justifying, and as such his perspectivism is either ad hoc or self-referential.
Foucault’s predilections (given by his a priori viewpoints) function as preconceived pseudo-transcendental understandings.
Again Foucault, in genealogy, is self justifying, and as such his perspectivism is either ad hoc or self-referential.
7. Foucault’s Will to Non-knowledge The épistémč (chap VI) In the modern episteme the ordered representation of knowledge (and the role of objectified representation itself) is by-passed by the AF.
In the modern episteme the ordered representation of knowledge (and the role of objectified representation itself) is by-passed by the AF.
8. Foucault’s Will to Non-knowledge On wealth and signification (chap VI) Objectivism contends an absolute objective knowledge, the existence of an absolute truth.
For the relativist this point of objective true knowledge is either unknown or is deemphasized, but implicit for relativism is the existence of some objective reference point of truth. The question is always, “relative to what?” An end point is implicit in the change of “x is relative to y that is relative to z that is relative to….”
If there is no endpoint or fixed point of truth in knowledge, we have a case of perspectivism.
Perspectivism does not work with the notion of objective truth. Hence in Foucault's genealogies other values & horizons need to be mustered (than the progress of the “Same” of objectified truth of rationality).
For Nietzsche it was a biologically inspired “Will to Power”. But it is unclear to me what value & horizon – the “then what?” -- question which remains after genealogy.
My thesis argues that Foucault’s purpose with both archaeology and genealogy is the suspension in in varying degrees and levels of self-reflexivity.
Objectivism contends an absolute objective knowledge, the existence of an absolute truth.
For the relativist this point of objective true knowledge is either unknown or is deemphasized, but implicit for relativism is the existence of some objective reference point of truth. The question is always, “relative to what?” An end point is implicit in the change of “x is relative to y that is relative to z that is relative to….”
If there is no endpoint or fixed point of truth in knowledge, we have a case of perspectivism.
Perspectivism does not work with the notion of objective truth. Hence in Foucault's genealogies other values & horizons need to be mustered (than the progress of the “Same” of objectified truth of rationality).
For Nietzsche it was a biologically inspired “Will to Power”. But it is unclear to me what value & horizon – the “then what?” -- question which remains after genealogy.
My thesis argues that Foucault’s purpose with both archaeology and genealogy is the suspension in in varying degrees and levels of self-reflexivity.
9. Foucault’s Will to Non-knowledge Truth (chap VII) More examples:
Democracy isn’t brought to Irak as some objective, measurable, quality. What is it then?
The social truth is the belief of some Americans of the objective quality of their democracy & history.
What is the truth of human rights? Have hangings in China stopped? Why isn’t it pushed upon China any longer? Or is the mass-media that simply ‘forgot’ it? How genuine is our pursuit of human rights that we forget it so fast?
Incongruities arise when it’s used as a justification (e.g. human-rights, democracy) to increase super-national control on the globe, but these incongruities put into relief the character of their social construction.
More examples:
Democracy isn’t brought to Irak as some objective, measurable, quality. What is it then?
The social truth is the belief of some Americans of the objective quality of their democracy & history.
What is the truth of human rights? Have hangings in China stopped? Why isn’t it pushed upon China any longer? Or is the mass-media that simply ‘forgot’ it? How genuine is our pursuit of human rights that we forget it so fast?
Incongruities arise when it’s used as a justification (e.g. human-rights, democracy) to increase super-national control on the globe, but these incongruities put into relief the character of their social construction.
10. Foucault’s Will to Non-knowledge Power (chap VII) If we participate unknowingly (unconsciously) in power-2 relations how do we/Foucault get access to it?
Possible answers:
Because it is unconscious, even though we nominally know it’s existence, we are at an existential distance as to its effect on us and our participation in it. We cannot objectify the power relations since our own identities are at stake.
Some of us are in the process of objectifying power-2 but not all of us. E.g. maybe Foucault’s variant of Nietzsche’s superman?
We can’t be conscious of power-2 relations, maybe we don’t need to. Power-2 relations will exist in every culture, but in our Western culture it has become a prime avenue of social control.If we participate unknowingly (unconsciously) in power-2 relations how do we/Foucault get access to it?
Possible answers:
Because it is unconscious, even though we nominally know it’s existence, we are at an existential distance as to its effect on us and our participation in it. We cannot objectify the power relations since our own identities are at stake.
Some of us are in the process of objectifying power-2 but not all of us. E.g. maybe Foucault’s variant of Nietzsche’s superman?
We can’t be conscious of power-2 relations, maybe we don’t need to. Power-2 relations will exist in every culture, but in our Western culture it has become a prime avenue of social control.
11. Foucault’s Will to Non-knowledge Sexuality & psychoanalysis (chap VIII)
12. Foucault’s Will to Non-knowledge Sexuality & psychoanalysis (chap VIII) I am not aware whether it is Lacanian.
Sometimes academics form academic alliances based on friendship rather than similarities or merits of their work.
There is a much warmer relation Foucault & Deleuze, rather than Foucault & Derrida. This might be due to Derrida’s criticism of Foucault.
But in the academic world a good critic is a good friend. Maybe a relation of competition had arisen between the two.
Concerning Foucault & Lacan there is a silence that pervades over the land.
There is a lot of oblique writing that pervades HS1, it seems structuralist psychoanalytic.
If it is originally Foucault, I don’t know.
I am not aware whether it is Lacanian.
Sometimes academics form academic alliances based on friendship rather than similarities or merits of their work.
There is a much warmer relation Foucault & Deleuze, rather than Foucault & Derrida. This might be due to Derrida’s criticism of Foucault.
But in the academic world a good critic is a good friend. Maybe a relation of competition had arisen between the two.
Concerning Foucault & Lacan there is a silence that pervades over the land.
There is a lot of oblique writing that pervades HS1, it seems structuralist psychoanalytic.
If it is originally Foucault, I don’t know.
13. Foucault’s Will to Non-knowledge Reflexivity (chap IX)
14. Foucault’s Will to Non-knowledge Levels (Milgram & Foucault) (chap IX)
15. Foucault’s Will to Non-knowledge Levels (Kuhn & Foucault) (chap IX) …can involve understandings that are (almost) untranslatable.
I write “(almost)”, because if they indeed were not translatable, I wouldn’t be able to write a thesis about it.…can involve understandings that are (almost) untranslatable.
I write “(almost)”, because if they indeed were not translatable, I wouldn’t be able to write a thesis about it.
16. Foucault’s Will to Non-knowledge Conclusion (chap X ) Foucault’s archaeology of knowledge objectifies the self-reference between man and the knowledge that identifies him, in both (two) levels of reflexivity involved between knowledge and man (and vice-versa), but also the incongruities arising in the oscillation of this reflexivity.
Recall Power-2 is a (detached) extension of Power-1.
Foucault’s archaeology of knowledge objectifies the self-reference between man and the knowledge that identifies him, in both (two) levels of reflexivity involved between knowledge and man (and vice-versa), but also the incongruities arising in the oscillation of this reflexivity.
Recall Power-2 is a (detached) extension of Power-1.
17. 17 END
18. Foucault’s Will to Non-knowledge THE ANALYTIC OF FINITUDE
19. 19 Foucault’s Will to Non-knowledge THE ANALYTIC OF FINITUDE
20. 20 Foucault’s Will to Non-knowledge THE ANALYTIC OF FINITUDE
21. 21 Foucault’s Will to Non-knowledge THE ANALYTIC OF FINITUDE
22. 22 Foucault’s Will to Non-knowledge THE ANALYTIC OF FINITUDE I tried to show in the thesis how this ambiguity leads to self-reference, or as Foucault says that ”thought …(is) both knowledge and a modification of what it knows.” (OT, 327)
I tried to show in the thesis how this ambiguity leads to self-reference, or as Foucault says that ”thought …(is) both knowledge and a modification of what it knows.” (OT, 327)
23. Foucault’s Will to Non-knowledge THE ANALYTIC OF FINITUDE
24. Foucault’s Will to Non-knowledge THE ANALYTIC OF FINITUDE
25. Foucault’s Will to Non-knowledge THE ANALYTIC OF FINITUDE
26. Foucault’s Will to Non-knowledge THE ANALYTIC OF FINITUDE
